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11. Introduction
In this thesis, a novel approach is developed to measure the cognitive task performance of
human operators interacting with complex dynamic systems. To measure performance
of human operators normally the results of interaction sequences are evaluated. Not
considered are possible outcomes of the interaction which would have been reached if the
human operator had acted differently. This is a serious drawback of existing performance
measures.
The approach to measure human operator performance developed in this thesis con-
siders explicitly the alternative actions human operators could have selected. Therefore,
a cognitive planning model is implemented, which analyzes available actions and their
consequences represented in a discrete state space. The plans generated by this model
are used as criteria for the evaluation of actions of human operators. As the devel-
oped method measures performance during the interaction, it is called process-oriented.
To identify the impact of mental prediction uncertainty on human operators’ cognitive
task performance, a concept to represent uncertainty in state spaces is developed. Sub-
sequently, the developed model-based process-oriented human operator cognitive task
performance measurement is demonstrated and validated.
The developed performance measure makes a more detailed assessment of the human
operators possible and thereby facilitates the improvement of Human-Machine Sys-
tems (HMSs). The motivation for the development of this performance measure is
given below. Afterward, the remaining chapters of this thesis are briefly outlined.
1.1. Motivation
Human operators controlling complex dynamic technical systems play a central role in
many domains. Examples are manufacturing plants, refineries, power plants, flight decks,
and air traffic control. In these domains, automation increased during the last decades.
On the one hand, automation led to relieving the work burden of human operators. On
the other hand, new tasks were assigned to human operators and automation caused the
work of human operators to become more complex. However, human operators continue
to be a key component of automation concepts if their task cannot be automated or in
order to incorporate their creativity, flexibility, and knowledge into the combined HMS.
Especially in safety critical domains like industrial process control, power plant control,
or air traffic control, the consequences and implications of newly developed computer-
based assistance or procedures have to be evaluated before the innovations are transferred
into the field. New computer-based assistance or procedures for HMSs are validated
in human-in-the-loop simulators [MS05]. The measurement of human operators’ task
performance is an important aspect of these validations.
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For this reason, it is important to examine both how human errors arise, and how they
can be prevented. It is important to know not only when erroneous actions occur but
especially why the operator selected an action. Of particular importance is the identifi-
cation of the difference between the real system and the human operators’ mental models
of the system and why the wrong action made sense for the operator as a consequence
of this difference [Dek06].
The identification of actions, which lead often to high task performance, and actions,
which often cause a negative task performance and a high risk for erroneous actions,
allows for the provision of tailored assistance and for the improvement of the working
conditions of human operators. The more precise the human task performance can
be measured and the more specific need for assistance can be identified during the
evaluation, the more the further improvement of the system is facilitated.
The measurement of performance and the detecting of erroneous actions when dealing
with extreme situations is essential also in human-in-the-loop simulations conducted for
the purpose of human operator training.
Performance measurement is also important in so-called adaptive automation [KR99,
PCV09], or in the supervision of human operators [GOS07]. In adaptive automation,
an implemented allocation authority changes the Level of Automation (LoA) dy-
namically according the current needs of the operator [PBD+92]. Amongst others,
the human performance can be used as indicator for the need of additional assis-
tance [KR99, PCV09]. A similar application is the supervision of human operators
by technical systems. Such systems detect human erroneous actions, issue warnings, or
correct the consequences of erroneous actions if necessary. To realize this concept, hu-
man operators’ actions are evaluated continuously according to their goal-directedness
to intervene or takeover in the negative case [GOS07].
Measures of human performance can be distinguished between process measures and
product measures [HS09,CPS97,HR84]. Product measures look at the result of a task
and assess the outcome in relation to the goals (e.g. time and cost). Process measures
look at the activities and individual steps executed during a task and assess how the
result was reached (e.g. deviations from the optimal trajectory).
In complex dynamic environment, often several different options exist to reach similar
results. Hence, the steps executed during a task cannot be inferred from the reached
result. In contrast, the result can be inferred if the steps are known. Consequently,
product measures disregard some information and a process measure is necessary to
indicate steps causing deviations from the optimal solution. Thus situations in which
assistance could help are identified.
Therefore, an objective process measure of human task performance which is applica-
ble for the evaluation of HMSs but also for adaptive automation and human supervision
would allow a more detailed analysis of the system respectively a more specific support
of the human operator. If an objective process measure is available for the evaluation
of HMSs, additionally the detection of inefficient behavior and human erroneous actions
as well as identification of the exact situation in which they occurred becomes possible.
This information can afterward be used to improve the evaluated HMS.
Measured values cannot be interpreted if no criteria exist which define what should
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or what could be reached [YLVC02]. Consequently, criteria are necessary or otherwise
measured values are useless. The necessity of a situational criterion becomes evident if
it is considers that leading a dynamic system into a critical situation can only be blamed
to a human operator if there was actually a choice to avoid it. It should be asked, up
to what point options were available to prevent a critical situations. In this context it
is important that human operators are often able to recognize their errors and correct
them, if sufficient time is available and opportunities exists.
Besides avoiding critical situations, a common objective is to perform a process as
efficiently as possible. Consequently, a reduction of efficiency can be considered as a
reduction of performance and as an erroneous action. Also in this case, it is important
to know which options existed and if the operator had the choice to avoid a loss of
efficiency.
The performance measure developed in this thesis adopts the general idea of [OHS11].
In [OHS11] the available options were calculated and compared to the options judged as
feasible by the human operators. The available options denote the set of all actions an
operator can perform in a specific situation. In [OHS11], single actions are considered as
options. In this thesis, the term options is slightly modified and denotes all interaction
sequences an operator can perform following to a specific situation. In other words, the
term is extended from single actions to multiple actions.
The performance measure developed in this thesis applies the consequences of the
available options as criteria to measure the human operators’ performance. The con-
sequences are compared to the options finally selected by the human operators. In
order to assess not only the direct consequences of decisions but also the long-term
consequences, available interaction sequences are considered as options. To make an
objective performance measure possible, the goal-directed interaction sequences indicat-
ing the best existing option in each situation are used as criteria. By comparing the
consequences of decisions to the consequences of the goal-directed interaction sequences,
each decision can be evaluated. Thus, not only the result of an interaction but also the
process—considered as a sequence of decisions—can be evaluated.
A cognitive model of planning is developed in this thesis to generate goal-directed
interaction sequences which represent the best available option. This model analyzes a
state spaces representing the available actions and their consequences. The developed
performance measure should not be limited to discrete applications as former approaches
of state spaces analyzes for the evaluation of HMSs. Consequently, existing approaches
are extended in this thesis to be able to scope with time-depended dynamics.
According to [End95a], “situation awareness, as such, incorporates an operator’s un-
derstanding of the situation as whole, forming a basis for decision making”. Further-
more, situation awareness, as defined in [End95a], consists of the three levels “Percep-
tion”, “Comprehension”, and “Projection”. Consequently, situation awareness can be
incomplete if the situation is not completely perceived, not correctly understood, or
its future development not correctly predicted. In particular, the prediction of future
states poses a challenge [Dör80]. Thus, actions of human operators can be based on
uncertain knowledge about future states of the system. If human operators are uncer-
tain about the consequences of possible actions, they might tend to choose a solution
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which has a low probability of severe consequences but a high probability of a deviation
from the optimum. This uncertainty is an inevitable aspect of HMSs. It can be the
crucial difference between a human operator’s mental model of the system and the real
system. The impact of uncertainty can be quantified if it is possible to use interaction
sequences a human operator affected by uncertainty would select as criteria to measure
the performance.
1.2. Aims and Strategy of This Work
The overall aim of this thesis is the development and validation of a process-oriented mea-
sure of human operators’ cognitive task performance. The measure should be applicable
to complex dynamic task environments that can be formalized and in which rational
decisions are possible. Furthermore, the developed performance measure should also be
applicable if the decisions are effected by uncertainty.
To achieve the main aim, the following associated aims are must be reached. As rea-
soned above, goal-directed interaction sequences are used as criteria, which are regarded
as a plan which could be implemented by human operators. To generate such interaction
sequences, a cognitive model of planning is realized in this thesis. The model takes up
the idea to formally describe the action spaces as a discrete state space but extends
existing approaches by considering time-depended dynamics.
To make the identification of the impact of uncertainty on decision making possi-
ble, uncertainty in assisted HMSs is analyzed and an appropriate modeling approach is
chosen, implemented, and integrated into the cognitive planning model.
Finally, the applicability of the developed method is demonstrated in a microworld
simulating a simplified Air Traffic Control (ATC) task.
To summarize shortly, the aims of the work described in this thesis are
• to develop a process-oriented measure of human operators’ cognitive task perfor-
mance,
• to use goal-directed interaction sequences as criteria for the measurement,
• to develop a cognitive model of planning used to identify goal-directed interaction
sequences,
• to extend state-space based methods by time depending dynamics,
• to identify and to model human operators’ uncertainty in assisted HMSs,
• to integrate a representation of uncertainty into state spaces,
• to validate the developed measure of human operators’ cognitive task performance
in a study, and
• to demonstrate the benefits of this measure for the improvement of HMSs.
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1.3. Organization of This Work
This thesis is structured as follows and depicted in Fig. 1.1. At first, the background
of this thesis is presented in chapter 2. In this chapter, the role of human operators in
assisted HMSs is described, the ATC domain is introduced, and existing approaches for
the measurement of human cognitive task performance are analyzed.
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Chapter 2: Human-
Machine Interaction
Chapter 3: Petri-Net-
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Chapter 6: Validation
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
and future work
Chapter Main result
Figure 1.1.: Organization of work
In chapter 3 the applied modeling techniques are introduced first. After that, the
example application Micro Air Ground Integration Environment (MAGIE) is
presented. Finally, the cognitive planning model for the application example is realized.
Based on an analysis and classification of uncertainty in assisted HMSs, the planning
model is extended by uncertainty connected with prediction of future system states in
chapter 4. The procedure for the evaluation of human operators’ decisions is developed
in chapter 5. Additionally, the functions to evaluate the consequences of actions in
the example application are introduced in this chapter. Moreover, the application of
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the developed procedure is demonstrated as an example. Subsequently, the developed
measurement of human operators’ cognitive task performance is validated in chapter 6.
Finally, conclusions are drawn and future research directions are indicated in chapter 7.
72. Human-Machine Interaction with Complex
Dynamic Systems
This chapter explains models, theories, terms, concepts, and task environments which
are referred to later in this thesis. The chapter starts with an introduction of models and
theories describing the role and tasks of human operators in assisted Human-Machine
Interaction (HMI) in section 2.1. As the performance measure developed in this
thesis is demonstrated with a simplified ATC approach task, this domain is presented
in section 2.2. Section 2.3 is dedicated to the measurement of human (cognitive) task
performance and gives an overview of measurement methods and constructs used in
HMI in general, in the ATC domain, and in microworlds. Finally, in section 2.4, the
method developed in this thesis is compared to existing measurements of human task
performance and the advantages and disadvantages are discussed.
2.1. The Human Role in Automated Systems
This section is intended to give a short overview of the role and tasks of human oper-
ators. As the distribution of tasks and responsibilities between human, machine, and
an additional technical assistance is of fundamental importance, it is discussed first
(see section 2.1.1). Then models of human information processing are presented (see
section 2.1.2) and selected information processing steps are detailed.
Some descriptive models of planning are presented in section 2.1.4 as planning of hu-
man operators is of particular importance for the developed cognitive model. Different
theories of decision making are briefly presents in section 2.1.5 to analyze possible ex-
planations for deviations of human operator’s decision from the best available solution.
As the field of human error research provides another point of view for explaining these
deviations, a short introduction is given in 2.1.6.
2.1.1. Computer-based Assisted Human-Machine Interaction
The interaction between human operators and machines is a characteristic element of
many working domains. In the last decades, automation increased and interaction
changed from mainly direct control to knowledge-based supervisory control. In other
words, human operators do not influence an output by appropriate manual control ac-
tions anymore [Söf03] [Cac98]. Instead, the task of human operators is to monitor
the relevant information sources, to interpret this information, to make decisions by
connecting knowledge with the interpreted information, and finally to implement these
decisions.
Human operators can be assisted in performing these cognitive tasks. Due to the tasks’
complexity, this assistance is commonly based on computers. Technical progress allows
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developing computer-based assistance even for very complex systems in which human
operators formerly were unsupported. Computer-based assistance is often regarded as
automation in the literature. For example Parasuraman et al. define automation as “a
device or system that accomplishes (partially or fully) a function that was previously,
or conceivable could be, carried out (partially or fully) by a human operator” [PSW00].
Following this definition, devices taking over only small functions from human operator,
for example alarm systems, are called automation, even though they do not act on the
machine/controlled systems. To avoid misunderstandings, the term “computer-based
assistance” will be used in this thesis to describe such devices. Nevertheless, if such
a device replaces the human completely, the task is fully automated as the process of
automation is completed. A task cannot only be fully automated (the control loop is
closed by an implemented controller) or fully manual (the control loop is closed by a
human operator); it also can be partially automated, for example, if a technical assistance
senses and interprets the system state and suggests actions. In this case, human operator
and technical assistance jointly control the task.
A lot of models and concepts - also this thesis itself - focus on human operators of
HMSs but are not limited to the interaction between humans and machines. Models
and concepts can often be extended to interactions of human operators with complex
environments, for example medical application (interactions with biological system) and
emergency management. Indeed, the example application of this thesis - the air traffic
control task - is not a solely technical system. In this context, system refers to the
air traffic including aircraft and pilots. Therefore, the more general term “controlled
system” is used instead of the term “machine” in the following.
Systems controlled by human operators are often attributed complex and dynamic.
These attributes are valid not only for machines but for all types of systems with which
human operators interact. For this extended view, a dynamic systems was defined by
Brehmer as a system whose states change in real time autonomously and as a conse-
quence of the operators’ actions [Bre92]. Furthermore, the complexity of a system was
defined as a result from its structure and the relation between the input and outputs
which may be nonlinear or noisy [Osm10].
When designing new concepts for HMSs, the crucial question is, weather tasks are
handed over to the computer-based assistance or remain under the control of the human
operator. If a task is carried out by the human operator, the actions are flexible and
limited only by operator’s cognitive capabilities. If the task is transferred to the assis-
tance, the actions are limited to the functions implemented by the designer but they are
carried out with high precision and constant quality.
An early definition of rules which helped in deciding what tasks to hand over from the
human operator to technical assistance was Fitts’ list [Fit51]. On the list, the capabilities
of humans and technical assistance are compared in different task abilities. Tasks which
are better performed by technical assistance should be done by technical assistance.
Examples are tasks which require quick reactions to control signals or repetitive routine
tasks. Otherwise tasks should be assigned to humans operators, if their abilities surpass
machines. Examples are task which require inductive reasoning and flexible procedures.
Human-Machine Systems are often designed following such a technology-driven ap-
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proach. Every task is considered separately and shifted from the human operator to the
technical assistance if a technical device can be developed which outperforms the human
operator. Only tasks, where technology is not able to deliver better performance, are
assigned to human operators.
The opposite of such technology-driven approaches are human-centered approaches.
One example is the concept of Levels of Automation (LoAs). This approach gives
guidelines to decide which task should be handed over to an assistance and which task
should remain under the control of the human operator. The assignment of tasks is
independent from the technical possibilities.
For example, Sheridan and Verplanck [SV78] developed a taxonomy with ten LoAs.
The taxonomy is shown in Fig. 2.1. On the first level, the human operator makes
decisions but the decisions are implemented by the assistance. At level 2 to 5, the
assistance supports in determining the options and suggest one options (level 3 to 4) or
asks for the human operators approval to implement it (level 5). At level 6, the assistance
implements an option when the human operator does not intervene. At level 7 to 10,
the assistance makes decisions and implements them and tells the human operator later
what it did.
Level Description
1. Human does the whole job up to the point of turning it over to the
computer to implement.
2. Computer helps by determining options.
3. Computer helps determine options and suggests one, which human
need not follow.
4. Computer selects action and human may or may not do it.
5. Computer selects action and implements it if human approves.
6. Computer selects action, informs human in plenty of time to stop it.
7. Computer does whole job and necessarily tells human what it did.
8. Computer does whole job and tells human what it did only if human
explicitly asks.
9. Computer does whole job and tells human what it did and it, the
computer, decides he should be told.
10. Computer does whole job if it decides it should be done, and if so
tells human, if it decides he should be told.
Table 2.1.: Levels of automation in decision making by Sheridan and Verplank [SV78]
Another taxonomy was developed by [End87] which included five different role allo-
cations between human operator and assistance. The classification was later extend to
ten levels of automaton [End99]. In this extended taxonomy, a task is divided into four
functions: monitoring, generating (options), selecting (an option), and implementing.
In each LoA, each task is either assigned to the human, to the assistance or to both. In
the latter case, both fulfill the function jointly but the sharing of responsibility is not
defined.
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While former classifications are mainly based on making and implementing decisions
and, thus, on the output functions of a system [PSW00], this classification includes also
the input functions, which are monitoring and generating options. A similar approach is
followed by the classification of [PSW00], which distinguishes between types and levels of
automation. Here, automation is divided into four types according to stages of human
information processing. Similar to [End99], these stages are information acquisition,
information analysis, decision selection, and action implementation. The main difference
to [End99] is that a separate LoA (from fully manual to fully automatic) is possible for
each type of automation.
A lot of research was carried out to identify the influence of types and levels of automa-
tion on HMS performance during normal operations and in failure conditions, on work-
load, and situation awareness. For a recently conducted meta-analysis see [WLS+10].
This research identified some benefits of higher levels of automation. First of all, some
studies showed that the overall performance of HMS can be increased under normal
operating conditions if more functions are assigned to the computer-based assistance
(e.g. [MRO12, MP05]). Furthermore, higher LoAs often reduce operators’ workload
(e.g. [MP05,PCV09]). Both effects are the main reasons for automation of specific tasks
formerly carried out by human operators.
As a consequence of higher LoAs and taking human operators out of the control loop,
human operators’ Situation Awareness (SA) decreases (e.g. [EK95,KE04]). This can
cause out-of-the-loop problems [KOE00] with the consequence that human operators
may not be aware of the actual state of the controlled systems. Consequently, they
may not be able to make decisions as fast as needed after taking over if the assistance
fails. This is assumed to be one reason for reduced performance if the assistance is not
reliable [End99].
By changing the allocation of task and handing over more task to the assistance, com-
pletely new problems can arise, for example, when the assistance’s and human operator’s
goal are in conflict [Bai83].
Following the human-centered approach of LoAs, not every task should be handed
over to the computer-based assistance. Instead a medium LoA should be selected (e.
g. [PSW00]) as higher LoAs, resulting from technology-centered approaches, have serious
drawbacks as described above [End99]. Thus, human operators play a central role in
many domains despite the technical progress and the increasing automation.
2.1.2. Models of Human Information Processing
Controlling a complex system with accessing knowledge can be divided into several
steps. As already mentioned, the classification scheme of types and levels of automa-
tion [PSW00] defines four different types of automation according to four human informa-
tion processing steps, namely sensory processing, perception/working memory, decision
making, and response selection (s. Fig 2.1).
The first step of human information processing—sensory processing—includes regis-
tering different sources of information, focusing the attention, and pre-processing the
data. The next step—perception—includes the conscious perception of data and its
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manipulation and combination in working memory. The decision is made at the third
step—decision making—and a corresponding action is carried out in the fourth step—
response selection.
1. Sensory 
processing
2. Perception/
working 
memory
3. Decision 
making
4. Response 
selection
Figure 2.1.: Four steps of human information processing [PMH00]
Similar steps are described by the Human Model of References (HMR) [Cac98],
which also models human information processing (s. Fig 2.2). In the HMR, the four
steps to get from stimuli to response are “perception”, “interpretation”, “planning” and
“execution”, which are called cognitive functions and summarized under the term PIPE.
This model further contains two cognitive processes which are “memory/knowledge base”
and “allocation of resources”. The first process is connected to all cognitive functions to
allow them to access the stored knowledge. The second cognitive process is connected
to all functions and to the memory and defines the sequence of cognitive functions.
2.Interpretation
1.Perception
3.Planning
4.Execution
Allocation
 of resources
Memory/
knowledge base
Stimuli Response
Figure 2.2.: HMR/PIPE Model of human information processing [Cac98]
Both models of human information processing consist of four steps but have two main
differences. Although, information is perceived and interpreted in the first and second
step in both models, the distribution of the task into both steps differs. In the HMR,
the perception is completed in the first step so that the second step includes only the
interpretation. In the model shown in Fig. 2.1, the first steps includes only the sensory
processing so that perception and interpretation are carried out in the second step. The
second main difference between both models is that the third step is called “decision
making” in the model depicted in Fig. 2.1 and “planning” in the HMR. Both steps
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describe the same task, but the name is used to put the focus on the result (decision)
or on the process (planning).
A more detailed model of human information processing is the Step Ladder Model
(SLM) [Ras86] depicted in Fig. 2.3. The model describes a procedural behavior, begin-
ning with activation by the detection of a problem and ending with the execution of an
action. Between these two steps are the observation, identification, assessment of the
consequences, and the choice of tasks and procedures. Noteworthy is that this model
also describes shortcuts between these steps, so that not all of them have to be executed.
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Figure 2.3.: Step ladder model (SLM) [Ras83]
The SLM contains eight information processing activities depicted as rectangles and
eight resulting states of knowledge depicted as ovals. The eight information processing
activities describe the same procedure as the four cognitive functions of the HMR but
the SLM has a higher granularity.
The SLM can be combined with the Skill-Rule-Knowledge framework (SRK)
[Ras79, Ras83]. According to the SRK, human operators perform actions on different
2.1. The Human Role in Automated Systems 13
cognitive levels. Skill-based behavior is the lowest level and describes the direct connec-
tion of activation and execution. This behavior is highly automated (in the human mind)
and takes place without conscious control. At the medium level—the rule-based level—
the behavior is consciously controlled by stored rules with an if-then scheme. These
rules may be instructed or derived from experience. The knowledge-based behavior—
the third level—is only necessary if the human has to solve unknown situations. Only
on this level, the knowledge about the system has to be utilized.
The activities of the SLM can be assigned to these three different levels of behavior
as illustrated in (s. Fig 2.3) [Ras86, p. 104]. The skill-based behavior allows a direct
connection from activation to execution. A multitude of shortcuts exist in the SLM
between particular processing steps. These shortcuts are activated by rules and belong
to the rule-based level. The complete process from activation to execution belongs to
the knowledge-based level is entered. This level is only used as a matter of last resort
when no rules or skills can be applied.
The remainder of this section presents models and theories focusing on selected steps
of human information processing in detail.
2.1.3. Situation Awareness
A common characteristic of the models of human information processing described in
the previous section is the inclusion of perception and interpretation of sensory inputs at
the beginning of the process. Perception and interpretation is a pre-requisite for decision
making. Without knowing what is going on, the human operator is not able to make
appropriate decisions.
The result of the perception and interpretation process can be described by Situation
Awareness (SA) [End95a]. As proposed by the SLM, especially well trained operators
are able to apply rules, which allow them to proceed with action selection immediately
after they classified the situation. Consequently, the correct classification of the situation
is of utmost importance to activate the correct rule and, hence, to make the right
decision.
To clarify the construct, a definition of SA is necessary. The following common defini-
tion as a state of knowledge was given by Endsley [End88,End95a]: “Situation awareness
is the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space,
the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.”
Following this definition, SA has three hierarchical levels (see the top of Fig. 2.4).
The first level describes the perceived status and dynamics of the relevant elements in
the environment. It includes the awareness of the elements of the environment without
knowing about their identity, meaning, or relations. On this level, a non-expert may
reach the same SA as an expert because the first level of situation awareness does
not depend on expert knowledge. The second level characterizes the result after the
recognition of patterns and the understanding of the elements perceived in relation to
goals. Thus, it depends on the first level of SA and on the knowledge of the human
operator. The third level contains the prediction of future states and actions of the
elements. The human operators forecast of the future development of the situation
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Figure 2.4.: Three hierarchical levels of situation awareness as basis for decisions
[End95a] at the top and their mapping to the steps of the HMR at the
bottom
is also based on the interpretation of the current situation and the knowledge of the
operator about the elements’ behavior. Situation Awareness as a state of knowledge
should be distinguished from the process of achieving, acquiring, or maintaining SA,
which is termed “situation assessment” [End95a].
The “elements in the environment within a volume of time and space”, which are
mentioned in the definition, are these elements of a working domain which are relevant
to reach the actual goal. As these elements may differ in time, SA takes into account
the dynamics of a task and relates the current state of the environment to the past and
to the future.
The SA model can be mapped on the function of the HMR as illustrated in Fig. 2.4.
The first two functions of the HMR can be found in the process of achieving SA. The
result of the first step of the HMR (perception) can be mapped directly onto the first
level of SA. The second step of the HMR—the interpretation—is split into the processes
to acquire the second and third level of SA. The SA model emphasizes the importance,
not only to understand the current situations, but also to predict its implications for the
future.
The SA model further contains the steps “decision” and “performance of actions”
which are executed after achieving a sufficient SA. These steps correspond to the last
two steps of the HMR, with the already mentioned difference between decision making
and planning. Planning is not explicitly considered in the SA model. The third level
of SA includes only the projection of the future states of the environment and not the
influence of the operator actions explicitly.
2.1.4. Planning in Human-Machine Systems
Decisions can be made directly after a situation is assessed. This corresponds to the
skill-based level in the SRK framework. However, the effects of actions have to be
simulated mentally prior to decision making in complex cases. This mental simulation
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of different actions can be considered as planning. Thus, planning can be a part of
decision making and describes the mental simulation of the consequences of actions
prior to making a decision. Planning may aim to set a course of actions leading to a
desired future state [Söf03,WJM06]. However, it may be the case that the aim is not
to reach specific states but to avoid critical states. In this case, planning can also be
used to avoid specific states. After the definition of van Wezel et al. [WJM06], planning
comprises the decisions of future actions. Thus, planning can include the simulation of
not only single actions, but of a sequence of actions.
The planning process results in a plan which contains the future actions. However,
a plan may include only the objectives to be achieved. This is obvious if the plan is
generated and executed by different agents (e.g. human operator, cognitive technical
system). In this case, the executing agent has to choose the actions to reach the ob-
jectives. Also human operators of a complex dynamic system may have plans including
only objectives if the actions to reach these objectives are clear and do not have to be
specified beforehand. Thus, a plan can include the objectives to be reached and the
actions to be executed independently of each other.
Anticipation is needed to generate a plan [Dör89,Söf03]. To be able to anticipate future
states, the planning agent needs an internal model of the environment. To predict the
consequences of the actions regarding the agent itself, the agent needs additionally an
internal model of itself.
Different models were proposed to describe the generation of plans. Following the
model of Mumford et al. [MSD01], mental planning can be divided into the generation
phase, the refinement phase, and the execution phase. In the first phase (generation), a
plan is generated which can still be a prototype. In the second phase (refinement), the
plan can be revised and completed and details can be worked out. In the third phase
(execution), the plan is executed. Depending on the task, the phases can overlap in
time. Especially when operating with complex dynamic systems, the refinement phase
and the execution phase are alternating. While a plan is implemented, new opportunities
arise and previously considered alternatives disappear. Crucial here is the process speed
which determines the amount of time that can be used for the refinement of a plan.
As planning and execution are carried out in parallel during operations with complex
dynamic systems, a clear distinction between the generation phase and the execution
phase is not possible [Hoc06].
In the model of Hayes-Roth [HRHR79] an opportunistic approach is followed. In
this model, the planning process is not structured but it is a hybrid process that can
also explain seeming unstructured planning. In this model, a mental plan is created
by so-called specialists, which work together. The specialists access common knowledge
and the already generated parts of the plan. The generated parts are shared among the
specialists and are referred to as blackboard. If the preconditions required by a specialist
are satisfied, that means the information it needs is on the blackboard, it can execute
its actions and add further elements to the plan. Switching between various points of
the plan during the planning process can be explained with this modal. In addition, this
model can also describe a change between different levels of detail. For example, it can
be used to explain that a detailed part of a plan is generated prior to an abstract part.
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Figure 2.5.: The Dynamic Situation Management architecture by Hoc [Hoc06]
Another approach is the "case-based planning" by Hammond [Ham90]. This approach
assumes that plans are created based on previously applied and remembered plans. Plans
are stored in memory together with the objectives they can achieve and the problems
they can prevent. Before a plan is recalled, the objectives to be reached have to be defined
and the expected problems have to be predicted. If it turns out that a remembered plan
contains an error, a correction of the plan is carried out. If an incorrect prediction leads
to the error, an improved rule for the prediction of problems will be stored in addition
to the improved plan. This approach emphasizes that the knowledge and the experience
play an important role in planning.
In addition, the SLM (see section 2.1.1) was frequently used to describe diagnosis and
planning in dynamic tasks. However, the SLM is criticized for being too procedural (e.g.
[Hoc06,Bai97]). In particular, it is criticized that the model takes no feedback from the
environment into account, that the model primarily operates on a reactive basis, and that
no time is considered in the model. The Dynamic Situation Management architecture is
proposed [Hoc06] as an alternative (s. Fig 2.5). It has an representation of the current
situation as core. Modules similar to these in the SLM are activated by the representation
of the situation. Thus, the steps in this model are less procedural and are led by a mental
model. While the SLM concentrates on an external activation through observation of the
environment, the Dynamic Situation Management architecture concentrates on internal
activation by a mental model. In contrast to both models, the opportunistic model of
planning allows both types of activation.
The analysis of these models of planning shows that planning is always associated
with application of knowledge in the various models. It is also important to note, that
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different planning phases can be distinguish and that planning alternates between the
refinement phase and the execution phase in dynamic systems.
2.1.5. Decision Making
Decision making is defined in [Sha99] as “the process of choosing a preferred option or
course of action from among a set of alternatives”. Included in the process of decision
making are information-gathering, likelihood estimation and choosing [Sha99]. This
definition of decision making overlaps with situation assessment and planning. Here,
the step of “information-gathering” is attributed to generating situational awareness
and the likelihood estimation is considered as planning. Only the subsequent step of
choosing an action is deemed to be decision-making.
Decision making can be analyzed by the normative, descriptive or prescriptive ap-
proach [Sha99]. The normative approach describes a rational behavior. Thus, it de-
scribes a way, how one should act to find the optimal choice. The descriptive approach
analyzes human behavior based on empirical observations and tries to identify the fac-
tors that influence decision making. Research led to the conclusion that the behavior of
humans strongly differs to normative behavior (e.g. [KT79]). Reducing this difference
by influencing decision making and making it congruent with normative behavior is the
central topic of the prescriptive approach [Sha99].
In this thesis, first, the normative approach is important as it can be used as a criterion
for evaluating the decisions actually made by human operators. Second, the descriptive
approach is important as this approach can describe the actual behavior and, hence, can
help to explain the differences to the normative behavior. Therefore, both approaches
are briefly described below.
Normative Decision Making
The rational decision making theory (e.g. [Doy99]) describes an ideal decision making,
which is rarely observed but useful as contrast to the observed behavior. The following
mathematical description is taken from [Doy99]. The theory of rational decision making
assumes a set of alternative actions X together with their consequences Ω. It may be too
extensive to consider all possible actions so that only a subset of all possible actions is
considered, which include the important or interesting differences between alternatives.
Further a binary relation of preferences is considered by the theory. This is notated
as x - y, which means that y is weakly preferred to x (x, y ∈ X). It is required that
the relation of all alternatives can be ordered, which means to be reflexive (x - x) and
transitive (x - y and y - z imply x - z). The maximally desirable alternative x will
be chosen among all alternatives, so that y - x ∀ y ∈ X. The preference order can
be replaced by a numerical utility function U : X → R by assigning a number to each
alternative so that U(x) - U(y) if and only if x - y. This is described by the utility
theory (e.g. [Wel99]). The function U is an ordinal utility functions as it represents only
ordering and not magnitude.
To describe decision making in cases in which the same action may lead to different
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outcomes with known likelihood, the criterion of maximizing expected utility is used.
With Pr(ω|x) giving the probability of the outcome ω ∈ Ω as a consequence of action
x ∈ X, the expected utility of the actions x is
U(x) =
∑
ω∈Ω
U(ω)Pr(ω|x). (2.1)
In this case a cardinal utility function has to be used, which indicates order and
magnitude, to allow the weighted addition.
To make a decision following the normative approach is very extensive. The required
effort is increasing if decisions have to be made in complex or dynamic systems. Therefore
human operators are seldom able to follow the normative approach.
Descriptive Decision Making
An early descriptive decision making theory was proposed by Herbert Simon. According
to that theory, humans try to find a good-enough solution (statisficing) instead of an
optimal one (maximization) [Sim55]. If choosing among alternatives, the decision maker
sets an aspiration level and chooses the first alternative that meets this level.
Another example for a descriptive theory of decision making is Naturalistic Deci-
sion Making (NDM) [Kle93]. This theory was developed from field observations of
experienced decision makers. According to this theory, experienced decision makers do
not compare different options but recognize typical situations and then know what to do.
In more complex cases, they will mentally simulate the action and then either decide to
implement or to modify this action. If the situation is not familiar, they will seek more
information to detect similarities to known situations. Only if the first action coming
to mind is not considered as feasible, another option will be considered. This is done in
a serial process. This model of decision making is called Recognition Primed Decision
(RPD) model [Kle93]. After Klein, this behavior of decision makers can be found in
real-word-settings (which are the opposite of artificial laboratory tasks), if
• the decision maker is experienced,
• the environment is dynamic,
• a real-time reaction is required,
• the decision has to be made under time pressure,
• the task is ill-defined,
• and the decision has significant personal consequences [KK91].
Most of these conditions are fulfilled also in the interaction with technical systems. It
should be noted that also an ill-defined task is seen as requirement. In an ill-defined task,
the number of alternative actions is not fixed. It may require some effort to determine
the set of alternative actions in such a task, or it may even be impossible, when this
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set is unbounded. However, the tasks of operators of technical systems are often well
specified. Additionally, the set of actions is limited by the interface.
Heuristics may also play an important role in decision making [Gig08]. A first reason
for the use of heuristics is the trade-off between accuracy and effort, which is often
assumed when information costs time or money. As a consequence of this, the cost for
information will exceed its benefits at one point, where the search for information should
be stopped. However, it also has been shown that heuristics can lead to better decisions
than complex strategies [Gig08] even if information is for free. This is especially the
case if inferences have to be made based on small samples and the future may change in
unexpected ways.
According to these theories, operators will not evaluate all available options and chose
the best available; instead they will select an option which provides satisfactory results.
Operators of dynamic system cannot collect all information, as they have a limited
amount of time for making a decision. As a consequence, the use of heuristics seems
necessary to reduce the effort to a manageable amount. When compared to the SLM
(see section 2.1.1), the heuristics correspond to the rules, which can be used as short-
cuts between the particular processes. Although the rules are not always correct, they
nevertheless allow achieving a high performance. However, this performance cannot be
guaranteed when relying on heuristics as heuristics do not consider all relevant informa-
tion.
2.1.6. Human Erroneous Actions
While the creativity and flexibility of human operators is needed to control complex
dynamic systems, human operators are also prone to errors. These errors may lead
to accidents and may have catastrophic consequences. It is assumed that human erro-
neous actions are the main cause for accidents. Usually 60% to 90% of all accidents are
attributed to human erroneous actions [Hol98, p. 2-3]. Furthermore, there was a ten-
dency over the last decades to attribute an increasing proportion of accidents to human
error [Hol98,HW05].
Due to the possible consequences, it is of utmost important to reduce or avoid hu-
man erroneous actions. As errors can have a variety of causes, the countermeasures are
manifold and include organizational changes, specific training of operators and techni-
cal measures. However, developing countermeasures requires first to analyze errors and
to understand the conditions and reasons which lead to or facilitate erroneous actions.
There are two different approaches heading for this goal, the prediction of human erro-
neous actions to estimate the probability of accidents and the retrospective analysis of
accidents.
The term “human error” commonly used in the literature is used with different mean-
ings. It can denote the cause for an erroneous action, the action itself, or its conse-
quences [Hol98]. In [Hol98] it is suggested to use “erroneous action” to refer to the
action itself unambiguously. However, erroneous actions as well as outstanding perfor-
mance are two sides of the same medal caused by human performance variability. Thus,
the question how to differentiate between erroneous actions and normal performance
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actions has to be answered prior to a definition.
According to [Hol98] there are three aspects to be considered for a definition of human
erroneous actions. Firstly, in order to be able to measure a deviation, a performance
standard or criterion is necessary (also suggested by [RA03]). Secondly, there must be
an event (or action) that results into this deviation. And thirdly, the acting person
needs to have a choice to act in a way not considered as erroneous so that no deviation
results. Accordingly, human erroneous action can be defined as actions with avoidable
and undesirable consequences. Hence, the defined criterion as illustrated in Fig. 2.6
differentiates between acceptable performance and erroneous actions (not acceptable
performance). Following this idea, decisions with consequences below the threshold value
are classified as errors and it is assumed that they are caused by internal processing errors
whereas decisions with consequences above the threshold value (only slightly deviating
from the optimal solutions) are an inescapable implication of the working methods of
human operators. However, choosing a criterion which does not reflect the optimal
consequences seems arbitrary and choosing the optimal consequence as criteria results
in many actions classified as “erroneous actions”.
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Figure 2.6.: Threshold to differentiate acceptable and not acceptable performance
Two classes of criteria can be applied. On the one hand, externalized verifiable models
like system variables can be used as a standard. This class focuses on the consequences of
errors. On the other hand, internalized verifiable frameworks can be applied. Here, the
criteria are transient intentions and goals of the acting operator. This class concentrates
on the action itself as it can classify actions as erroneous before their consequences are
known [Hol98].
To analyze erroneous actions, several classification schemes were proposed. As these
schemes were developed in different field, they are either developed with the aim to
explain observed errors or to predict the probability of errors.
A first step in the classification of errors is the differentiation between correctly per-
formed actions, the failure to perform required actions (omission), and the performance
of undesired actions (commission). However, while an omission describes a more spe-
cific error (not to do something), the term commission subsumes different error modes,
as there are many ways to do something wrong. However, to consider only the tim-
ing of an action already reveals four different forms of omissions. First, actions can be
missing completely, they further can be performed to early or to late, and finally, they
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can be replaced by another action [Hol98]. It is necessary to define the duration of a
the complete event sequence to differentiate between missing and (infinitesimal) delayed
actions [Hol98].
To consider only these four error modes already demonstrates that it is often not
possible to define an error unambiguously as omission or commission. An example is
illustrated on the left of Fig. 2.7. An action which should be performed in the time
interval T1, but actually is performed during the time interval T2, is an omission during
the time interval T1. However, it is also a commission in the time interval T2. A similar
problem is shown on the right side of Fig. 2.7. The action A2 is executed while another
action A1 was required in the same time interval. First, skipping A1 is an omission,
but the execution of A2 is a commission. This shows that every commission is also an
omission as the correct action is missing.
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Figure 2.7.: Erroneous actions to illustrate the difficulty of differentiating omissions
and commissions
Not only due to the difficulty of assigning an error to the omission or commission
class but in particular because the various error modes within a class can have different
consequences (e.g. the error modes “to early” or “to late” within the class “commission”),
the differentiation between omission and commission is not sufficient but the specific
error mode should be indicated, both for the analysis of accidents and for the prediction
of errors [Hol00].
The above definition of missing, delayed, or premature actions uses clearly an external-
ized criterion. Other classification schemes focus on the internal information processing
and classify errors by internalized criteria. One example of this is the Generic Error
Modeling System (GEMS) proposed by Reason [Rea90], which is based on the SLM
(see section 2.1.1). The GEMS further builds on the assumption that separate levels of
cognitive functions exist as described in the SRK (also see section 2.1.1). Reason defined
four basic types of errors in the GEMS. Errors on the skill-based level describe actions
which differ from the intention. It can be distinguished between slips, which are exe-
cution errors, and lapses which result from wrong recalls of stored information. Errors
are called mistakes, if the action and intention are identical but the executed plan is
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Table 2.2.: Selected differences between skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based
errors [Rea90]
Skill-based Rule-based Knowledge-based
slips and lapses mistakes mistakes
Activation Routine Problem-solving
Error Prediction
Mostly predictable error Variable
established but wrong
(Scheme) (Rule)
Error rate Many possibilities / only few errors Few errors/high error rate
Error detection Quick and efficientdetection Hard, often help from outside needed
not appropriate. This can happen on the rule- and knowledge-based level. A mistake of
applying a rule is called rule-based mistake, whereas a mistake on the knowledge-based
level is called a knowledge-based mistake.
Some properties of errors as given by Reason [Rea90] are summarized in Table 2.2. One
aspect is the predictability of errors. Errors are predictable, if they are caused by false
rules, which corresponds to rule-based errors, and false schemes, which are applied on
the skill-based level. Errors on the knowledge-based level cannot be predicted accurately,
as errors on this level are a result of complex interactions between knowledge and the
mental model.
Also the frequency of errors varies with the level. On the skill- and rule-based level,
there are many possibilities for errors, but the relative frequency is low. Since only in a
few cases the knowledge-based level is used, only a few possibilities for errors exist on this
level but the relative frequency is higher than on the other levels. Additionally, execution
errors are usually quickly detected by operators and can be solved, while errors, which
are based on a false knowledge and thus appear on the rule- and knowledge-based level,
are more difficult to detect by the operator and external help is needed to discover such
errors.
Drawing a conclusion from these characteristics, it can be stated that support for
error detection would be helpful especially on the rule- and knowledge-based level. The
reason is that errors on these levels are difficult to detect by the operators themselves
and there is a high error-rate on the knowledge level [Rea90]. On the other hand, the
source of errors on the rule-based level are false rules. This allows to predict errors
(when the false rules are known) and correct behavior (if the correct rules are used). As
the GEMS, like other classifications based on models of human information processing,
does not consider contextual factors, it is criticizes due to its lack of ability to explain
the exact reason for errors [Hol98].
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An—in many respects different—classification scheme of errors was developed by
Dörner [Dör89] (also see Schaub [Sch06]). This classification scheme was developed
in the field of Complex Problem Solving (CPS) (in German: “Komplexes Problem-
lösen”) and describes the errors of participants dealing with complex dynamic problems
in microworlds. This classification scheme contains only errors which can be assigned to
the knowledge-based level, which is obviously a consequence of the chosen approach to
observe untrained participants trying to solve complex problems. Although the research
was not concerned with HMI, the developed classification can be transferred into the
field of HMI under the assumption that humans are prone to the same errors solving
problems in an artificial microworld and in real world tasks.
As explained in the last section (see section 2.1.5), operators do not optimize but
select actions based on rules or heuristics. The SLM and the GEMS illustrate the
importance of rules during the interaction with complex dynamic systems. Therefore,
human erroneous actions are not caused by overstraining the human information capacity
but by selecting inadequate rules. To explain and prevent erroneous actions it is thus
important to understand “how peoples’ assessments and actions made sense at the time”
[Dek06, p. xi]. As erroneous actions result from a “mismatch between cognition and
context” [Hol98, p. 81], they must be interpreted relative to the characteristics of the
situation when the error happened. In other words, human erroneous actions result from
differences between the reality and the human operators’ mental model of the reality.
2.2. The Air Traffic Control Domain
This section gives a short introduction into the domain of ATC as this task, strictly
speaking the approach task, is the example application of this thesis. The domain of
ATC is an example for HMSs. The Air Traffic Control Officer (ATCO) is the
human operator who interacts with a complex dynamic system. Since the controlled
system comprises both aircraft and pilots, it is more than a purely technical system.
One challenge in the ATC domain is the expected growth of traffic. Despite the
European economic crises, it is assumed that in the years 2013 and 2014 the amount
of traffic increases by 1.2% per year [Eur12]. These growth rates are relatively low
compared to the rates expected for longer periods. For instance an annual growth of
about 3% is expected for the years 2015-1018 [Eur12] and by 2035, about 1.5 times the
traffic of 2012 is predicted [Eur13].
Challenges in ATC arise, not only because of the expected growth, but also due to in-
creasing demands. At first, there is the need for environmental sustainability. Therefore,
aims were defined to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) and noise emission. Moreover, the
cost-efficiency of air traffic has to be improved. At the same time, safety must be kept
at a high constant level. Despite the increased traffic, the number of accidents should
not increase. To scope with this challenges, new procedures and additional support from
technical systems will be introduced, which will change the task of air traffic controllers.
Improvements in these key performance areas, namely safety, capacity, environment, and
cost efficiency, are the four high-level goals of Single European Sky [SES2012].
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This section is first intended to reflect briefly the task and responsibilities of ATCOs.
As the example application in this thesis is a new approach concept including the merging
of two arrival streams supported by an Arrival Manager (AMAN), existing AMANs
and the new concept will be presented.
2.2.1. Organization of Air Traffic Control
The most important objectives of ATC are to prevent collisions between aircraft, to
support an orderly flow of air traffic, and to provide information useful for safe and
efficient flights [ICA13]. Consequently, a minimum separation between the aircraft has
to be ensured and the pilots have to be enabled to use efficient flight trajectories and to
reduce fuel consumption.
2.2.2. Areas of Responsibility
The air traffic control task is divided into the three areas
• Tower Control (TWR) (also aerodrome control),
• Approach Control (APP) (also terminal control), and
• Area Control (ACC for Area Control Center, also en-route control) [Bau07,KM12].
Each of these areas will be introduced shortly.
Tower Control (TWR)
The air traffic at an airport—on the ground and in the immediate surroundings—is
called Tower Control at it is controlled from the tower. This is the only area in which
ATCOs have visual contact with the aircraft. The outside view is the primary source of
information for ATCOs.
In Germany, the national air navigation service providerDFS Deutsche Flugsicher-
ung GmbH (DFS) is responsible for the runways. The airport is responsible for the
traffic at the other traffic areas, but it can delegate the responsibility to an air navigation
service provider. As a consequence, the actual division of responsibility varies between
airports and the ATCOs can be responsible for the aircraft on the runways, taxiways,
aprons, and stands and in the airport’s control zone, which is the airspace around the
airport.
At busy airports, the task is divided into subtasks. The responsibility for the aircraft,
vehicles, and persons on the airport’s apron is given to the Ground Control. The tower
position is still responsible for the runways and the control zone and gives clearances for
take-offs and landings.
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Approach Control (APP)
TheTerminal Maneuvering Area (TMA) (or Terminal Control Area in North Amer-
ica) is about 30 km – 50 km [KM12] around major airports. The ATCOs in the terminal
control are working in approach control rooms at radar screens, which indicate the ac-
tual position and status of aircraft in (or near) this area. They are communicating with
the aircraft via radio. An APP can either conduct the air traffic control for one airport
solely or for several airports located close together. It can be located in a control center,
as the ATCOs in APP do not require an outside view like in the tower.
The APP controls the approaching and departing aircraft, and fly-overs, which are
just crossing the TMA. The task of ATCOs is also to generate the landing sequence
while ensuring the minimum separation. Coming from the en-route sector, aircraft often
use Standard Terminal Arrival Routes (STARs) from the cruise altitude to the
initial approach fix. At this point the approach start, which is divided between initial,
intermediate, and final approach [KM12]. For the approach, the Instrument Landing
System (ILS) can be used for the correct alignment and descent. The ATCO can use
radar vectors (a heading for the aircraft) to line up the aircraft on the ILS. Similar to the
STARs, Standard Instrument Departure Routes (SIDs) are used for departing
aircraft to guide the aircraft from the runway out of the TMA. The approach control
positions can be divided into a pick-up and a feeder sector. The pick-up sector passes
the arriving aircraft on to the feeder sector.
Area Control Center (ACC)
The controlled airspace is divided into different Flight Information Region (FIR),
whose borders are often identical to national borders. They have been split up verti-
cally to create Upper Flight Information Regions (UIR). The FIR and UIR in
Germany are shown in Fig. 2.8. These Regions are controlled from Area Control Cen-
ter (ACC) orUpper Area Control Center (UAC). The German airspace is divided
between three ACCs (Bremen, Langen, and München) and two UACs (Maastricht and
Karlsruhe).
Each region is divided into different sectors. A sector is “the smallest area of airspace
under specific control” [Bau07]. Normally, each sector is controlled by two ATCOs, one
Executive Controller (EC) (sometimes called Tactical Controller) and one Planning
Controller (PC) sitting next to each other. Only under special conditions ATCOs work
alone in a sector. To scope with changing amounts of traffic, sectors can be combined
or split up to regulate the workload of the controllers. Besides the separation in their
own sectors, ATCOs in ACCs have also to ensure the separation of aircraft heading to
the same airports when entering APP.
2.2.3. Task of Air Traffic Controllers
On the one hand, ATCOs are bound to stringent rules and procedures. On the other
hand, they need to be flexible to solve unknown situations, which they are often con-
26 Chapter 2: Human-Machine Interaction
MADRIDUIR(LECM)
ZAGREBFIR/UIR(LDZO)
BRATISLAVA FIR(LZBB)
BUDAPESTFIR(LHCC)
NICOSIA UIR(LCCC)
BEOGRADUIR(LYBA)
FINLANDUIR(EFIN)
DNIPROPETROVSKFIR(UKDV)
TBILISI UIR(UGGG)
YEREVAN FIR(UDDD)
SANTA MARIAOCEANIC FIR(LPPO)
FRANCEUIR(LFFF)
ROMA UIR(LIRR)
SWITZERLANDUIR(LSAS)
ANKARAFIR(LTAA)
CANARIASUIR(GCCC)
SHANNON UIR(EISN)
SCOTTISHUIR(EGPX)
BRUSSELSUIR(EBUR)
BRINDISIUIR(LIBB)
FIR PRAHA(LKAA)
TIRANAFIR(LAAA)
ODESA FIR(UKOV)
LONDON UIR(EGTT) AMSTERDAMFIR(EHAA)
MILANO UIR(LIMM)
LJUBLJANAFIR(LJLA)
SKOPJE FIR(LWSS)
CHISINAUFIR(LUUU)
KOEBENHAVNFIR(EKDK)
RHEIN UIR(EDUU)
ISTANBULFIR(LTBB)
RIGA FIR(EVRR)
FIR SOFIA(LBSR)
LISBOA FIR(LPPC)
BARCELONAUIR(LECB)
WARSZAWAFIR(EPWW)
VILNIUSUIR(EYVL)
KYIV FIR(UKBV)
MALTA UIR(LMMM)
HANNOVERUIR(EDVV)
WIEN FIR(LOVV)
SARAJEVOUIR(LQSB)
NORWAY FIR(ENOR)
BODOOCEANIC FIR(ENOB)
HELLASUIR(LGGG)
L'VIV FIR(UKLV)
BUCURESTIFIR(LRBB)
SIMFEROPOL'FIR(UKFV)
FIR/UIR in the Upper Airspace (EUROCONTROL Member States)
SWEDEN FIR (ESAA)
?????????????????????????????????????
?? ????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ?? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ??????????????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ? ??????? ?? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????? ?? ??? ???? ? ??? ? ? ?????? ????????? ????? ???????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??????? ?? ??? ???? ??????????????? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ???? ? ??????? ?? ? ?????? ????????? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ?? ???????? ??? ?? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????????????
?????????? ????????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??????????? ???? ????? ??? ???????????????????????
????? ? ??????????? ?????? ????? ??? ?????? ? ? ????? ???? ???????? ?? ??? ????????????? ????? ???? ???? ???????? ????? ???? ??????? ????? ??? ????????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ??????? ???????? ???????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????????????????? ??????????????????? ?????????? ????? ? ?? ???? ???? ???? ??????????? ????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????????? ? ???? ?????????? ???????? ??? ? ???????? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????
(a) UIRs [Eur14U]
BREST FIR(LFRR)
MALTA FIR(LMMM)
BRUSSELSFIR(EBBU)
MUNICHFIR(EDMM)
ZAGREBFIR/UIR(LDZO)
BRATISLAVA FIR(LZBB)
BUDAPESTFIR(LHCC)
DNIPROPETROVSKFIR(UKDV)
YEREVANFIR(UDDD)
SANTA MARIAOCEANIC FIR(LPPO)
BRINDISIFIR(LIBB)
SWEDEN FIR(ESAA)
ANKARAFIR(LTAA)
VILNIUS FIR(EYVL)
TBILISI FIR(UGGG)
MARSEILLEFIR(LFMM)
LANGENFIR(EDGG)
BEOGRADFIR(LYBA)
PARIS FIR(LFFF)
BREMEN FIR(EDWW)
FIR PRAHA(LKAA)
TIRANAFIR(LAAA)
NICOSIAFIR(LCCC)
ODESA FIR(UKOV)
SCOTTISHFIR(EGPX)
BARCELONAFIR(LECB) ROMA FIR(LIRR)
AMSTERDAMFIR(EHAA)
SWITZERLANDFIR(LSAS)
MILANO FIR(LIMM)
LJUBLJANAFIR(LJLA)
SKOPJE FIR(LWSS)
CHISINAUFIR(LUUU)
LONDON FIR(EGTT)
BORDEAUXFIR(LFBB)
KOEBENHAVNFIR(EKDK)
ISTANBULFIR(LTBB)
RIGA FIR(EVRR)
FIR SOFIA(LBSR)
FINLANDFIR(EFIN)
SHANWICKFIR(EGGX)
LISBOA FIR(LPPC) MADRIDFIR(LECM)
SARAJEVOFIR(LQSB)
WARSZAWAFIR(EPWW) KYIV FIR(UKBV)
CANARIASFIR(GCCC)
SHANNONFIR(EISN)
REIMS FIR(LFEE) WIEN FIR(LOVV)
NORWAY FIR(ENOR)
BODOOCEANIC FIR(ENOB)
ATHINAI FIR(LGGG)
L'VIV FIR(UKLV)
BUCURESTIFIR(LRBB)
SIMFEROPOL'FIR(UKFV)
FIR/UIR in th  Lower Airspace (EUROCONTROL Member States)
?????????????????????????????????????
? ?? ???? ????????? ?????????? ?? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ??????????????? ?? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ? ??????? ?? ?????????? ??? ???? ???? ?? ???? ? ??? ? ? ?????? ????????? ????? ???????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ?? ??? ??????? ??????? ?? ??? ???? ??????????????? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ???? ? ??????? ?? ? ?????? ??????? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ?? ???????? ??? ?? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????????????
????????? ? ???? ??????????? ????????? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ????? ??????????? ???? ????? ??? ???????????????????????
????? ? ???? ? ? ?????? ????? ??? ?????? ? ? ????? ???? ???????? ?? ??? ????????????? ????? ???? ???? ???????? ????? ???? ?????? ????? ??? ????????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ??????? ???????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????????????????? ???????? ?????? ?????????? ????? ? ?? ???? ???? ???? ??????????? ????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????? ? ? ?????????? ???????? ??? ? ???????? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????
(b) FIRs [Eur14]
Figure 2.8.: Flight Information Regions (FIRs) and Upper Flight Information Regions
(UIRs) in Germany
fronted with [Bau07]. Hence, they are working both on the rule-based level but also on
the knowledge-based level (see section 2.1.1).
A flight progress strip is given to ATCOs, which depicts the aircraft’s identification,
waypoints and flight level, some minutes before it enters the sector and appears on
the radar screen. The flight progress strip is either paper-based or—to an increasing
degree—electronic flight strips are used. When an aircraft appears on the radar screen,
the data of the flight progress strip has to be compared to the arriving aircraft. Then
the consequences especially for separations have to be assessed. On the radar screen
different kinds of information for aircraft can be presented including
• call sign,
• flight level (altitude),
• attitude (change of altitude),
• speed,
• heading, etc.
The two controllers of a sector have different tasks. The task of the PC is to com-
municate with adjacent sectors, to manage the flight progress strips and to identify
trajectories with the least risk of conflicts. The PC is communicating with the pilots.
2.2. The Air Traffic Control Domain 27
He has to detect potential conflicts and issues instructions accordingly. The communi-
cation between the ATCO and aircraft is mainly voice communication over radio but
also datalink is used increasingly. The ATCOs give the aircraft permissions to proceed,
called clearances. These clearances can be limited to specific conditions.
A task analysis [KvD99] revealed ten different processes in the en-route controllers’
task, one control process, five task processes, which include one or more of four sub-
processes. Further work found out that no major differences between the processes of
en-route arrival/departure and aerodrome position exist [DKv00]. On overview of the
processes is given in Fig. 2.9.
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Figure 2.9.: Processes of Air Traffic Controllers [KvD99]
The identified control process is called “switching attention”, the four identified sub-
processes are called
1. updating mental picture and maintaining situational awareness,
2. checking,
3. searching conflicts, and
4. issuing instructions.
The first three of these sub-processes describe the perception, interpretation, and
prediction of information from the environment. This highlights, that ATCOs are mainly
concerned with managing information.
The five task processes are called
1. taking over position (includes sub-processes 1, 2, 3),
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2. monitoring (includes sub-processes 1, 2, 3),
3. managing routine traffic (includes sub-processes 1, 2, 3, 4),
4. managing requests and assisting pilots (includes sub-processes 1, 2, 3, 4), and
5. solving conflicts (includes sub-processes 1, 2, 4).
After taking over position, the ATCO monitors the traffic. This is the core process
and the other processes are activated depending on the monitored situation. The task
process 4 is activated externally by requests from pilots, whereas the task process 5 is
activated internally after a conflict was detected.
It can be concluded that the task of controllers is mainly cognitive. Their actions are
guided by their mental picture of the current traffic situation. Due to the strict rules
and procedures, they will work on the rule-based level of the SRK most of the time.
2.2.4. Arrival Manager
Since managing the stream of aircraft arriving at a high-traffic airport is one of the most
difficult tasks in ATC, AMANs have been developed to support ATCOs since the early
1980’s [Völ90]. AMAN have to meet different - sometimes conflicting - aims, namely to
increase the safety, to enhance the efficiency by reducing arrival queuing, to maintain
an optimal throughput at the runway, and to decrease the impact on the environment
(fuel-burn and noise) [HC10a].
An AMAN has to support the controller in performing his tasks. These tasks of the
ATCO managing the arriving traffic, which are illustrated in Fig. 2.10, are
• to build a sequence of the arriving aircraft (sequencing),
• to assign an expected time over waypoints for each aircraft, especially a Target-
Time of Arrival (TTA) for the runway threshold (metering),
• to plan trajectories, which meet the previously defined times (trajectory genera-
tion), and
• to generate clearances from the trajectories and guide the aircraft appropriately
(clearance generation) [Obe06].
The development of AMANs began with COMPAS by theGerman Aerospace Cen-
ter (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt) (DLR). It used flight plan
data and early radar information to build an arriving sequence und calculate TTAs
for the runway. The COMPAS system was brought into operation at Frankfurt Air-
port [Völ90]. The successor of COMPAS is the 4D-Planner which development started
in 1996 [ADG+96] in a close cooperation of DLR and DFS. It additionally uses actual
radar data for an improved sequence planning and is able to adjust the sequence if the
controller’s actions deviate from the provided plan. The 4D-Planner further developed
by DFS was brought into operation in Frankfurt airport in 2003. Besides Frankfurt, the
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Figure 2.10.: Task of air traffic controllers to establish arrival sequences
4D-Planner is also used at Munich airport [HC10b]. These airports are the only airports
in Germany using AMANs. Different commercial AMAN are available and in use today.
On overview of the AMAN operating in Europe can be found in [HC10b].
The further development of the 4D-Planner within DLR is named 4D-CARMA. This
system is able to calculate trajectories and to generate guidance instructions based on
these trajectories. Thus, this AMAN is able to support the controller in the four tasks
mentioned above.
2.2.5. Late Merging of Arrival Streams
One of the weaknesses of current approach operations, as analyzed in the Future Air
Ground Integration (FAGI) Project, are inefficient trajectories [WO10]. They result
from merging arriving aircraft early at distances of about 30NM away from the landing
threshold on a limited number of arrival routes. Consequently, they need to use similar
speed profiles. This inevitably leads to inefficiency and unnecessary fuel consumption as
each type of aircraft has its own optimal speed profile. The late merging of aircraft only
6NM – 10NM away from the runway threshold was proposed as a solution (s. Fig 2.11),
which allows each aircraft to fly an used-preferred trajectory (preferred speeds and de-
scent rates) [WO10]. However, this procedure increases the complexity and puts a higher
demand on ATCOs so that further support is necessary.
The key idea of the concept developed in FAGI is that aircraft use separate routes
as long as possible and are merged at a Late-Merging-Point (LMP). Aircraft are
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Figure 2.11.: Late-Merging route structure, with direct routes (black lines) and path
stretching area (dashed gray lines)
divided into two groups depending on the capability of their Flight Management
System (FMS). Aircraft equipped with a 4D-FMS are able to fly a specified route
within a high time-precision and are allowed following a direct approach (black aircraft
and routes in Fig. 2.11). They negotiate a fixed time with the AMAN and can fly their
preferred profile as long as they can meet the time restrictions. The equipped aircraft
fly separated routes and are merged at the LMP just 6NM away from the landing
threshold. As these aircraft can fly their preferred profile, they can fly a Continuous
Descent Approach (CDA). In a CDA, level segments are avoided, so that aircraft
are flying with higher altitudes compared to conventional approaches. Thereby the
noise immissions at the ground are reduced. The use of these 4D-FMS capabilities is
a key potential for a further increase of efficiency. While CDAs are not implemented
in high traffics situations today due to their negative impact on capacity [Erk99] the
FAGI-approach aims to enable aircraft equipped with a 4D-FMS to fly CDAs without
reducing the airports capacity. As a consequence, the environmental impact in terms of
fuel consumption and noise immissions can be reduced.
Aircraft which are not equipped with a 4D-FMS have to be guided in the conventional
way manually from the arrival routes over a path-stretching area (called Trombone, gray
aircraft and dashed gray routes in Fig. 2.11). The path stretching area consists of a
downwind leg, a base leg and an extended centerline. By changing the trombone length,
the arrival time of aircraft can be adjusted, so that unequipped aircraft can be merged
into the established stream and fill the gaps between equipped aircraft.
A preliminary study showed that the merging of both arrival streams is the most
challenging task [WO08]. For this reason, two kinds of visual aids to assist the con-
troller during the late-merging-procedure have been developed. One of this visual aids
is ghosting [OWR09]. For each equipped aircraft, a synthetic copy (ghost) is projected
onto the runway centerline extension. When the unequipped aircraft have to be lined
up, the ghosts indicate positions reserved for equipped aircraft. The ghosts move along
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the centerline and meet with the symbol of the corresponding real aircraft at the late
merging point. The other visual aid developed is Targeting [OWM10]. This visual aid
projects a copy of each unequipped aircraft on the centerline. These targets indicate
the goal-position of the unequipped aircraft on the centerline, as calculated by the an
AMAN. To investigate the effect of the visual aids on the controller under standardized
conditions, the simulation environment MAGIE was developed. It applies a simplified
route structure proposed for the late-merging operations. This simulation environment
is applied as the example application in this thesis.
The 4D-CARMA AMAN was extended to be able to handle the developed concept of
integrating aircraft into a stream of 4D equipped aircraft. This capability was validated
during the Project FAGI [OGS08,WO10]. The extension of the concepts developed in
the FAGI project to a real-world setting, including bad weather conditions and flexible
routes, are part of the ongoing project FlexiGuide [TCE+11].
2.3. Conventional Human Performance Measurement
In this section, the term “human performance” is defined and an overview of the current
state of the art in measuring human performance is given. At first, the measurement of
human performance in HMSs is analyzed. Since the method developed in this thesis is
demonstrated with an ATC task, the measurement of human performance in ATC will
be discussed in detail. As this thesis uses a microworld as simulation environment, per-
formance measurements in other microworlds, which are common in Cognitive Science,
are analyzed. Based on the examination of the various areas where human performance
is measured, implications for a new measure of performance are drawn.
2.3.1. Human Performance Measurement in Human-Machine Interaction
Human erroneous actions may lead to serious consequences as mentioned in section
2.1.6. For this reason, the performance of human operators of complex technical systems
is of utmost importance. Even in the absence of hazardous results, human actions
are a determining factor of system efficiency. Thus, a poor performance of the human
operator will at least lead to monetary consequences. Due to these consequences, human
performance is a main research issue.
The measurement of human performance is of particular importance during training
to evaluate its success and to decide about the amount of training necessary. Further-
more performance measurement is important for the evaluation of new concepts and
technology. If new concepts or technology are introduced, this will change the working
methods and the performance of the human operators. Consequently, it is essential to
demonstrate that new concepts have a positive impact (or at least no negative impact) on
the human performance or that a decrease in performance can be avoided by additional
assistance [MMFP00,RA03].
The human performance can be defined as the accomplishment of the task by a human
operator [Gaw00,MMFP00]. Although this definition sounds simple, there are several
problems in the measurement of human performance. Firstly, the accomplishment of
32 Chapter 2: Human-Machine Interaction
the task is the fulfillment of its objectives. However, actually many HMSs lack of clear
defined objectives (see section 2.1.5). An example for such an ambiguous objective is the
objective to guide a process efficiently. Without giving objectives with exact numbers, it
is not possible to make a statement about its fulfillment. Consequently, precisely defined
objectives are a prerequisite of human performance measurement.
Validity and Reliability
Valid and reliable measurement of human performance is essential. Validity corresponds
to the quality of the results. According to [TD08], four different kinds of validity can
be distinguished as illustrated in Fig. 2.12. First it has to be distinguished between
cause (e.g. task difficulty) and effect (e.g. task performance) and between the construct
(e.g. human task performance) and the measure (e.g. amount of produced units). The
measure is the operationalization of the abstract construct. The conclusion validity
describes the examined relationship between the measured operationalization of a cause
and an effect. Thus, only the measurements are compared. The internal validity is
given, if this relationship is a causal one. The construct validity describes how well the
operationalization complies with the constructs. In other words, the construct validity
is given if the used measurement is appropriate to measure the cause respectively the
effect. Finally, the external validity is given, if the results can be generalized.
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Figure 2.12.: Four types of validity
Another important requirement for a measure is its reliability. Reliability is defined
as the variance of the true value of a construct divided by the variance of the measured
value. Thus, the reliability is related to stochastic measurement errors. If the measure-
ment error is low, the reliability will tend to 1, whereas a high measurement error will
lead to reliability near zero. Consequently, the repetition of measurements with a low
reliability will probably produce different results.
The relationship between validity and reliability are illustrated in figure 2.13. The
center of the target is the concept that is tried to be measured. The dots are the
individual measurements. In the left figure a measurement with a high validity (the
mean of the dots is close to the center) but a low reliability is shown. In the figure
in the middle a measurement with a low validity but a high reliability (the dots are
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close together) is shown. A measurement with a high reliability and a high validity is
illustrated in the right figure. A performance measure needs—like every other measure—
a high reliability and validity.
(a) Valid but not reliable (b) Reliable but not valid (c) Valid and reliable
Figure 2.13.: Validity and reliability
Types of Performance Measures
Human performance measures can be distinguished according to different characteristics
(e.g. [RA03]). The different characteristics of performance measures or summarized in
Table 2.3. At first there is the difference between subjective and objective measures.
Examples for subjective measures are questionnaires or interviews, which can be used
for a self-assessment by the human operators. Another example are expert observers,
which may be used to rate the performance and who may be able to identify problems
that have remained hidden for human operators. These techniques can also be used to
derive objectives measures if a criterion is used as a standard. For example, the rating
of an action as excellent is subjective, to confirm that it is adherent with the standards
is an objective measure [RA03].
Table 2.3.: Summary of different types of performance measures
Characteristic Types
Perspective Subjective (e.g. excellent) vs.Objective (e.g. adherent with standards)
Access Primary (measured) vs.Secondary (calculated, e.g. max. or average)
Measurability Direct (measured) vs.Indirect (inferred from direct measures)
Object Human-Machine performance (e.g. throughput) vs.Human performance
Focus Result measure (considers exclusively outcome) vs.Process measure (considers additionally intermediate states)
The measurements of human performance can either be direct or indirect [RA03].
If performance is measured indirectly, it must be inferred from direct measures. For
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example, the performance can be measured directly in detection task (rate of correct
detections). Indirect measures have to be used, if the correct decision is not known in
each situation. In these cases, variables of the systems are measured, which describe the
consequences of decisions. To infer the performance from these variables, they have to
reflect the accomplishment of the task. An example for such a variable is the systems’
consumption of energy which can be used as an indirect measure of efficiency reached
by human operators’ decisions. To reach a high construct validity when measuring
human performance indirectly, it is crucial to choose a variable, which is appropriate for
describing performance (the measured construct). In the case of human performance
this variable must reflect the objectives of the tasks.
Another issue is the distinction between primary and secondary measures. Secondary
measures are derived from primary measures. The difference to indirect measures is
that secondary measures can be derived exactly whereas indirect measures are inferred.
Examples for secondary measures are the calculation of maximum or average values.
A difficulty when measuring human performance is to differentiate between the per-
formance of the human operator and the performance of the system respective the per-
formance of the team, if humans are working cooperatively [RA03]. Typical examples
of system measures are capacity, throughput, or delays. These measures are greatly in-
fluenced by human performance but include also the performance of the technical parts
of the HMS. The differentiation between system performance and human performance
is of particular importance as the increasing computer-based assistance takes over sub-
tasks from the human operator and it is consequently difficult to allocate the reached
performance to the controlled system or the human operator. The confusion between
system and human measures leads to problems especially when comparing variants of a
system, which differ in the LoA. For example, using the energy consumption of a HMS
as an indirect measure allows performance to be compared between human operators
coping with the identical problem but it does not allow performance to be compared
across different problems (requiring different amounts of energy to be solved) or LoAs.
If a required standard of performance or a frame of reference can be defined for each
problem or scenario, a comparison between the actual performance and the standard be-
comes possible [YLVC02]. The resulting deviation of the performance from the standard
can finally be used to compare different scenarios.
Another distinction is the difference between process and product measures. Whereas
product measures only concentrate on the result or the output, process measure consider
how the result was reached. If the performance is measured indirectly, for example the
energy consumption, the measure describes the summarized performance of a whole
simulation and the performance cannot be broken down to the various actions. This
shows that some indirect measures cannot be used as process measures. The difference
between process and product measures was already discussed in section 1.1 and the
drawbacks of results measures are the main motivation for the development of a process
measure of human performance in this thesis.
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Signal Detection Theory
If the objective of the process is clearly defined and it is possible to define the right
decision in every situation, the performance can be measured by determining the cor-
rectness for each action. An example for such a task is the detection of signals or the
identification of problems. In this case, the contribution of each decision to the overall
performance can be measured by applying the Signal Detection Theory (SDT). The
SDT is introduced briefly in the following. For in extensive description see [GS89,MC05].
The SDT assumes two states of the environment (signal/problem present or not) and
two human responses (detect signal/problem or not). This results into a 2 x 2 matrix
(see Table 2.14). Each decision is classified into one of the four categories of this matrix.
The hit rate, which is the amount of hits divided by the total of hits and misses can
be calculated out of this matrix. Additionally, the false alarm rate can be calculated by
dividing the amount of false alarms by the sum of false alarms and correct rejections.
The SDT can reveal the individual decision criterion and the individual detection
performance of human operators. The individual detection performance corresponds to
the ability to differentiate between the presence and absence of a signal (or problem).
The individual decision criterion is a measure for the human operators’ conservativeness.
In other word, it can distinguish between human operators preferring a high hit rate at
a cost of a high false alarm rate from operators preferring both rates to be lower. The
individual detection performance can be calculated using the sensitivity by d′ = z(hit
rate)− z(false alarm rate) with z as the inverse of the cumulative Gaussian distribution.
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Figure 2.14.: Four categories of performance according to the signal detection theory,
depending on the state of the world and the operators response
The decision criterion and the individual detection performance are both represented
by the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) which is depicted as the ROC-
curve. The individual performance results in one point in the ROC plot. In Fig. 2.15
an example of four ROC curves is shown. If the human operator is only guessing, the
hit rate and the false alarm rate are equal. This corresponds to a diagonal through
the origin in the ROC diagram. A higher individual detection performance will result
into a higher hit rate and a lower false alarm rate. The performance corresponds to the
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distance between the individual point (defined by the measured rates) and the diagonal.
The individual decision criterion corresponds to the distance between this point and the
axis of ordinate. A more conservative decision criterion will reduce the hit rate and the
false alarm rate as well, but the ability to differentiate between the presence and absence
of a signal is the same and thus the performance is the same. If the individual decision
criterion is modified while the detection performance is constant, the individual point
moves along its ROC Curve.
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Figure 2.15.: Receiver-Operator-Characteristic (ROC) curves
Time Window
To account for the dynamics of complex systems a time window as a measurement
construct was proposed [Rot01, Rot11]. A time window is a relationship between a
required situation and a time interval in which this situation is reachable by an action.
During a simulation, a time windows is first inactive. It is designated as open, if the
situation is currently required and an action to reach the required situation is available
at the current point in time. The time window is closed, if the situation is no longer
required or is not reachable anymore. According to the time window method, an action
of the human operator is considered as a two-tuple consistent of a detectable act and a
specific point in time, at which it is performed.
To evaluate human performance two Boolean indicator functions are defined. There-
fore m actions are denoted as bj for j = 1 to m and n time windows are denoted as wi
for i = 1 to n. The first functions
I1w(b) =
{
1, if b meets situation specified in w
0, if b does not meet situation (2.2)
evaluates if an action leads to a required situation, for which a time window is defined.
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The second function
I2w(b) =
{
1, if b is relevant towards w
0, if b is not relevant towards (2.3)
is used to determine if an action is relevant towards a time window. This function
evaluates to 1, if the action does not lead to a required situation but would result in a
required situation at a different point in time.
Combining the actions of the human operator and the available time windows, seven
different categories result (s. Fig 2.16). The two main dimensions are first the existence
of a time window (independent of its state) and a corresponding required situation (state
of the environment) and second the response of the operator. This results into a 2 x
2 matrix similar to the SDT. If an action is not relevant to any window, the action is
classified as false alarm. In contrast, if no action is relevant to a window, the window is
classified as missed. If an action b meets the situation specified in the time windows w,
the actions is either on-time, if it is required when the action is performed (time window
open), or early or late (time window inactive or closed). An action is incorrect, if it does
not lead to the required situation, but would have if it had been executed at another
point in time.
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Figure 2.16.: Seven categories of actions defined by the time window method, depend-
ing on the state of the world and the operators response [RN11]
Compared to the SDT, the time window method considers the dynamics of a task.
The application of time windows gives more information about the operator’s actions
and thus allows for a more detailed classification. If only on-time actions are considered
as hits and all other actions (gray background in Fig. 2.16) are considered as false alarms,
the time windows method leads to the same classification as the SDT.
2.3.2. Human Performance Measurement in Air Traffic Control
This section focuses on the measurement of human performance in Air Traffic Con-
trol (ATC). As already described in the previous section, the variables used to measure
human performance have to depend strongly on the particular application. This section
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will consider the application of the above described methods to measure human perfor-
mance in the context of ATC. As the example task in this thesis is an air traffic control
approach task supported by an AMAN, this section concentrates particularly on the
measures of human performance used for the validation of AMANs.
In the field of ATC simulations are used to evaluate the performance in a controlled
environment. ATCOs are interacting with a replica or a prototype of a real system
during a simulation. Simulations are done either to assess the training performance or
the feasibility of new procedures. Each condition for a simulation run is called a scenario.
Simulations allow analyzing scenarios which are too risky to test under operational
conditions. This includes scenarios with a very high task demand as well as scenarios
which include new technology. A disadvantage of simulations is that after the first action
the situations between different simulation runs of the same scenario will not be the same
again. Even slight differences in the timing of an action may lead to complete different
results and require different further actions [MS05]. As a consequence, the simulation is
hard to control and the comparison of different simulation runs is complicated.
The measures used for human performance must reflect the fulfillment of the operators’
task. The task of ATCOs is preventing collisions between aircraft and maintaining the
safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic [ICA13]. (For a detailed description
of the ATCOs subtasks see section 2.2.) As the task of ATCOs is mainly cognitive,
most of the activities are not directly observable. That complicates the measurement of
performance of ATCOs additionally. As a result many aspects of the performance have
to be inferred [HGS99].
Objective Performance Measures
Performance can either be quantified by a subjective opinion or by objective observable
variables. An example for subjective measure in ATC are Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs), which are often used as observers to rate the human performance. Thereby
some instruments like rating scales can be used. The first rating scales in use were
vague, for example ranging from poor to excellent performance. One improvement was
to introduce Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales (BARSs), which tie points of
the rating scale to observable behavior. These BARSs are completed by the SMEs and
are thus depended on their subjective opinion. If SMEs have to go through a checklist
to record observed events, the results can be treated as objective because the occurrence
of an event should not be arguable if there is a clear definition.. However, the use of
SMEs is limited by their availability and the monetary resources to pay them.
Besides from BARSs, objective measures can additionally be derived from recordings
of system data. One example is the identification of Operational Errors (OEs).
The problem of using OEs as a measure of human performance is that they are very
rare. They can be provoked in simulations but only by putting the ATCO under a very
high and unrealistic task load. Also this measure lacks to detect aberrations from the
normal behavior of ATCOs which lead to near misses of OEs [MS05]. Other examples are
System Effectiveness Measures [BDHK83] or Performance and Objective Workload
Evaluation (POWER) [Ran04]. These collections of possible measures include system
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variables or measures which are derived from system variables. Examples are the number
of controlled aircraft, the control duration, the amount of pairs of aircraft in conflict,
etc. These collections were developed to provide objective measure for ATCO’ taskload
and performance and are easy to obtain.
However, there are some problems associated with these objective measures. First of
all, they do not measure the criterions of interest directly so that secondary measures
are necessary [RA03] and their interpretation is less clear [MMFP00]. As a consequence,
the main problem is not the availability of the data but the construction of valid and
reliable measures. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that no criteria are defined for the
POWER measures and a lot of measures are used which meaning is not clear [Ran04].
Also it is often not possible to define the difference between system and individual
performance [MS05].
Objective measures of performance measures used in ATC were collected by Hadley
et al [HGS99] and Rantanen et al [RV07] and organized in databases. Hadley et al listed
more the 170 measures and assigned them to different categories. Further, they defined
which kind of effect on the system is measured (safety, capacity, efficiency) and in which
environment the measure can be applied (en route, tracon (tma), tower, oceanic). They
furthermore separated the task of ATCOs in steps (situation assessment, planning &
decision making, and implementation) and defined the relevance of each measure for the
performance in the individual steps. The literature review of Rantanen et al [Ran04]
found 2475 directly and 2344 indirectly measured variables (also including workload
measures) in 260 articles. These measures were ordered into 65 classes of direct and
36 classes of indirect measures. They found out that the most used indirect measures
for human performance in ATC are the amount of actions, the performance rated by
an observer, the response time, durations, the amount of events, and the self-rated
performance. 70% of the measurement variables that have been used in the reviewed
literature were one of those.
Validation of Arrival Manager
In the following the use of performance measures for the validation of AMANs (see
section 2.2.4) is analyzed. For the validation of AMANs, mainly objective performance
measures were applied. In the following a few examples are mentioned.
The COMPAS system (see section 2.2.4) was evaluated in real-time simulations and in
field test. The simulation compared traffic samples (with COMPAS) against a baseline
(without COMPAS) to assess traffic handling performance, controller workload, and
acceptance. Direct measures like the observed and planned times, the aircraft’s radar
tracks and controller activities were recorded during the simulations. This data was
used to calculate secondary measures like the sector and TMA flight time of aircraft as
measures for performance [Sch98].
During the Eurocontrol project PHARE (Programme for Harmonised Air Traffic Man-
agement Research in Europe) conducted in the mid 1990s, which aimed to increase the
capacity of European air space through a harmonization and the use of 4D-Trajectories,
real time simulations were conducted, to show the benefits of the developed concept.
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The objectives of the second major real time simulation exercise PD/2 was to assess the
controller workload and performance of arrival traffic handling in the Extended Termi-
nal Maneuvering Area (ETMA). The controller was supported through a computer
generated 4D profile and a computer assistance to plan and establish conflict free tra-
jectories. To determine the accomplishment of these objectives, objective measures were
calculated like the number of landings per time, the average flight time, inbound delay,
the time precision of delivery, and the number of separation violations [RSA+98].
For the 4D-Planner, the successor of COMPAS, it was planned to measure the traf-
fic flow (landing aircraft per time), the demand (possible landings, ignoring minimum
separations), delay, and separation during its evaluation in the field [Sch98].
The successor of the 4D-Planner is called 4D-CARMA. This AMAN has been em-
ployed in several projects. One example is the project OPTIMAL. The objective of the
project was to define and validate approach procedures with reduced noise immissions
and increased safety and capacity. A dual threshold approach was validated, in which
the use of two thresholds on a runway makes the reduction of the separation minimum
possible. During this validation in a real time simulation in December 2007 and January
2008, arrivals per time, average track length, and average flight time [HHUR+09] were
analyzed as objective measures.
Another example for the application of 4D-CARMA was the validation of the FAGI-
Concept (see section 2.2.5). In the conducted real time simulation, objective perfor-
mance data was recorded in the categories throughput, separation, conflicts, and flight
efficiency. Throughput was measured in terms of landed aircraft. The secondary mea-
sures in the category separation were the violation of the separation at the touchdown
(in terms of time and distance). Additionally, the average violation and the average
additional flight duration and flight distance were considered. The observed violations
of the separation were analyzed according to the involved aircraft types and the areas in
which they occurred. The flight efficiency was measured in terms of the average flight
time and flight distance of all aircraft (respectively all unequipped) [WO10].
These examples show that especially objective data (recorded flight trajectories and
events) is used for the validation of AMANs. The use of this objective data is associated
with the problems mentioned above. They allow for an assessment of the performance of
the complete systems, consistent of human and controlled system. The determination of
the respective contributions to the overall performance and thus the determination of the
human performance in isolation is not possible. In the provided examples opportunity
to analyze the operators’ performance more accurately, to identifying specific problems,
and to derive possible improvement for to systems is not used.
2.3.3. Human Performance Measurement in Microworlds
This section analyzes the measurement of human performance in microworlds. Mi-
croworlds are small-scale computer simulations of real systems [HV98]. Dependent on
their purpose they are representative of industrial scale complex HMS or political pro-
cesses, or, in the brought sense, human-environment interaction (the environment can be
a company or a small city). They are designed to be between simple laboratory environ-
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ments and field studies. Consequently, microworlds are highly controllable and traceable
but they lack of a high degree of correspondence with the real system [Gra02,BD93].
Microworlds are commonly used in the similar domains of dynamic decision making
[GVM05] and CPS [Fun98]. Because of their high face validity (they appear to have a
high validity), microworld are also used in personnel selection [Fun98]. For this purpose,
the real task is not important and the simulated task is only a cover story to increase the
subjects’ engagement. Furthermore, some microworlds exist which simulate the ATC
tasks but for research questions in the field of ATC the terms mid-fidelity simulator
or low-fidelity simulator are more common. Examples for such simulators are ATC-
Lab Advanced [FLN09], Multitask (used by [KPS+06]), TRACON (used by [Ack92])
and FAirControl [MOW08]. Many studies have been conducted with microworlds or
mid/low-fidelity simulators in the field of ATC (e.g. [KPS+06,MP01,RJR+00,JBPD11]).
Characteristics of microworlds
According to Brehmer [Bre92] microworlds used in the domain of dynamic decision mak-
ing replicate three characteristics of real world decision problems. These are complexity,
dynamics, and opaqueness. Complexity results from many interacting elements and
from different—possible conflicting—goals. Dynamic in microworlds has four aspects: a
series of decision has to be made, decisions are not independent, the world is dynamic,
and decisions have to be made in real time. Microworlds additionally do not reveal all
their characteristics and relationships and are consequently opaque.
Likewise microworlds are used in CPS. Intransparency, polytely, complexity, connec-
tivity, and dynamics are important characteristics of complex problems according to
Dörner [Dör89] and Funke [Fun91]. Intransparency implies a lack of clarity of a sit-
uation, which means the current state is not completely observable. The existence of
multiple goals is depicted as polytely. The definitions of complexity and dynamics are
similar to the definitions in the field of dynamic decision making given above.
The characteristics of microworlds as defined above are often found in real HMS.
Consequently, research conducted using microworlds is also of relevance when analyzing
problems in HMSs. Additionally CPS has some similarities with NDM (see section 2.1.5).
They both concentrate on real-life tasks, which are ill-structures and dynamic, require
a sequence of decisions and have multiple goals [Fun01]. While NDM focuses on deci-
sion making by experts in real life, CPS concentrates on novices interacting with mi-
croworlds.
Microworlds in ATC
As mentioned above, some microworlds were developed which are based on the work-
ing environment of ATCOs. One example is the mid-fidelity simulator ATC-lab Ad-
vanced [FLN09], which is the successor of ATC-lab and simulates the task environment
of en-route ATCOs. Because of the unavoidable tradeoff between realism and exper-
imental control and the different demands of research questions, ATC-lab Advanced
allows varying realism and control systematically. Clearances are entered via keyboard
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and mouse. Values for speed and altitude have to be chosen from a dropdown menu, and
a new heading is given by dragging a line to the destination point. ATC-lab Advanced
was used in different studies for applied and basics research in which endorsed ATCOs
as well as non-experts participated. A screenshot of ATC-lab Advanced is shown in
Fig. 2.17.
Another example for a microworld featuring an ATC task is Multitask. Multitask is a
PC-based simulation and shows the positions of aircraft on a radar screen. The task also
includes two airports near the middle of the screen. The goal of the operator in Multitask
is to contact the incoming aircraft and ensure their safe landing. Participants have to
change the clearances for aircraft which potentially caused conflicts. The clearances were
given by selecting one of eight commands from a control box. A screenshot of multitask
is shown in Fig. 2.18.
Performance Measurement in Microworlds
The above applications put high demands on the quality of performance measurement
in microworlds. Though, the measurement of performance in microworlds has been
criticized in the literature. Since the participants input will determine the course of the
process, the intermediate situation and thus the way on which a result was reached vary
greatly. Additionally, there are often several very different ways leading to similar results.
A performance measure, which considers only the result and not the process, ignores
the differences between the chosen solutions [Fun98,HV98]. Moreover, if a microworld
is designed without a known best solution, only a relative comparison of the reached
score is possible [Fun98]. A further problem is that much data can be collected but
that most of it is hard or impossible to interpret [Fun98,HV98]. In addition, a coarse
performance measure (like the number of errors) is not suited to differentiate between
subjects [HV98]. Also, it is seldom possible to differentiate between the performance of
the operator and the system [Klu08]. These problems are very similar to the problems
of performance measurement in human machine interaction (see section 2.3.1)
To solve these problems, various alternative performance measures have been pro-
posed. Performance measures, which can be calculated from the recorded log files, have
the advantages that they are objective and that they can be determined automatically.
In the following, some suggested performance measures are discussed which meet these
conditions and furthermore consider the process (process measures) instead of consider
only the result (product measures).
Such performance measures were suggested by Howie and Vicente [HV98]. They
proposed to analyze the course of variables in the continuous state space to measure
performance. The proposed state space consists of measures which indicate the relative
achievement of the operator’s goals and thus can be considered as a goal space. In their
demonstrative example, a process has to be controlled to produce a specified output and
to reach a given temperature. Thus the specified output and the temperature are the
objectives and the axes of the goal space. The process starts at the origin (0,0) and
the point at which both objectives, output and temperature, are reached is defined as
(1,1). One proposed measure of performance is the length of this trajectory. The more
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Figure 2.17.: Annotated user interface of ATC-lab Advanced [FLN09,FN08]
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Figure 2.18.: User interface of the microworld Multitask [KPS+06]
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directly the operator reaches to goal, the shorter the trajectory. Further the distance to
the target in the goal space can be calculated at any time and indicates the approaching
of the target point. Another proposed measure of performance is the integral of this
distance over time.
One of the disadvantages of the measures proposed by Howie and Vicente is that
discrete variables describing the objectives would unavoidable cause jumps in the per-
formance measure. These measures further require a fixed and known target (at least
know to the researcher). However, in some tasks with the objective to reach a maxi-
mum output the best possible solution is not known. Consequently a measure of relative
performance cannot be defined for such tasks and the proposed performance measures
cannot be applied.
Sager et al [SBD+11] proposed a performance measure based on optimization to com-
pare the subject’s performance to the optimal solutions. The developed method should
allow the calculation of an objective performance measures for complex scenarios.
The method was demonstrated with the Tailorshop microworld. In this microworld,
participants are in charge of a small company producing shirts for one year. They can
make decisions about the infrastructure (machines and workers), the financials, and
logistics in every month. Hence the participant’s decisions can be described by an input
vector for each month uk = u(k), for k = 0, . . . , N − 1;N = 12. The state of the
microworld is xk = x(k), for k = 1, . . . , N . The objective is to maximize overall balance
at the end of the simulation, thus the objective function is
F (xN) = xoverall balanceN . (2.4)
Sager at al used optimization methods to calculate an optimal solution for each month
and constructed a so-called how much is still possible function
F ∗(xN ;ns), for ns = 0, . . . , N − 1. (2.5)
This function allows the assessments of the still possible performance for every month
and thus enables to identify good and bad decisions. They further used Lagrange mul-
tipliers to analyze the impact of the components of the input vectors on the how much
is still possible function which enables to determine the impact of each decision. The
how much is still possible function is monotonically decreasing and allows inferring the
potential that has not been used. The not used potential ∆Pk is calculated by tak-
ing the difference between the results of the how much is still possible function for two
consecutive months
∆Pk =: F ∗(xN ;ns = k + 1)− F ∗(xN ;ns = k). (2.6)
As long as the decisions are compared to a global optimum, the function ∆Pk is
non-positive and indicates the lost potential for each decision.
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This approach allows looking into detail by using a process measure instead of a
product measure. However, it is also limited to microworlds, in which a state depends
only on its predecessor state and the decision, but not on time. In such microworlds the
state of the world does not vary with time continuously but only as a consequence of
decisions.
2.4. Concluding Remarks
This section presented some performance measures for human interaction with complex
dynamic systems. Examples from HMI in general as well as examples from ATC and
microworlds were discussed. It was shown that most performance measures concentrate
only on the result and ignore the course of actions and possible alternatives. However,
measuring the performance in each situation would allow evaluating each single decision.
As a consequence, more detailed insight into the working methods of human operators
would result.
A performance measure considering the process was proposed by [SBD+11] for the
use in microworld. The optimal solution is calculated with optimization methods. The
resulting how much is still possible function is the best possible action sequence in each
situation and used as a criterion. The method presented to calculate the how much is
still possible function can be applied if the state of the world depends on the former
state and the operators’ decision but not if the state also depends on time. In complex
dynamic systems, in which the state also varies with time and the exact timing of an
action is important, the definition of such a sequence of actions is more complicated.
Not only the different actions and different sequences but also the different points in
time for each action have to be considered.
This problem will be tackled in this thesis. Consequently, the first main contribution
of this thesis is the development of a cognitive planning model to calculate a how much
is still possible function, which can also be applied to transform a given situation into
a goal situation if the state of the environment changes with time (see chapter 3). The
interaction sequences calculated by this model are externalized variables used as standard
for the measurement of human performance. Human erroneous actions can be detected
as deviations from the best available option.
As described in section 2.1, operators do not make the optimal decision in most cases
but chose an action which has a satisficing result. Using the optimal performance as
criteria causes the excessive detection of human erroneous actions. A differentiation
between human error and not optimal performance is not possible. One of the main
reasons for a not optimal performance is the uncertainty, both regarding the current
situation and especially regarding future states and the consequences of actions. To
consider the prediction uncertainty as a reason for not optimal solutions, it is integrated
into the criterion by integrating it into the cognitive planning model. The interaction
sequences generated by the extended model shall differentiate between small inevitable
deviations caused by prediction uncertainty if the human operator is not able to identify
a better option and larger deviations if the human operator should be able to select a
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better option. This extended model calculates action sequences which lead to the goal
even if the future is not exactly predicted. Consequently, these sequences deviate from
the optimal performance but are a more realistic estimation of human behavior and can
be used to identify human errors.
The integration of this uncertainty into the calculation of the action sequence is the
second main contribution of this thesis. This will be explained in chapter 4.
If the consequences of operators’ decisions are compared to the how much is still pos-
sible function, exactly the operators’ influence is measured and the performance can
clearly be assign to the operator. However, to allow evaluating operators’ single actions
it has to be considered that the results of this action may only show up later. Con-
sequently, the immediate consequences cannot be compared to the how much is still
possible function. To enable the comparison between the effects of the implemented ac-
tions and the how much is still possible function, both have to be considered in the same
time horizon. Therefore it was proposed [SBD+11] to calculate the difference of the how
much is still possible function in two consecutive steps to get the lost potential with each
implemented action. The observed and implemented actions may be only the first step
of a plan the operator has in mind to reach the goal. When this step is evaluated, the
further steps the operator could take have to be considered. Hence, to evaluate single
decisions, the best solution before the actions is implemented is compared to the decision
of the operator, which consists of the measured action and the best possible option.
This method allows not only evaluating actions implemented by the operator but
also identifying missing actions. They are indicated by a decrease of the reachable
performance (equally to a lost potential) from on situation to the next without an
action between. Consequently, the use of a goal-directed sequence as a criterion enables
evaluating the human operator’s behavior at every point in time. After human operator’s
decisions are evaluated with this method, the decisions can be assigned to one of four
categories similar to those of the SDT (see section 2.3.1). The first dimension is the
necessity for action which is given if the sequence of actions includes an immediate action.
This action can either be executed by the human operator or not (second dimension).
Depending on the position of the executed action in the sequence and its effect, it can
also be classified as too late or too early and the extended classification scheme as defined
in the time window method can be applied (see section 2.3.1).
The third main contribution of this thesis is the development of a method to assign
the measured behavior to the categories of these classification schemes. This will be
explained in chapter 5.
The evaluation of actions based on the possible outcome has three advantages.
• First, the characteristics of a situation are compared to the performance in this sit-
uation and thus allows detecting differences between the human operators’ mental
models and the reality.
• Second, the method is objective and reproducible since a model and an algorithm
are used to interpret the recorded interaction logs.
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• Third, the integration of time-dependent dynamics allows an application to a va-
riety of systems.
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3. Petri-Net-Based Modeling of Human Planning
The human operator cognitive task performance measure developed in this thesis uses
goal-directed interaction sequences as criteria for the evaluation of human operators’
decisions. To generate these interaction sequences, a cognitive planning model is devel-
oped. This chapter is dedicated to the development of this model. The developed model
consists of three parts. First, it includes a Coloured Petri Net (CPN) model of the
task environment. The second part of the model is a set of rules describing normative
human operators’ behavior. The third part is the planning process, which analyzes the
state space of the modeled task by applying the set of rules defining the normative
behavior. Thereby, the best available option is identified.
The chapter is structured as follows. At first, the concept for the generation of inter-
action sequences is explained. In particular, the requirements imposed by an application
of the method in a complex dynamic task environment as well as their fulfillment will
be discussed (see section 3.1). Second, both applied modeling techniques, namely CPNs
and Situation-Operator-Modeling (SOM), are introduced. Subsequently, the com-
monalities of these techniques and their application for the simulation and analysis of
HMSs are described in section 3.2. Afterward, the task and the implementation of the
utilized microworld simulation environment will be presented in section 3.3. The CPN
used for the simulation in this microworld is detailed in section 3.4. Subsequently, the
deduction of the set of rules is explained in section 3.5 followed by the description of
the implemented planning process in section 3.6. Finally, the developed planning model
is demonstrated exemplarily in section 3.7 before some concluding remarks are given in
section 3.8.
Previous versions of the cognitive planning model developed in this chapter are already
published in [HS13a,HS13b,HS14].
3.1. Requirements and Concept
In this section, the concept for the generation of a planned interaction sequence as a
criterion for the evaluation of human operators’ decision will be presented. This is
based on the analysis of the requirements imposed by an application of the method in a
complex dynamic task environment.
3.1.1. Requirements for Performance Criteria in Human-Machine Systems
Several difficulties in dynamic HMSs complicate the definition and generation of goal-
directed interaction sequences as criteria. However, to ensure the applicability of the
method to a broad range of HMSs, the developed concept has to fulfill the requirements
imposed by characteristics commonly found in HMSs and discussed in the following.
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• In some cases, the conditions of the system can facilitate its operation, e.g. when
only few actions are necessary to reach a certain result. On the other hand, the
system can converge to a critical situation without human operators having a
change to avoid this situation. In other words, a good result reachable in one
situation will probably not be reachable in most other situations. This requires
generating a new criterion for each situation.
• Some actions have not only immediate consequences but have also long-term ef-
fects. These effects include the gain and loss of options as consequences of actions.
The effects have to be considered to decide about goal-directness of an action.
This requires knowing an interaction sequence leading the system from the actual
situation to a goal situation as a criterion.
• In a dynamic system, the variables can change both as a consequence of opera-
tors’ interventions as well as with time (e.g. [End95b]). Thus the effects of an
action additionally depend on the time of its execution. Consequently, actions or
interaction sequences are only goal-oriented in small time windows. Consequently,
the options (represented by interaction sequences) are changing with time and a
frequent update is necessary.
• Interactivity is a fundamental characteristic of HMSs, as human operators influence
the systems and determine the course of events. In addition, inputs can be made
in various forms. For example operators can have the choice between several
target values. In many cases the systems’ states depend on the operators’ input
so strongly that small differences in input lead to completely different situations
which cannot be foreseen. Consequently, interaction sequences as criteria can
only be calculated during or after an observed interaction but not previously.
Additionally, the complete set of actions possible even in a specific situation cannot
be considered due to its enormous amount [OHS11].
• The state of a system is often described by time-dependent continuous variables
which are linked for example with differential equations. The operator input,
on the other hand, is often event discrete. The modeling technique to describe
interaction sequences must consequently allow describing discrete and continuous
variables.
• Additionally, there are often multiple and sometime contradictory objectives. For
example, the task may be to increase the output of a process and to avoid critical
situations in the meantime. Thus, the developed approach must be able to deal
with multiple objectives.
3.1.2. Concept of the Developed Planning Model
The developed model to generate interaction sequences is an implementation of the cog-
nitive function planning. However, the information processing of humans consists of
3.1. Requirements and Concept 51
several cognitive functions, e.g. after the HMR (see section 2.1.2) of perception, inter-
pretation, planning and execution. Focusing on planning is sufficient as this function
generates possible courses of actions out of the available options. As a plans rejec-
tion would require an alternative plan to be generated, the future course of actions is
eventually determined by the planning function.
In the developed model, planning is realized two-piece. On the one hand, a prediction
based on a CPN is used to calculate the possible future states and problems of the
controlled system. On the other hand, a set of rules is defined which models operators’
behavior. Each rule describes an action added to the plan to prevent detected problems.
Consequently, the planed sequence strongly depends on the definition of problems and
corresponding actions to avoid these. Therefore, the rules, which combine a problem
definition and a suitable solution, are thoroughly and systematically deducted from the
objectives and the available action.
A plan represents what is reachable in a given situation. Using a plan as a criterion
will consequently allow differentiating between the impact of the human operator and
the inevitable effects of the controlled system. To consider also long term effects, plans
consist of sequences of actions. To deal with the dynamics and interactivity of HMSs,
plans will be generated frequently for the situations measured during an interaction. Out
of the many options available in a specific situation, each generated plan represents only
one option. This is sufficient only when the plan is goal-directed and represents the best
option available. In this case, other options can either be excluded by the defined set
of rules or refused during the planning after being identified as inferior. Consequently,
the objectives have to be integrated into the set of rules. It is also possible to integrate
multiple objectives into the set of rules. Different objectives can be realized by adapting
the set. In the developed approach, the continuous variables are discretized in time
and each time step is treated as an event. The dynamics of the system are modeled as
autonomous changes whereas the inputs of the operator are modeled as external events.
Consequently, the developed model fulfills the requirements defined above.
Petri Nets were chosen because they offer numerous possibilities for analyzes as a
formal language. Furthermore Coloured Petri Nets can be used for realizing a simulation
environment so that real interaction and simulation can be performed using the same
model [OGS08,Wer06]. Additionally, CPNs already demonstrated their benefits for the
realization of simulation environments and the analysis of human behavior [GOS09,
MOW08,HOS09,OHS11]. Another advantage of realizing the concept based on CPNs is
that the implementation of the simulation of the operated system and of the planning
model can be realized with the same programing language. The benefits of CPN for
the holistically modeling of systems and human behavior are also already demonstrated
[Wer06,Möh11].
If a plan representing a goal-directed interaction sequence is known, the effects of the
human operators’ decisions can be compared to the effects of the sequence. However,
also human operators’ decisions have long term consequences and it is not sufficient to
compare the immediate consequences of a decision to the long-term consequences of an
interaction sequences. To allow such a comparison, the consequences of the operators’
decision and the consequences of the interaction sequence have to be considered in the
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same time horizon. Therefore, a second interaction sequence is necessary to complete the
observed decisions. Comparing both sequences in terms of the quality of the reachable
goal allows evaluating the operators’ performance. This method is not bounded to
evaluate actions (observable decisions). Additionally, missing actions (omissions) can be
identified when two interaction sequences of adjacent situations are compared. Missing
actions are indicated by a decrease of the reachable performance without an action
between. Hence, implementing no action is also considered as an option available for
human operators. The details of the application of the developed cognitive planning
model for the measurement of human operator performance are given in chapter 5.
3.1.3. Related Work
The developed model is based on the analysis of action spaces, which are modeled
with CPN and analyzed with the SOM Technique. Situation-Operator-Modeling was
developed inter alia for the formalized description and analysis of HMI [Söf03, Söf04a].
The use of Petri Nets to build executable models based on SOM and the analysis of
Petri Nets with SOM have been proposed in former research [GOS09, EGVS10]. One
application is the realization of cognitive architectures [GS09b, EGVS10]. Apart from
that, SOM and Petri Nets have also been used to enable the comparison of operators’
decision making in dynamic task environments and the results from formal state space
analysis. For this purpose simulation environment based on CPNs have been developed
[MOW08,GOS09,GS09a].
One example for the analysis of human decision making based on a CPN model can
be found in [MS10]. A holistic human-machine model was realized as CPN. To analyze
heuristics applied by air traffic tower controllers, not only the processes at an airport
where modeled (machine model) but additionally the decision making of the controllers
(human model). Both models are connected with an interaction model. The model
can be coupled with a graphical user interface to constitute a simulation environment.
Two heuristics, a hierarchical and a first-come-first-serve heuristic, were implemented
with the three-step-principal consisting of an information search rule, a stop rule, and a
decision rule. The calculation of the state space of such a holistic human-machine model
reveals the decision space of the tower controller and allows analyzing this space.
In this approach, only a small set of inputs can be made by the operator. Furthermore,
the effect of time is neglected for the generation of the action space. The approach is
thus not able to deal with interactivity (as a complete state space needs to be calculated)
and dynamics as the approach presented in this theses. The holistic modeling approach
and the cognitive planning model developed in this thesis both consists of a human and
a machine model. In the holistic approach, both are integrated into one CPN whereas
in this thesis the CPN only models the technical system (machine) and the set of rules
models human behavior.
Another CPN-based simulation environment was applied in [GOS09] for the auto-
mated detection of formalized human errors (Automated Error Detection (AED)
approach). The environment simulates the abstract task of an arcade game. The Petri
Net is not used as a core of the simulation environment itself. Instead, it models the
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task and is connected to it to receive information about executed actions and changes
in the environment. In this application, multiple partial state spaces are calculated
starting from measured intermediate states instead of a complete state space starting
from the initial state. This reduces the computational demand. The partial state spaces
are limited by a defined maximal amount of nodes. As theses state spaces are based
on measured intermediate states, partial state spaces can only be calculated a posteri-
ori. As an example, the human error ’rigidity’ as described by [Dör89] and formalized
in [Söf04a,Söf04b] is detected if
• an action is not goal-directed,
• the previous action was goal-directed, and
• the action would be directed to the previous goal if no event would have occurred
in the meanwhile.
Therefore, the detection of errors requires the identification of action’s goal-directedness.
An action is goal-directed, if the amount of actions necessary to reach the goal is reduced.
As partial state spaces do mostly not contain final goals, intermediate sub-goals were
defined and used to determine the goal-directedness.
The similarity between the AED approach and this thesis are the a posteriori gen-
eration of partial state spaces to get goal-directed sequences. In the AED approach,
the partial state space is first generated and afterward analyzed to determine the goal-
directedness. In this thesis, the states are analyzed during the calculation of the partial
state space to allow concentrating on a goal-directed sequence. Therefore, this thesis
applies a model of human behavior, whereas the AED-approach uses only a machine
model. A further difference is that the AED approach can only be applied if changes of
the environment can be modeled as single events. It is not able to deal with continuous
dynamic.
This thesis is also influenced by theKnow Your Options (KYO) approach [OHS11].
The KYO approach also analyzed CPNs to evaluate human operators. A two-folded
approach is developed to detect difficulties with the interaction of human operators with
dynamic environments by contrasting the existing solutions to the perceived solutions.
To determine the existing solutions, partial state spaces are calculated a posteriori for
measured intermediate states. A simple set of rules to model human behavior is defined
to guide the calculation of state spaces. The aim is to determine the goal-directedness
of the options defined by the rules.
The main difference between the KYO approach and this thesis is that goal states
have to be reachable by the execution of only one action in the KYO approach. In
contrast, the planning model developed in this thesis is able to generate sequences of
actions to transform an initial state into a goal state. Thus, it can handle tasks requiring
more actions to reach goals and consider long-term effects of actions. Furthermore, in
the KYO approach, the correct perception of available options was analyzed. In this
thesis the execution of actions (and thus the selection and implementation of an available
option) is evaluated.
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The aim of this thesis is to develop an objective process measure of the operators’
task performance. To evaluate the operators’ decisions, goal-directed interaction se-
quences for the operation of complex dynamic systems are used as criteria. As in former
approaches, CPNs are used to analyze the consequences of operators’ decisions. In con-
trast to these former approaches interaction sequences instead of single actions are used
as a criterion. These are calculated by a newly developed planning model. Furthermore,
the developed method can be applied to a wider variety of system, due to its ability to
handle actions which effect depends on the time of their implementation.
3.2. Applied Modeling Techniques
In this section, first the concept of CPNs, which is a Higher Petri Net formalism, is
described. CPNs are used to model the system controlled by the human operator and
are applied in a way that the same model can be used during the interaction and for the
purpose of analysis. Next, the SOM technique is introduced. This technique is applied
to describe the procedure of the developed planning model. The section will close with
a brief comparison of both modeling techniques.
3.2.1. Coloured Petri Nets
Petri Nets and their extension CPNs applied here are mathematical and graphical model-
ing techniques initially developed by Carl Adam Petri [Pet62]. Petri Nets will be briefly
introduced in the following. For an extensive introduction to Petri Nets see [Bau96]
or [Kie06]. The following definitions of CPNs are taken from [JK09].
A Petri Net is a bipartite graph which consists of a set of places P and a set of
transitions T . They are connected by a set of directed arcs A which are a subset of
(P × T ) ∪ (T × P ). Places are symbolized by circles (or ovals) whereas transitions are
symbolized by rectangles (or bars). If a directed arc connects a place pi to the transition
tj, pi is an input place of tj. If a directed arc connects a transition tj to a place pi, the
place pi is an output place of tj.
Places can store data in terms of tokens (or marks). The set of all tokens in the net are
called the marking of the net and define its state respectively the state of the modeled
system. In common Petri Nets the tokens are uniform. In contrast, tokens can have a
data type like integer or string in CPNs and thus represent different characteristics.
Furthermore, combined data types are possible, which are similar to structures in some
programming languages. The data type of each token is called color set and must belong
to the set of defined color sets Σ. Each place p can only contain tokens of a fixed color
set C(p). This is defined by the color set function C : P → Σ. As the color set function
is fixed, the data type of the place tokens can not change during run-time.
Transitions model the changes of the system’s state and can modify the marking. A
transition can fire (is enabled), if the transition’s input places contain enough tokens
and—if the capacity of places is limited—the output place have enough free capacity.
The amount of necessary tokens on the input places respectively the necessary free
capacity on the output places is defined by weights assigned to the respective arcs. If
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Figure 3.1.: Example of a state space with 3 states (large gray circles). In each state,
the corresponding marking of the underlying Petri Net is depicted. The
initial marking mi = m0 is transformed with the firing sequence T1,T2
into the final marking mf = m2.
a transition fires, tokens are deleted form the input places and are added to the output
places corresponding to the weights. Although several transitions can be enabled at the
same time, only one transition can fire at once. After firing a transition, the conditions
for all transitions are checked again.
To be able to use the extended functionalities of CPNs and to handle more complex
marks some variables V have to be defined whereby the type of each variable v has to
agree with one of the defined color sets Type[v] ∈ Σ for all v ∈ V . Further, expressions
e can be used in CPNs, with EXPR as the set of all expressions. The free variables
used in an expression are denoted as V ar[e] and the type of the expression is denoted
as Type[e]. The set of expressions for which all V ar[e] ∈ V are denoted as EXPRV .
One extension of CPNs is that instead of a weight, an arc expression e can be assigned
to each arc a by E : A → EXPRV to manipulate the token and the data stored in
the connected places. Additionally, a function can be assigned to each transition to
manipulate the data of all input places or to define the tokens which are added to the
output places. This function can be seen as a special kind of arc expression. A further
extension is the concept of guards. A guard g can be assigned to each transition t by
G : T → EXPRV and use the tokens on the input places as input. The type of the
guard is required to be a Boolean expression. Additionally to the condition that each
input place must contain at least on token, a transition with a guard is only enabled if
the guard evaluates to true. All reachable markings of a Petri Net constitute its state
space or reachability space.
The advantage of Petri Nets is their formal definition and the resulting possibilities
for analyzes. One kind of analysis is the reachability. A final marking mf is reachable
from an initial marking mi if a firing sequence of transitions exists to transform mi into
mf . An example is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. The developed planning model will use this
functionality to determine the reachability of goal states.
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3.2.2. Situation-Operator-Modeling
The core of the meta-modeling technique SOM as developed in [Söf03, Söf04a] is that
changes of the real world are regarded as a sequence of scenes and actions [Söf03,Söf04a,
Söf08,GOS09]. A problem-fixed scene is modeled by a situation while focusing on rele-
vant aspects of the system. A problem-fixed scene can vary with time but the same event
always causes the same structural changes of the scene independent from the moment
of its occurring. The item operator is used to model effects/actions changing scenes
like human actions. The considered aspects of the world are modeled by combining
situations and operators to an alternating sequence [Söf08].
The item situation is therefore used to describe the internal structure of the modeled
system. The situation S is composed of characteristics C and connecting relations
R. The characteristics consists of an unique name (or identifier) describing relevant
facts and a variable parameter p (or value) which can have an arbitrary data type.
Furthermore, the amount of characteristics is not fixed and may vary from situation
to situation. The item characteristic also includes the possibility of representing time-
dependent parameters. The relations R are structured like certain modeling techniques
(e.g. ODEs, DAEs, etc.) to describe the interdependence of characteristics [Söf08].
Operators are used to model the events and actions changing the scene (changes of
situations S). According to [Söf08], a functional perspective is taken to model operators
O. The item “operator is an information theoretic term that is defined by its function F
(as the output) and the related necessary implicit and explicit assumptions iA and eA
as inputs” [Söf08]. The explicit assumptions eA have to be fulfilled to realize a function
F . These assumptions have the same quality as the situations’ characteristics C [Söf08].
Operators and situations are closely connected due to the identity of the characteristics
of the situations and the explicit assumptions of the operators. This allows the double
use of operators, as passive operators used to structure situations internally and as active
operators to connect consecutive situations externally [Söf08].
Situations are illustrated as oval gray areas and operators as circles connecting two
situations. An example is shown in Fig. 3.2. In this example, an operator O1 transforms
the initial situation S1 into the situation S2. The situation S1 consists of the two
characteristics C1 and C2 (illustrated as small light gray circles), which are connected
by the relation R1 (larger dark gray circle). The situation S2 consists of two relations
(R1, R2) and three characteristics (C1, C2, C3). The operator adds the characteristic C3
and the relation R2, and therefore describes the changed problem configuration. Other
operators may change only the parameters or delete characteristics or relations.
The possible interactions of an agent with its environment can be interpreted as a
net of scenes and actions and modeled by a bipartite graph of situations and operators.
The root of the graph is the initial situation to which all possible operators have to be
applied. Thereupon all possible operators are applied to the resulting situations. This
process is repeated until all possible operators have been applied. The graph can contain
the same operator a number of times. Such a graph of situations and operators resulting
from the execution of possible operators from an initial situation as root is denoted as
action space according to [GS10].
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Figure 3.2.: Situation-Operator-Situation sequence. Operator O1 adds characteristic
C3 and relation R2 to situation S1 which results in situation S2.
If a lot of actions are possible, the graph may become very large or even infinite. Thus,
the graph has to be reduced in a suitable manner. An action space containing only
relevant actions is denoted as a “partial action space” [GS10]. The presented planning
model uses the set of rules describing goal-directed sequential behavior to concentrate on
the relevant aspects of the action space. This also reduces the action space to a partial
action space.
The SOM approach only gives the frame to model the structure of changeable scenes,
and therefore maps the action space using the proposed structural framework to a for-
malizable representation [Söf08].
3.2.3. Similarities of Coloured Petri Nets and Situation-Operator-Modeling
Coloured Petri Nets and SOM are both bipartite formalisms consisting of active and
passive elements. While only one situation is used to model a scene in SOM, a set of
places define the actual state of a Petri Nets. Thus, the item situation (including its
characteristics) in SOM corresponds to the places of a net (including the tokens). Events
in the real world are modeled as operators in SOM and as transitions in Petri Nets. The
change of the scene is described by the operator function F and by the arc expression
e in CPNs. The explicit assumption eA of an operator correspond to the guard G in
CPNs. In this case, each operator is equivalent to one transition. These similarities
enable to implement SOM models as Petri Nets and to analyze Petri Nets with SOM.
This is also pointed out by [GS09a].
Despite these similarities, there are also differences between both modeling approaches.
On difference is that a net of places and transitions only defines the actual state and the
possible set of events but a graph of situations and operators describes the action space
as defined above. Furthermore, SOM is not bounded to a predefined set of characteristics
and relations but the net structure of a Petri Net is fixed. Hence, the SOM formalism
extends the possibility of Petri Nets. However, this limitation of classical Petri Nets can
be avoided when Reference Nets, a Higher Petri Nets formalism, are used which allow
Java objects as tokens [Gam11].
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3.2.4. Coloured-Petri-Net-Based Simulation
According to [GS09a], a situation is modeled as a place containing one token. As the
data type of this place/token is fixed (in contrast of the structure of a situation in
SOM), all characteristics possible during the interaction must be included in the data
type. Active operators are modeled as transitions which can modify the token describing
the current situation. The simulation environment applied in this contribution follows
this approach, but extends it by additionally modeling passive operators and thereby the
inner structure of situations as transitions. This extension will be detailed in section 3.4.
Implementations of SOM models as CPNs are used as cognitive architectures [GS09b,
EGVS10], for the comparison of operators’ decision making in dynamic task environ-
ments to the results from formal state space analyzes [GOS09,MS10, OHS11] and for
simulation environments based on CPNs [MOW08,GOS09,GS09a].
Coloured Petri Net simulation environments can be used in different ways to analyze
the behavior of operators in dynamic task environment. In [MS10] it was used to identify
heuristics used by the operators of an air traffic control tower simulation. It was fur-
ther applied in [GOS09] for the automated detection of formalized human errors. The
approach was also used in [OHS11] to compare the consequences of available options
as perceived by the operator and the real existing consequences of these actions in a
dynamic environment.
3.3. Application Example Microworld MAGIE
The human performance measure applying the cognitive model of planning developed in
this chapter is demonstrated with the simulation environment MAGIE. The simulation
environment MAGIE was built as a mid-fidelity simulator to evaluate prototypes of new
procedures and assistance systems for ATC in an approach sector within a simplified and
highly controlled setting (for details see former studies using this simulation environment
e.g. [OWR09,OWM10,WFS+10] or section 2.2.5 for a brief introduction of the evaluated
procedure). The simulation environment was further extend to be suitable for different
task environments like en-route control (as used in [OHS11, PW12]). However, the
original approach task will be used in this thesis.
The simulation environment MAGIE consists of a CPN to simulate the aircraft’s
physical behavior, a Graphical User Interface (GUI) which is shown in Fig. 3.3,
and a very basic AMAN. Implementing the simulation of MAGIE as a CPN following
the design approach presented in section 3.2.4 enables analyzing human behavior by
contrasting the Petri Net’s state space to the queried operators’ perception and to the
measured consequences of decisions.
In the new arrival concept implemented in MAGIE, aircraft are divided into two
groups depending on the capability of their FMS. Aircraft, which are equipped with a
4D-FMS and are able to fly a specified trajectory within a high time/location-precision,
follow a direct approach. They negotiate a fixed time with the implemented AMAN and
are allowed flying their preferred profile as long as they can meet the time restrictions
at the LMP [OTK+08].
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Aircraft, which are not equipped with a 4D-FMS, have to be guided in the conventional
way manually from STARs over the path-stretching area consisting of downwind leg, base
leg, and extended centerline. They start turning from the downwind leg towards the
extended centerline after being instructed. Unequipped aircraft are merged into the
stream of equipped aircraft at the LMP [OTK+08]. Both groups of aircraft fly along the
final to the runway. To ensure a safe separation between the aircraft (which depends
on the wake vortex category), it is crucial to stretch the flight path of the unequipped
aircraft in the right amount. This requires predicting the aircraft’s trajectory up to the
LMP.
Assistance in shape of ghosting and targeting was developed to support the operator in
this task during the FAGI project [OWM10] (see section 2.2.5). If ghosting is activated, a
copy (ghost) of each equipped aircraft is projected onto the runway centerline extension
to indicate positions later occupied by equipped aircraft. If targeting is activated, a copy
(target) of each unequipped aircraft is projected onto the runway centerline extension.
Targets indicate the goal-positions of unequipped aircraft calculated by an AMAN. Both
tools reduce the length of predictions operators have to make. Without assistance, the
positions of equipped and unequipped aircraft have to be predicted up to the late merging
point. If ghosting is active to indicate positions for equipped aircraft, the positions of
unequipped aircraft have be predicted relative to the ghosts. If targeting is active and
the goal-position for each unequipped is calculated and displayed, only the change of
the difference between actual and goal positions (targets) needs to be predicted.
The simulation environment MAGIE was created to analyze the benefits of new visual
assistance following that new concept. Consequently, the task of the operator is derived
from that concept. In MAGIE, the operator has to control the unequipped aircraft by
issuing clearances, which have to be selected out of a set of available clearances. An
unequipped aircraft will fly along its arrival route and into the path-stretching area if it
is not instructed otherwise. In contrast to that, the 4D-equipped aircraft and aircraft
outside the control zone cannot be influenced. The control zone ranges from short before
the downwind leg to short after the late-merging-point (gray zone in Fig. 3.3).
The route structure and the actual position of the aircraft together with their current
and cleared speed and altitude are shown in the GUI (see Fig. 3.3). The aircraft equipped
with a 4D-FMS have a call sign starting with “A” and are shown in red (light gray in
the figure). The unequipped aircraft have a call sign starting with “U” and are shown
in yellow (dark gray in the figure). Clearances are given by clicking on an aircraft label,
choosing a clearance from the selection window (s. Fig 3.4), and confirming it by another
click. In this manner, the operator can change the speed and altitude of the aircraft.
The possible altitude ranges from 3000 ft to FL 80 (flight level). Altitudes above the
transition altitude, which is defined at 5000 ft, are given in flight level (1 FL = 100 ft).
To simplify the conversion, the local QNH is defined as 1013hPa so that FL 50 is equal
to 5000 ft. The speed ranges from 160 kn to 250 kn. The operator can further instruct
the aircraft to start the turn maneuver from the trombone to the extended centerline.
The simplified AMAN integrated in MAGIE generates an arrival sequence, calculates
trajectories for each aircraft, and derives the commands necessary for these trajectories.
The generated sequence can be displayed in the GUI of MAGIE as a table including call
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Figure 3.3.: The GUI of the simulation environment MAGIE [HS14].
Figure 3.4.: Command window of the MAGIE GUI to change altitude (in the upper
left) and speed (in the lower right) and to start the turn maneuver (in the
lower left)
sings and arrival times at the LMP sorted by arrival times. Additionally, the concept
of ghosts and targets is integrated and virtual aircraft are projected on the extended
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centerline. The displayed call sign of ghosts consists of the call sign of the correspond-
ing equipped aircraft and a “G”. For targets, a “T” is added to the call sign of the
corresponding unequipped aircraft. Moreover, derived commands can be displayed as
advisories, either for each aircraft individually at its label or combined in a stack.
The possible set of actions can be modeled by three operators. The operator Ospd(a,x)
models a speed change of the aircraft a with the target value x. Instructions concerning
the altitude of an aircraft are modeled by the operator Oalt(a,x). Finally the opera-
tor Oturn(a) corresponds to the instruction for aircraft a to start the turn maneuver.
The main objective of the human operator is to ensure a safe separation between all
aircraft. This is defined as 3NM for each pair of aircraft (according to a medium/medium
combination). The separation is of the utmost importance. The operator further has to
ensure an efficient trajectory. This is implemented as constraints for different sections
of the aircraft’s route (as shown in Table 3.1) and by the objective to guide the aircraft
quickly to the airport (of minor importance compared to the other objective). In sum-
mary the operator has the three objectives (in order of decreasing priority): Separation,
constraints, and throughput.
Table 3.1.: Constraints on route sections requiring reductions of speed and altitude
[HS14]
Section Speed Altitude
Min Max Min Max
Downwind leg 180 kn 250 kn 5000 ft 8000 ft
Base leg 180 kn 250 kn 3000 ft 8000 ft
Ext. centerline 160 kn 230 kn 3000 ft 6000 ft
LMP 160 kn 180 kn 3000 ft 3000 ft
Finala 160 kn 180 kn 0 ft 3000 ft
Runwaya 160 kn 160 kn 0 ft 0 ft
a Not to be controlled by the human operator as outside
controlled sector
3.4. Coloured-Petri-Net-Based Model of Task Environment
This section presents the CPN model which was realized as simulation engine for the
simulation environment MAGIE. It describes how the events and also the continuous
dynamics are modeled. The relation of this model and the resulting action space to the
SOM approach is discussed for the first time.
The state of the individual aircraft constitute the state of the simulation in MAGIE.
This state is changing dynamically as a matter of time and as a consequence of the
operators’ decisions. The operators’ decisions are discrete changes. In contrast, the po-
sition of the aircraft changes continuously. Both changes are important for the analysis
of the human behavior. The presence of both continuous and discrete dynamics is an
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important difference to former analyzes of human behavior in Petri-Net-based simula-
tion environments [MOW08,GOS09] were all changes could be reduced to events. In
the MAGIE environment the timing of a decision and the actual position of the air-
craft play an important role for the comparison of the operators’ decisions to possible
alternative decision. If a clearance is given too late or too early, this can change the
consequences completely, also with regard to the fulfillment of the overall objectives.
Also if the separation between aircraft is slightly below or above the threshold value
is an important difference. It is thus important to consider the exact position of the
aircraft. For this reason, it is unavoidable to simulate the continuous dynamic behavior
of the aircraft. Nevertheless, the positions of the aircraft on the radar screen change
very slowly. Consequently an update of the position is necessary only each second.
Consistent with the approach discussed in section 3.2.4 the CPN model for the MAGIE
simulation consists of only one place paircraft to model the actual situation. This place can
only contain tokens defined by the color set function C(paircraft) = aircraft, which repre-
sent the individual aircraft. Such a token is added to the place, when the corresponding
aircraft is activated. In short scenarios (up to 10 minutes) all aircraft of the scenario are
activated at the beginning. Tokens are deleted from this place when the corresponding
aircraft is on the final and leaves the sector. The color set aircraft is a combined color
set and includes amongst others a variable of the color set aircraftstate and a variable of
the color set aircraftclearance. The color set aircraftstate includes the actual position,
heading, speed, and altitude of the aircraft; the color set aircraftclearance includes the
target values for speed, altitude, and heading. Issuing clearances is modeled as a tran-
sition tclearance connected to the place paircraft as input and output place. The transition
tclearance realizes active operators modeling the actions of human operators. This active
operators transform a situation into a different situation. However, since realized as
Petri Net, no characteristics can be added (or removed) from a situation. Instead of
modeling several transitions for different types of clearances, only this transition is used,
which has the three different types of clearances and their values as parameters. The
changes by the given clearances are modeled as arc expressions (aircraft → aircraft) at
the arc connecting the transition tclearance with the place paircraft .
The continuous dynamics modeled by passive operators as internal relations of sit-
uations are discretized and realized also as transitions. These transitions are likewise
connected with paircraft as input and output place and update the state of the aircraft
every second. Each firing of a transition updates one aircraft and simulates one second
of flight. Four transitions are used to model the different behaviors of aircraft depend-
ing on their current flight mode. The transition tequipped is used to updates the equipped
aircraft. Unequipped aircraft flying on a route (STAR, downwind, centerline, and final)
are update by the transition (troute). The third transition (tvector) is used to update
aircraft which are flying a vector. This is the case after the aircraft has been instructed
to fly into a specified direction, like during the turn procedure. The fourth transition
is used for the intercept process (tintercept), which takes place when an aircraft reaches
the centerline, leaves its vector, and follows the centerline. Additionally, these transition
model changes of the aircraft’s flight mode which initiated automatically under specific
conditions. For example, the flight mode changes from “intercept” to “route”, when
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an aircraft reaches the centerline. The dynamics modeled by these transitions are im-
plemented as arc expressions (eequipped , eroute, evector , eintercept) at the output arc. Each of
these four transitions has a guard function (gequipped , groute, gvector , gintercept) to enable only
one transition for each aircraft. The guards of these functions correspond to the explicit
assumption of the operators and the arc expressions realize the operator functions. The
guards check the aircraft mode and are mutually exclusive, as an aircraft can only be at
one mode at a time.
The Petri Net is modified to simplify the analysis. First, the color set of the place
paircraft is changed to contain a list of aircraft as one token C(paircraft) = listaircraft. Also
the four transitions to model the dynamics are replaced by one transition (tdynamics). This
transition checks the mode for each aircraft and simulates the according behavior. It
still realizes the internal relation of a situation and thus passive operators. Additionally,
all aircraft are updated at once. The expression at this transition’s output arc is a com-
bination of the replaced arc expressions, to ensure the same behavior. It is implemented
by
edynamics =

eequipped , if gequipped evaluates to true
eroute, if groute evaluates to true
evector , if gvector evaluates to true
eintercept , if gintercept evaluates to true
. (3.1)
The expressions used in the guards are applied to achieve identical calculation. Addi-
tionally, the transition tclearance is changed. Instead of simulating the clearances received
from the GUI, the transition can generate all possible clearances.
Further elements in the original Petri Net used for the initialization and the commu-
nication with the GUI during the simulation were also removed for the purpose of the
analysis. As a result of the changes, the CPN used for analysis consists in its core of one
place and two transitions.
In Figure 3.5 an exemplarily cutout of a simulation sequence for the aircraft a is
shown, from entering to leaving the simulated approach sector. The first situation S1,
describes the aircraft flying along the downwind after entering the sector. The dynamics
are described by the arc expression eroute, which is shown as an internal relation and
implemented by the transition troute. During the downwind the clearance to decrease
to 3000 ft is given. This is the manual execution of the operator Oalt(a,3000) (as each
clearance modeled by the transition tclearance), which leads to the next situation S2. As
the operator changes only one parameter, the structure of the situation is unaltered.
After that, the aircraft is instructed to turn with the operator Oturn(a). This results in
situation S3. In this case the internal relations are exchanged, because the aircraft is
in the intercept mode now. A speed clearance (modeled by Ospd(a,230)) is given during
the turn resulting in S4. This clearance does not alter the structure and just updates
the current parameters. Then the aircraft reaches the centerline (S5). This is modeled
by a self-executing operator Omode(a,route). The aircraft is now again in its route mode
and the internal relations of the situation are changed accordingly. Later, another speed
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clearance (Ospd(a,180)) is given, which again changes only the parameters and leads to S6.
Finally, the aircraft reaches the LMP and leaves the control zone.
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Figure 3.5.: The Situation-Operator sequence to guide an arriving aircraft along the
path stretching area to the late-merging-point is depicted. The situation
includes the characteristics to model the state of an aircraft. The operators
Oturn and Omode(route) change the situation’s internal relations.
3.5. Deduction of Rules to Model Human Operator Behavior
This section describes how the task specific set of rules is derived which is used by the
planning model to generate goal-directed interactions in form of sequences of operators.
The rules consist of a problem definition, which indicates the necessity to modify the
operator sequence, and a modification which is applied to the already generated part of
the interaction sequence. The rules model the goal-directed normative behavior of the
human operators.
The problem definitions are deducted from the objectives whereas the modifications to
counter the problems or derived from the set of available actions. This general approach
is detailed in section 3.5.1. Subsequently, the deduction of the rules for the example
application is explained. The definition of the problems based on the objectives of the
operator is demonstrated in section 3.5.2. Section 3.5.3 focuses on the derivation of
modifications from the available set of actions.
3.5.1. General Approach
In order to make statements about the presence of a problem a clear definition of the
considered problems is required. Thus a set of problem functions Pi is needed which
needs the current situation (and thus the marking of the Petri Net) as input and returns
true if a problem i is present. Such a function can easily be constructed for objectives
which describe states to be avoided. Similarly, a function can be defined for objectives
which define an allowed range of values by inverting the range. If an objective defines a
state to be reached (or characteristics of states to be reached) the definition of a problem
function requires a greater effort. States (or characteristics), which clearly cannot lead
to the desired state, have to be derived logically.
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Figure 3.6.: Transformation of the initial situation SI into the measured situation SM
by the interaction between human operator and system. The measured
situation SM is in turn transformed by the plan generated by the model
into the problem situation SP .
After the problems are derived from the objectives, a modification has to be assigned
to each problem. A modification either adds an operator to the already generated
interaction sequence or changes an existing operator. Out of the available operators,
the operators not influencing the problem or clearly exacerbating it are excluded to find
suitable operators, which can solve the problem. Problems are split into more specific
problems if the set of suitable operators/modifications can be reduced for each specific
problem. In the best case, exactly one modification for every problem remains.
To define problems, it is important to distinguish between the initial, the measured,
and the problem situation as illustrated in Fig. 3.6. The initial situation SI is the sit-
uation at the beginning of an interaction. After some time of interaction, the resulting
situation can be observed and is called measured situation SM . The planning model
starts with that situation and generates a plan. This transforms SM into the problem
situation SP . Some problems in the set of rules are related only to the problem sit-
uation, others are additionally related to the measured situation. Consequently, the
problem functions Pi(mM ,mP ) needs the marking of the CPN model corresponding to
the measured situation mM and the marking corresponding to the problem situation mP
as input.
Problems can have different priorities. Accordingly, a solution for a problem with a
high priority is allowed causing problems with lower priority if they are unavoidable.
If these lower priority problems are detected later, the operator sequence cannot be
changed again as this causes the higher priority problem again. The priority assigned
to each operator avoids such circles. The operator sequence is changed only, if the
priority of the modification is higher than the priority of all operators affected by that
modification.
66 Chapter 3: Modeling of Human Planning
3.5.2. Deduction of Problem Definition in MAGIE as Example
The definitions of the problems are derived from the objectives of the human operator.
In case of MAGIE, these are the objectives separation, constraints, and throughput,
which are defined in the instructions. As the problems have not been defined yet, they
are derived in the following.
The objective separation leads straightforward to the problem function PS which eval-
uates to true if the distance between two aircraft is lower than the separation minimum
of three nautical miles. As the objective constraints defines states to be avoided, the
allowed ranges for speed and altitude are inverted into forbidden ranges. This results in
the problem functions Pspeed and Palt.
As the objective throughput is defined in a positive way, a transformation into an
equivalent negative definition is necessary. A high throughput can only be reached if the
aircraft are as close as allowed when reaching the runway. Consequently, the aircraft
should initialize the turn maneuver, as soon as a trajectory fulfilling the other objectives
would result. This is equivalent to avoid flying along the downwind (Pdownwind) if possi-
ble. Additionally, the aircraft should fly as fast as allowed by the constraints (PtoSlow).
Another aspect of the objective throughput is that the aircraft have to intercept the
centerline east of the LMP . Thus, aircraft which reach a line, orthogonal to the cen-
terline and intersecting the late merging point, without being on the centerline, are also
defined as a problem (PmissLMP ). It is effectively to decrease the altitude as early as pos-
sible to avoid problems later. Aircraft not satisfying this condition are also considered
as a problem (PtoHigh). Thus four problems according to the objective throughput are
defined: aircraft flying along the downwind, aircraft slower than the maximum speed,
aircraft not meeting the LMP, and aircraft not decreasing altitude as early as possible.
All defined problems are given in the second column of Table 3.2, which also shows the
derived set of modifications detailed in the following.
3.5.3. Deduction of Modifications in MAGIE as Example
Additional to problems, the corresponding modifications have to be derived, which is
done in the following. Some characteristics of MAGIE simplify the deduction of mod-
ifications, as often only a limited set of action is reasonable to solve a problem. For
example, the aircraft’s route over ground is only affected by the turn maneuver. Fur-
thermore, the aircraft’s speed and altitude do not interact so that decreasing the altitude
does not increase the speed. Instead, aircraft’s speed changes with a constant decelera-
tion or acceleration and altitude changes with a constant angle and thus is proportional
to the vertical length of the trajectory. Additionally, conflicts depend only on the lat-
eral position, which can only be influenced by the turn maneuver or by speed changes.
Because of the route structure it is assumed that the vertical position of the aircraft
is similar and cannot be used for their separation. Furthermore, the aircraft can be
considered separately as the same rules apply to each aircraft.
First, it is important to assign specific priorities to each modification. In agreement
with the instructions, modifications made for separation have the priority 3, modifica-
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Table 3.3.: The four priority groups for the defined set of rules
Priority Group
4 Fixed
3 SeparationThroughput (only turn)
2 Restrictions
1 Throughput (except turn)
tions for constraints have the priority 2 and modifications for throughput have the lowest
priority 1. Furthermore, the priority of 4 is defined for modifications which are fixed and
cannot be affected even by modifications due to separation. As modifications due to the
objective constraints should not be able to modify the turn (it is possible to fulfill the
constraints independently of the turn), but modifications due to the objective separation
must be able to, a further category is defined for modifications of the turn to increase the
throughput with priority 3. An overview of the resulting priorities is given in Table 3.3.
To reduce the set of possible solutions, PS is split into the nine specific problems PS1 to
PS9. One important difference concerns the aircraft’s route. It is distinguished, whether
the aircraft is on the downwind, if it started the turn but its route can be modified, or
if the route is fixed and only speed modifications are available. A fixed route results, if
the turn maneuver was already implemented in the measured situation, and a variable
route results, if the turn maneuver is a part of the plan (s. Fig 3.6). In case of variable
routes, the turn maneuver can be modified, in case of fixed routes or if the aircraft is on
the downwind, avoiding conflicts is possible only by changing the speed of an aircraft.
The second difference between problems takes advantages of considering the aircraft
separately. Thus, the relative position of the considered aircraft to the other aircraft in
a conflict can be used to differentiate between problems. Consequently, it is possible to
distinguish if increasing the speed may solve the conflicts, if the other aircraft is behind,
or reducing the speed may solve the conflict if the other aircraft is in front.
Conflicts of aircraft with a fixed trajectory and another aircraft behind constitute the
problems PS1 and PS2. These problems can be solved only by increasing the speed.
However, aircraft are already as fast as allowed to maximize throughput. As conflict
avoiding has a higher priority than constraints, increasing the speed above the allowed
limit is acceptable here. Consequently, a speed increase will be added to the operator
sequence if problem PS2 occurs. However, the speed has to be reduced after the conflict
is solved and the modifications activated by problems regarding the constraints will not
be allowed overriding speed changes added to solve conflicts as conflicts have a higher
priority. Therefore, a speed reduction is additionally added to the operator sequence
when PS2 occurs. If the conflict is not solved by the modification and reoccurs later,
which is defined as PS1, this speed reduction is delayed to increase the duration of the
aircraft flying at maximum speed. The speed increase has the priority of 4 as it should
not be modified again (especially not by PS1), the speed reduction has the priority of 3
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as it is related to separation.
The next two problems describe conflicts with a fixed trajectory and with the other
aircraft ahead. This conflicts can be solved by reducing the speed. When problem
PS6 occurs, it is sufficient to reduce the speed some time before the conflict occurs to
the speed of the other aircraft ahead. However, if a conflict is already present in the
measured situation, which is defined in PS4, the speed has to be reduced to the minimum
possible speed to increase the distance to the other aircraft as quickly as possible. For
the same reasons as in the case of PS2, a second speed change is added after the first
occurrence of this problem and is postponed, as long as the problem is not solved. This
is defined in PS3. Again, the modification have the priority 4 and 3.
If an aircraft arrives on the final without a conflict, the turn maneuver started at
the right moment. Thus, conflicts on the final included in PS5 are solved by changing
the speed. If the other aircraft is ahead, this is assigned to, otherwise this conflict is
classified as PS1. The problem PS7 includes aircraft in conflict with a variable trajectory.
In this case, the conflict is caused by starting the turn at the wrong time. It can be
solved by changing the moment of the turn and thus by stretching the length of the
aircraft’s route. As the turn is planned as early as possible, the only available option is
to delay it.
The last two problems describe conflicts while the considered aircraft is on the down-
wind. Here the speed is first reduced to the minimum and then increased. Similar to
PS2/PS1 and PS4/PS3, this problem is split into PS9 and PS8.
The two problems Pdownwind and PmissLMP regarding the objective throughput can be
solved only by changing the route. This in turn can only be archived by adding the
turn operator to the planned sequence respectively by delaying it. The other problems
resulting from the objective throughput, PtoSlow and PtoHigh, are divided dependent on
the position of the aircraft.
To reduce the altitude as early as possible, three rules are defined. One rule decrease
the altitude as soon as the aircraft reaches the downwind (and is thus in the control zone)
and the second rule decreases the altitude as soon as the aircraft reaches the base-leg
(and thus a further reduce is allowed). As the altitude is already decreased as early as
possible, the altitude at the late-merging point can only be reduced by increasing the
length of the route (which means to delay the turn). This is problem PtoHighLMP . If an
aircraft is not flying with the maximum allowed speed, called PtoSlow, the speed has to
be increased depending on the current route section of the aircraft. Both modification of
the turn, PmissLMP and PtoHighLMP , have the priority 3 so that they can not be affected
due to constraints.
The problems resulting from the constraints are also divided according to the aircraft
positions. As the rules resulting from throughput are stricter regarding speed increase
and altitude reduction, only the opposite rules PspeedC , PspeedF , and PPalt have to be
defined for the objective constraints. Thus, speed is reduced if it is above the allowed
maximum. Further ,the altitude is increased if it is below the allowed value. As the
lowest altitude clearance is 3000 ft which is the minimum on the centerline and during
the turn, an altitude below the allowed minimum is only possible on the downwind
and only one modification (to climb) has to be defined. The complete set of deducted
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modification is given in Table 3.2. These set of rules, consisting of a problem condition
and a modification, describe the normative behavior of human operators interacting with
MAGIE. It can be applied by the cognitive planning model described in the next section
to generate interaction sequences to reach goal situations fulfilling the objectives.
3.6. The New Cognitive Planning Model
In this section, the developed cognitive planning model to generate a goal-directed oper-
ator sequence to be executed by a human operator interacting with a complex dynamic
system is described. As human operators of such systems have many options to inter-
act, innumerable situations may result [MS05]. When the action space of the human
operator is analyzed, the state space explosion problem [JK09] occurs. Accordingly a
complete action space of a complex dynamic simulation (like MAGIE) cannot be calcu-
lated and only partial action space for situations of interest can be analyzed, as proposed
in [GOS09]. The aim of the developed planning model is to reduce the action space of
a dynamic system to the partial action space by finding the relevant parts.
The steps executed by the developed planning model are illustrated in Fig 3.7. At
first, the simulation protocol is loaded which describes the recorded/measured interac-
tion of the human operator as a sequence of states. This is interpreted by the model
as a sequence of situations and operators. Then the model focus on specific aspects of
a situation, called focused situation, to simplify later steps. A focus situation contains
only some characteristics of the original situation. In the example, a focus situation con-
siders only certain aircraft. Focusing only on some characteristics of a situation assumes
that no relations connect the focused characteristics to the other characteristics. In the
following step, the main planning process starts using the set of rules modeling the op-
erators’ behavior and the CPN model of the controlled system. Each planning process
loads an initial focused situation and simulates the system behavior (modeled as inter-
nal relations of the situation) and the execution of planed actions (modeled as external
operators). The planning is repeated for every focused situation of the initial situation
to generate individual plans. In every repetition, the focused is extended so that every
time more characteristics of the original situation are considered. The sequences gener-
ated for former focused situations are considered during the simulation of the planning
process in further repetitions, to allow the detection of problems which affect the com-
plete situation. However, the formerly generated sequences are not considered for the
application of rules. Thus, they cannot be modified during latter planning processes and
these sequences cannot hinder the activation of rules. During the repetition, the focus is
extended so that finally an interaction sequence results which can transform the original
situation into a goal situation.
The planning model uses the modified Petri Net for this purpose. A direct access
to get the actual state and possible successor states is needed. This is realized by the
Access/CPN [WK09] interface. Using the direct access to the net, an arbitrary marking
(denoting an arbitrary situation) can be defined to start the simulation. Consequently,
the marking can be manipulated in a way that only a focused situation is loaded.
3.6. The New Cognitive Planning Model 71
Select focused
situation
Evaluation of 
human operator 
decisions
Combine
planned 
sequences No
Load last 
unaffected 
situation
Char-
acteristics 
left?
Yes
Model of 
technical system 
(Petri Net)
Model of operator 
behavior
(set of rules)
Yes
Evaluate and 
compare planned
sequences
No
Cognitive planning model
Goal 
reached?
Simulate system 
and sequence
Apply 
modification
Yes
No
Planning process
Problem
detected?
Yes
No
Situation
left?
Measured
situation
Problem
situation
Measured 
interaction 
sequence
Load protocol
Figure 3.7.: Processes in the cognitive planning model [HS14]
3.6.1. The Planning Process
The planning process generates a goal-directed interaction sequence by adding one op-
erator after the other. This process consists of three steps and uses the Petri Net of the
operated system to predict the future states and problems of the systems and the set of
rules described in the last section.
The planning process starts with one situation loaded into the Petri Net. The neces-
sary modification of the Petri Nets marking is possible with the direct access provided
by Access/CPN. Then the internal dynamics of the system is simulated. The simulation
is done by using the direct access to the Petri Net and firing the transitions which imple-
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ment the relations included in the loaded situation. If a sequence is already generated,
the operators in that sequence are executed during the simulation. All states reached
during the simulation are checked for problems defined in the set of rules by using the
problem functions Pi(mM ,mP ). If the state meets the problem condition of one rule,
this rule will be activated.
The activation of a rule will cause a modification of the operator sequence. This is
the third step of the planning process. The modification either adds a further operator
or changes the execution time of an existing operator. If an operator is modified, the
following operators are deleted because the modified operator may change the systems
states and the potential problems after its execution. Consequently, the problems which
initially caused the deleted operators to be added may not occur after that modification.
After the modification, the simulation is reset to the latest state which is not effected
by the modification. This means that the situation is loaded into the Petri Net, to which
the added operator is applied. In case an operator is delayed, the situation to which
the operator was applied before the modification is loaded and in case an operator is
executed earlier, the situation to which the operator is applied after the modification
is loaded. These three steps are repeated until an operator sequence is found which is
suited to transform the initially loaded situation into a goal situation.
The modifications, which bring an operator forward or postpone it, will be applied
step by step until either the problem is solved or the operator will be applied as early
as possible. In the latter case, the problems, which require a further modification of
this operator, are ignored during the further procedure as they cannot be solved and are
unavoidable.
An exemplary planning process to generate a goal-directed sequence is illustrated in
detail in Fig. 3.8. In this example, the steps are repeated in four iteration cycles. In
the upper part of the figure the state of the Petri Net is shown and in the lower part
the corresponding action space is shown represented in SOM symbolic. The planning
process starts with the first prediction from state 0 at time t = 0 s and simulates the
system until a problem is detected in state 4 (t = 4 s). As the transitions from 0 to 4
are only caused by internal dynamics, they are all described by situation S1 and the
changes of the state are described by internal relations of the situation. As a problem
defined in the set of rules is detected in state 4, the operator sequence is modified. In this
example the operator O1 is added at time t = 2 s. Consequently state 2, which is just
before the execution of operator O1, is loaded into the Petri Net. During the next run,
the simulation starts at state 2 and applies the operator in the calculated interaction
sequences at first and then simulates the internal dynamics. The resulting states (5 – 9)
are described by the situation S2. To solve the next detected problem, a second operator
is added to the sequence (O2). During the third run of the simulation (from t = 4 s to
t = 7 s, resulting in the states 10 – 13), the second operator O2 is simulated and a
third problem is detected in state 13. This is solved by a modification of the second
operator. The time of its execution is decreased by one second from t = 4 s to t = 3 s.
Consequently, the fourth run will start at t = 3 s from state 6. This simulation run leads
to state 18, which is a goal state. Thus the resulting operator sequence O1(t=2 s), O2(t=5 s)
is a goal-directed sequence.
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Figure 3.8.: Exemplary result of a planning process. An interaction sequence is calcu-
lated (at the bottom) by analyzing the state space (at the top). States and
situation included in the final sequence are labeled in black. States and
situations withdrawn during the calculation are labeled in gray. White
states indicate the presence of a problem [HS14,HS13b].
3.6.2. Application of the Planning Model to MAGIE
In the application example MAGIE, a situation contains all aircraft currently in or
near the controlled sector. As there are no relation between the individual aircraft, it
is possible to focus on some of the available aircraft. In the first run of the planning
process, only one aircraft is focused. When this focused situation is loaded into the Petri
Net, the other aircraft are deleted for the list to be placed on paircraft . Consequently, the
planning process considers only one aircraft. The planning process is repeated for each
unequipped aircraft present in the measured situation. Thereby, the focus is extended
in each repetition and one additional aircraft is considered during the planning process.
The system is simulated by firing the transition tdynamics. If some operators are already
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in the planned interaction sequence, the transition tclearance is fired to simulate these. If
one of the 19 defined problems is found during simulation, the corresponding modification
will be activated. The simulation stops if a goal is reached and all aircraft have arrived
at the runway. During each run, only operators for the just added aircraft are planned
but the resulting operator sequence contains operators for all focused aircraft.
As the aircraft are not independent of each other aircraft and the sequences of other
aircraft are considered during the planning process, the order in which aircraft are added
to the focused situation is important. Either a first-come-first-serve order can be used
or in the contrary extreme all different orders can be calculated.
If x unequipped aircraft are present during a simulation and the first-come-first-serve
rule is applied, one sequence is generated running the planning process x times. Overall
x! possible orders exist, so that the planning process has to be executed x · x! times if
all orders are analyzed. When 4 unequipped aircraft are present at once, 24 sequences
are calculated and the planning process started 96 times. Consequently, the calculation
of all possible sequences becomes very extensive if x increases.
3.7. Results
The planning model is demonstrated with the situation illustrated in Fig. 3.9. In this
figure a part of the controlled sector including the LMP and its surroundings is shown. In
this situation reached at t = 200 s after the start of the simulation, the four unequipped
aircraft U90, U74, U23, and U48 are present (U48 is on an arrival route in the south a
not visible in the shown part of the GUI). A plan will be calculated to transform this
situation into a goal situation in which all aircraft have reached the runway. For this
example situation 24 different orders of aircraft are calculated in 96 runs of the planning
process. Some exemplary sequences are reported to clarify some important aspects of
the algorithm.
During the planning process for U90 the following modifications are applied to solve
the detected problems. At first the problem PtoSlowC is detected immediately, as the
aircraft is not flying with the maximum allowed speed of 230 kn. Consequently the
operator Ospd(U90,230) is added. At t = 246 s this aircraft is too close to A57. This
problem belongs to category PS6. The speed of U90 is reduced to the speed of A57,
which is 170 kn, by Ospd(U90,170). The speed reduction is moved backwards step by step
to solve the problem. When it is applied at t = 218 s, the separation will still fall
below the minimum, but the speed of A57 has changed to 160 kn in the meanwhile.
Accordingly, the operator Ospd(U90,160) is added. After this operator has been moved to
t = 215 s, which deletes the operator Ospd(U90,170), the problem is solved and U90 reaches
the end of the sector as fast as possible (according to the constraints) and without
a violation of the minimal separation. This final sequence is given in Table 3.4. To
generate this sequence, 2501 states are calculated.
Then the operator sequence for U74 is calculated under the assumption, that the above
described sequence for U90 is implemented. Here it is detected that U74 can decrease
its altitude and thus the according operator Oalt(U74,5000) is added. Further the turn-
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Figure 3.9.: Section of the MAGIE GUI showing the traffic close to the Late-Merging-
Point after 200 seconds of interaction
operator Oturn(U74 ) is added to keep the trajectory as short as possible. Additionally, a
descent to 3000 ft is given. When U74 reaches the centerline, its speed is above the limit
(PspeedC). Thus, the operator Ospd(U74,230) is added to the sequence sufficiently early.
Following this trajectory, U74 is too near to A04. As the trajectory of U74 is not fixed
(PS7), the turn is postponed to solve this problem. The operators after the turn are
consequently deleted but added again in the further calculations. When Oturn(U74 ) is
executed at t = 210 s, the U74 and A04 will firstly be too close to each other on the final
and thus this is solved by speed modifications. Therefore, a speed reduction to 170 kn
is added and moved to t = 368 s. Finally, another speed reduction to 160 kn at t = 420 s
solves the problem and completes the sequence. This sequence is also given in Table 3.4.
To generate this sequence, 3075 states were calculated.
This procedure is repeated 96 times to calculate the sequences in all 24 different orders.
To generate the combined sequence for the order U90, U74, U23, and U48, additionally
the two sequences for U23 and 48 are calculated. Afterwards the four sequences are
combined to the result given in Table 3.5. This sequence transform the given situation
at t = 200 s to a goal situation, in which all aircraft have left the sector and the three
objectives separation, constraints, and throughput are fulfilled.
3.8. Concluding Remarks
The developed model of cognitive planning allows generating plans, which are sequences
of operators from the Situation-Operator-Modeling point of view and firing sequences
from the Petri Net point of view. To generate these sequences, a model of the con-
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Table 3.4.: Operator sequences for the unequipped aircraft U90 and U74 calculated
individually for both aircraft
Aircraft Operator TimeCharacteristic New value
U90 Speed 230 kn 201
U90 Speed 160 kn 215
U74 Altitude 5000 ft 201
U74 Start turn 210
U74 Speed 230 kn 284
U74 Speed 170 kn 340
U74 Speed 160 kn 420
Table 3.5.: Combined operator sequence for four unequipped aircraft integrated in the
order U96, U54, U92, U81.
Aircraft Operator TimeCharacteristic New value
U90 Speed 230 kn 201
U74 Altitude 5000 ft 201
U74 Start turn 210
U90 Speed 160 kn 215
U23 Altitude 5000 ft 263
U74 Speed 230 kn 284
U23 Start turn 328
U74 Speed 170 kn 340
U48 Altitude 5000 ft 344
U23 Speed 230 kn 402
U74 Speed 160 kn 420
U48 Start turn 483
U23 Speed 170 kn 486
U48 Speed 230 kn 557
U23 Speed 160 kn 566
U48 Speed 170 kn 624
U48 Speed 160 kn 709
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trolled system, realized as CPN, and a model of the normative behavior of the operator,
implemented as a set of rules, is applied.
Using the generated interaction sequences as criterion, human operators behavior can
be compared to a situation dependent criterion, which allows a more precise assess-
ment of the performance than a fixed criterion. Furthermore, the interaction sequence
represents which goals are still reachable and to what extend the objective can be ful-
filled. Thus it reflects the possible options of the operator. Consequently, it is possible
to evaluate a decision as poor if the operator actually had the opportunity to make a
better decision. The other way around, decisions can be evaluated as good even if the
fulfillment of the objectives is low if the operator did not have a chance to prevent this.
Being able to define those situations in which human operators are more likely to get
problems is the first step to improve HMS, procedures, or training in the future.
Former approaches using a Petri-Net-based analysis to evaluate human operators ei-
ther used fixed interaction sequences in time-dependent dynamic systems or situation-
specific interaction sequences in event-discrete systems. This chapter presented a cog-
nitive planning model which allows for the first time generating situation specific goal-
directed interaction sequences in time-depended dynamic systems to model the behavior
of human operators using a Petri-Net-based analysis.
Additionally, the developed planning model was applied to a dynamic example ap-
plication. The applicability of the developed model and the correct operation of the
implementation could be demonstrated.
As the calculated solution is based on the set of rules, the quality of the solution
depends on the completeness of this set. Therefore, much effort was put in the deduction
of the rules. However, this set has to be validated in further studies. This could be
achieved by comparing the interaction sequences generated by the cognitive planning
model to the decisions of the human operator. Decisions of human operators with a
higher fulfillment of the objectives than the interaction sequence of the model would
indicate an incomplete or incorrect set of rules.
The generated interaction sequences are based on exact predictions and assume a very
precise implementation of the planned actions. Human operators, on the other hand, are
not able to reach this precision when predicting consequences and implementing actions
due to their cognitive limitations. To allow a more precise prediction of human operator
behavior, the effect of prediction uncertainty is included in the planning model in the
next chapter.
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4. Modeling of Uncertainty in Human Operator
Planning
The Petri Net model of the system controlled by human operators, which is applied by
the cognitive model of human operator planning developed in the previous chapter to
predict the consequences of actions, is extended to include prediction uncertainty in this
chapter.
Uncertainties are often present when making decisions and influence the performance
of human operators. By integrating uncertainty into the cognitive planning model,
more realistic predictions of human behavior become possible. The consequences of in-
teraction sequences generated by a model containing uncertainty should less frequently
deviate from the measured consequences of human operators’ decisions than interac-
tion sequences generated ignoring uncertainty. When fewer or smaller deviations occur,
a part of the measured lack of operators’ performance can be explained by prediction
uncertainty caused by human operators’ mental models. Furthermore, sequences gen-
erated with prediction uncertainty can be used to differentiate between deviations from
the optimal performance caused by prediction uncertainty and erroneous actions due to
other reasons.
In this chapter, first the motivation to integrate uncertainty into cognitive models is
explained in more detail (see section 4.1). Then the term uncertainty is defined and
issues of uncertainty are discussed (see section 4.2.1). Thereupon, the different perspec-
tives of uncertainty in HMI are analyzed as well (see section 4.2.2). These distinction
are combined to a classification scheme of uncertainty in section 4.2.3. Subsequently, the
different approaches to model uncertainty and their appropriateness for the described
problem are examined (see section 4.2.4). Based on this classification, prediction uncer-
tainty is integrated in Colored-Petri-Net-based models (see section 4.3). Some results
on predictions modeled with uncertainty are reported in section 4.4. At the end of this
chapter, some conclusions are drawn (see section 4.5).
Some ideas regarding the implementation of uncertainty into the developed human
operator planning model have already been published in [HS14].
4.1. Need for the Integration of Uncertainty into Human
Performance Models
Recently, a lot of effort was made for the development of models of human cognitive
performance. The purpose of these models are diverse. One purpose stemming from the
engineering science is the evaluation of HMS reducing the need for human-in-the-loop
simulations including human operators interacting with these systems. Consequently,
the required effort and time for the development of HMS can be reduced. In this field, the
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aim of the models is to reproduce human performance. Another purpose is to enhance
the understanding of human cognition and comes from psychology. These models must
not only reproduce human performance but model detailed aspects of human cognition to
focus specific cognitive functions. A further example is the evaluation of human cognitive
performance. Here the models’ predictions are compared to measured operators behavior
(e.g. [OHS11]). Consequently, these models do not have to model cognition in detail
but must be able to predict human performance. This category includes in particular
models of human decision making and applications of the signal detection theory (see
section 2.3.1), the lens model (e.g. [Coo96,BKG+00]), and rational decision making (see
section 2.1.5).
As detailed in section 2.1.5, humans normally do not make optimal decisions espe-
cially when interacting with complex dynamic systems. Making optimal decision is very
costly in terms of effort and time, as it requires first to detect all different options, to
simulate this options mentally, to evaluate their consequences, and to select the best op-
tion. Especially when interacting with dynamic systems, optimal behavior is usually not
possible as the time constraints of the system require quick decisions and the available
time is not sufficient to follow an optimization procedure. Although, a lot of models use
optimal decisions as a standard.
As humans often do not apply optimization methods, a model making optimal deci-
sions is not able to predict the behavior of human operators. Such models should not
be used during training or as basis for technical assistance. Human operators would be
compared to a formal standard they cannot hold. If they want to conform to the model,
they have to adapt their working methods which can result into performance decreases
due to insufficient time or cognitive resources for making optimal decisions [Kle01]. If
optimal models are used as assistance, the actions advised by the assistance will prob-
ably differ to those preferred by the human operator and the operator will not be able
to follow the assistance. Consequently, the human operator can either trust the systems
without question it decisions. This problem is called overreliance [PR97]. In other cases,
the human operator can ignore the systems and make it useless. Further, he can adapt
his working methods with the above mentioned consequences. Models of human perfor-
mance should therefore not provide optimal solutions but realistic solutions taking into
account human limitations. As decisions often have to be made under uncertainty (e.g.
uncertain information or uncertain predictions) and uncertainty strongly affects deci-
sions, it should be integrated into models of human performance. To make the cognitive
planning model developed during the last chapter applicable for training purposes, for
example to use the generated interaction sequence in a discussion with a human operator
who selected another option, it should not provide an optimal solution in every case but
one that is expectable and realistic taking into account the human cognitive limitations
and the effect of uncertainty.
Uncertainty changes by integrating technical assistance. In the real world, fallible
indicators are often connected to continuous uncertainty, for example, the distance to
an obstacle. This uncertainty can often be engineered out by assistance systems, for
example, by precise measurements. In contrast to that, often discrete states and pre-
cise indicators are present, for example, when a system is in a specific mode [DSK99].
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Table 4.1.: Reduction and induction of different types of uncertainty by technical as-
sistance
Task assignment
Human operator Technical assistance
Uncertainty reduction due to
information gathering by tech-
nical assistance
d = ? d = x
Uncertainty induction due to
decision making by technical
assistance
driver reacts
mode: keep distance, 
reaction = ?
When assistance systems not only take over the task of information gathering and inter-
pretation but also the task of decision making and implementation, uncertainty about
consequences of decisions made by technical assistance, and thus uncertainty about fu-
ture system states, can be induced by the assistance. In other word, even if the mode of
operation is indicated precisely, the consequences of this mode and the reaction of the
system to specific events can be unclear to the operator.
These different cases are illustrated in Table 4.1 with the example of an automated
distance control in a car. In the upper row, the reduction of uncertainty by technical
assistance is shown. In the lower row, the induction of uncertainty is depicted. On the
left hand side, the human operator has to carry out the tasks, on the right hand side, the
tasks are executed by a technical assistance. Consequently, the driver has to estimate
the distance to the car ahead in the upper left corner. The uncertainty can be reduced,
if the distance is measured more precisely by assistance (upper right corner). When
another car drives into the gap, a decision is necessary to avoid a collision (lower left
corner). If this is automated, the drivers may not know what behavior of the technical
assistance to expect and uncertainty is induced (lower right corner).
The different kinds and forms of uncertainty will be discussed in more detail later.
It should be noted here that a model can not ignore these uncertainties nor calculate
optimal solutions integrating these uncertainties to make realistic predictions of human
cognitive performance.
A frequently chosen approach for modeling human behavior is to provide the required
procedural knowledge in form of if-then rules. The development of the human cognitive
planning model also follows this approach. Such models aim to mimic human behavior
and not to find always the optimal solutions. One widespread example is the cognitive ar-
chitecture ACT-R which stores the procedural knowledge as production rules [ABB+04].
Similarly, the cognitive planning model develop in this thesis also applies a set of rules to
model procedural knowledge. If integrating uncertainty in such models, the arising ques-
tions are about the combination of the different kinds of uncertainty with the procedural
knowledge in form of if-then rules.
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Figure 4.1.: Situation with two approaching aircraft on a radar screen. As the aircraft’s
routes are intersecting and the aircraft will reach the intersection at the
same time, the aircraft are in a conflict.
Similar to other CPNs-based approaches, which calculate the available options with
the aim to measure the human operators’ task performance by contrasting these options
to the human operators’ behavior and decisions [OHS11,HS13b], the cognitive planning
model developed in the last chapter does not considered uncertainty. This chapter
presents an approach to integrate uncertainty into human cognitive performance models,
which store the procedural knowledge in form of rules, to achieve more realistic behavior.
This approach is used to extend the cognitive planning model developed in the last
chapter. The focus lies on prediction uncertainty generated by imprecise predictions of
future states by the human operator.
4.2. Classification of Uncertainty
Uncertainty has many aspects and is much more than the probability of a specific out-
come. To demonstrate this, different kinds of uncertainty will be analyzed and classified
in this section. This will be illustrated with a striking example from the ATC domain.
In ATC, one important task is to ensure a safe separation between aircraft at all time.
Aircraft are separated, if the vertical distance between the aircraft is at least 1000 ft or
if the horizontal distance is at least 5NM (see section 2.2). The example used here is
a situation with two aircraft on conflicting routes which is shown in Fig. 4.1. In this
situation, the task of the ATCO is first to estimate if the minimum separation between
the aircraft will be maintained and second to choose the appropriate action in case of
violations. The position of the aircraft is given by the corresponding dot on the radar
screen. The measured speeds and altitudes of the aircraft are displayed as numbers in
the individual aircraft’s label.
4.2.1. Issues of Uncertainty
Something is uncertain if it is “not able to be accurately known or predicted” [Har13].
This definition includes two interesting aspects. First, the definition emphasizes that
4.2. Classification of Uncertainty 83
Table 4.2.: The three different issues of uncertainty
Issue Uncertainty
Situation State uncertainty
Options Selection uncertainty
Consequences Prediction uncertainty
uncertainty can be related to both knowledge as well as predictions. Secondly, it is
highlighted by the insertion of the word "accurately" that uncertainty does not describe
that something is completely unknown but only a lack of precision.
In the following the Situation-Operator-Modeling approach (see section 3.2.2) is used
to state uncertainty more precisely. Either specific characteristics of situations can be
subject to uncertainty or the situation as a whole is subject to uncertainty. For example,
a human operator is interacting with a system, which is in a specific operation mode.
Thus, the situation modeling the perceived state of the system contains the characteristic
“mode”. If the human operator cannot identify the current operating mode of a system,
the human operator can guess about the current mode or can consider all possible options
as equally probable. In both cases, the characteristic “mode” is uncertain as well as the
situation containing the uncertain characteristic. However, the operator may not even
know that there are specified modes of operation. Thus the characteristic “mode” is
not only inaccurate, but unknown. In contrast to that, the situation which includes all
other characteristics of the system is known inaccurately as one characteristic is missing.
Thus, the situation is also denoted as uncertain in this case.
An analysis of the sources of uncertainty decision makers have to cope with revealed
three different issues of uncertainty, namely situations, alternatives (or options), and
outcomes (or consequences) [LS97]. These three different issues can also be found in
decision making in human-machine interaction. The three different issues and the cor-
responding uncertainty are given in Table 4.2.
The first issue is uncertainty about the situation. In this case, the human operator
either does not know the exact parameter of one or more characteristics of a situation,
or one characteristic of the situation is completely unknown. In the situation shown
in Fig. 4.1, one example for an uncertain characteristic of the situation is the distance
between the aircraft. Even if the positions of both aircraft are given, the exact distance
between them has to be estimated by the operator and usually results as uncertain.
Uncertainty about the actual situation will be called state uncertainty in the following.
The second issue is about the options and describes that the operator does not know
exactly which actions can be applied. This is especially the case in ill-defined tasks when
the set of actions is large. In a highly structured and regulated task domain such as ATC,
an experienced and well-trained operator should be aware of possible actions, especially
since these are rather limited. Similar to the characteristics of a situation, a single option
can be associated with uncertainty or an option can be completely unknown so that the
whole set of options is uncertain (not accurately known). In the example given above, a
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non-expert may not see the option to separate the aircraft vertically and thus the option
is unknown. Another example is that the possible climb rate of an aircraft is unknown
to the operator. As every possible climb rate corresponds to an option, some options
are unknown and thus the set of options is uncertain. Uncertainty about the options
will be called selection uncertainty.
The third issue is uncertainty with respect to the consequences. This describes that
human operators may not know the exact consequences of their options. In analogy to
descriptive uncertainty, predicted situations may either contain uncertain characteris-
tics or characteristics may be missing. Examples for uncertain characteristics are the
aircraft’s future horizontal position and its altitude after it is cleared to climb. It is
noteworthy that the altitude is uncertain during the expected climb procedure, but the
longer the prediction horizon, the more certain the aircraft will have reached its cleared
altitude. Similar it can be uncertain, if the aircraft reaches the altitude necessary for
vertical separation in time. Uncertainty about the consequences can be caused by state
uncertainty or by imprecise predictions. For example, if the climb rate of an aircraft
is unknown (state uncertainty) the prediction of the aircraft’s future altitude can be
only imprecise. On the other hand, especially predictions in dynamic systems have been
shown to be difficult and therefore to cause errors [Dör89]. Uncertainty related to the
consequences will be called prediction uncertainty. The three issues of uncertainty are
summarized in Table 4.2.
4.2.2. Perspectives of Uncertainty in Assisted Human-Machine Interaction
In the context of HMSs, the uncertainty discussed up to now is related to the situa-
tion, options, and consequences as perceived by the operator. However, the uncertainty
present in the real environment (including the controlled machine) is influenced by tech-
nical assistance and interfaces before it can be interpreted by the human operator. Each
steps has an impact on uncertainty. Therefore, uncertainty should be considered from
the different perspectives of a HMS (environment including machine, technical assis-
tance including interface, and human operator). In order to facilitate the discussion,
different terms will be introduced here. These terms are summarized in Table 4.3. First,
the uncertainty present in the environment including the machine will be called real
uncertainty or ambiguity. One example (s. Fig 4.1) is the reaction time of the pilots.
Second, uncertainty can be considered from the perspective of the technical assistance.
As explained in section 4.1, technical assistance can reduce or induce uncertainty. Ad-
ditionally, the interface can also have an effect on the uncertainty depending on the
presented information and their illustration. The interface will be seen as a part of
the assistance here, as it can comprise some types of assistance, for example informa-
tion analysis (for types of automation see e.g. [PSW00]). The uncertainty from the
perspective of the technical assistance (including the interface) will be called technical
uncertainty or inaccuracy. Finally, human operators have to perceived the information
and combine it with their knowledge to understand its meaning. This is the uncertainty
they have to cope with when making decisions and it will be called mental uncertainty
or vagueness. The term uncertainty (without specification) will be used as a general
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Table 4.3.: The three different perspectives of uncertainty in Human-Machine Systems
Perspective Uncertainty Situation
Machine/Environment Real uncertainty/Ambiguity Real Situation
Assistance (Interface) Technical uncertainty/Inaccuracy
Technical situation
• Measured characteristics
• Secondary characteristics
• Self characteristics
Human operator Mental uncertainty/Vagueness
Mental situation
• Measured characteristics
• Secondary characteristics
• Self characteristics
term for all issues and perspectives of uncertainty.
To distinguish between the individual perspectives of HMSs, it is helpful to use three
different descriptions for the same scene. At first, the actual state of the machine or the
environment controlled by the human operator can be modeled by the real situation.
This description includes all relevant characteristics of the current scene and does neither
comprise the technical assistance nor the human operator. This situation includes real
uncertainty or ambiguity.
Second, the scene can be modeled from the assistance point of view. This situation
includes three type of characteristics. First, this situation includes the measured char-
acteristics of the real situation. Moreover, it further contains secondary characteristics
which are derived from measured characteristics (e.g. if the aircraft are on conflicting
routes). Finally, this situation also includes self characteristics necessary to describe
the state of the assistance itself (e.g. working properly or not). This situation is called
technical situation and is subject to technical uncertainty or inaccuracy.
Finally, the mental situation models the scene as perceived and interpreted by the
human operator. This situation also consists of three different types of characteristics,
similarly to the filtered/augmented situation. First, this situation contains the per-
ceived characteristics presented by the interface and perceived by the human operator.
Furthermore, the human operator can also extend the perceived situation by secondary
characteristics derived by the application of knowledge. Third, the perceived situation
can also contain self characteristics describing the state of the human operator. These
state can model the human operators self-awareness and include for example the sub-
jective actual workload. In this situation, vagueness is present.
4.2.3. Classification Scheme
The classification of uncertainty regarding the three different perspectives of HMSs can
be combined with the three issues discussed above which results into the classification
scheme with nine cells in Table 4.4. From left to right, the table depicts the three different
perspectives. In the top row, the perspective is illustrated graphically. Top down, this
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table contains the different issues of uncertainty. In the following, each combination is
examined and clarified with the example (s. Fig 4.1).
At first, the state uncertainty is analyzed from the three different perspectives. As
the real situation models the state of the environment exactly as it is, no uncertainty for
measurements and predictions are considered. Thus, state uncertainty is not present in
the real situation.
If these characteristics are modeled in the technical situation, they can be inaccurate as
they are based on measurements with limited precision. For example, the position, speed,
and altitude of the aircraft in Fig. 4.1 are measured, and thus contain measurement errors
and therefore are uncertain. The accuracy can be increased if measurements of different
sensors are combined to determine one characteristic. The secondary characteristics of
the technical situation calculated by the assistance can be inaccurate as well as they
are derived from the measured characteristics. Finally, the self characteristics model the
state of the technical assistance and can be inaccurate in cases the assistance cannot
determine its status precisely.
The reasons for vagueness in the mental situation can be manifold. As the human
operator perceives the information presented by the interface, the inaccuracy of this
information persists also in the perceived characteristics of the mental situation. Ad-
ditionally, a disagreement between information sources can induce uncertainty [Hen99].
Further, these characteristics are influenced by perception errors, which cause an in-
crease of ambiguity, influenced by the presentation of the information on the interface.
In the example, altitude is given as a number and is thus exact. In contrast, positions of
aircraft are indicated by dots and the distance between aircraft has to be estimated by
the human operator, and thus is subject to vagueness. Moreover, if too much informa-
tion is presented, the operator may not be able to track all information and to keep the
mental representation up to date due to a lack of time or limited cognitive resources.
The secondary characteristics of the mental situation are influenced by the vagueness
of the perceived characteristics and the knowledge applied to interpret these charac-
teristics. Knowledge can be applied to reduce vagueness but imprecise or incomplete
knowledge can also increase vagueness. For example, if the current mode of an aircraft
is not displayed and cannot be perceived directly, the operator can use his knowledge to
determine the current mode. The mental situation is related to situation awareness and
corresponds to the first and second level of situation awareness as defined in [End95b]
as it includes the perception of the current state (position, speed, altitude) as well as its
interpretation (conflict).
The second issue of uncertainty, the selection uncertainty is present in each part of
HMSs in a different way. At first, there are existing options in the real situation (other
options do not exist) and there is no ambiguity inherent in this situation. However, two
equivalent options can exist. In this case, there is no option superior to all other options
and the best option cannot be defined.
The human operator can chose from the set of options available in the technical
situation. This set of available options is in general not identical to the set of existing
options. First of all, the options can be restricted. In the ATC example, the options are
restricted by rules. Second, the assistance can execute some actions automatically. Thus,
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Table 4.4.: Examples of continuous (light gray) and discrete (dark gray) uncertainty for
the three issues (situation, options, consequences) and for the three perspec-
tives of assisted Human-Machine Systems (machine, assistance/interface,
human operator).
 Environment / Machine Assistance / Interface Human operator
Situations
-
State
uncertainty
Options
-
Selection 
uncertainty
Consequences
-
Prediction
uncertainty
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these options are not available to the human operator. Further, there can be additional
options available for the human operator for the interaction with the assistance to turn its
functions on or off. Selection inaccuracy can be present in the example, if the assistance
has no information about the climb rate and the range of vertical solution is uncertain.
Another reason for selection inaccuracy is state inaccuracy. For example, the information
if an aircraft is already on the radio frequency is missing and it cannot be determined
if the aircraft can be influenced by the operator and the set of solutions involving this
aircraft can be applied.
The perceived options may also differ to the available options and selection vagueness
can be present. This can result from state vagueness and incomplete knowledge. If
the human operator is not certain about the actual situation, he cannot be certain if
the conditions for an option are fulfilled and the option can be applied. Further, the
operator may not know that an option is available or is not sure about the conditions
which have to be fulfilled to select an option. This is more likely when a large amount of
options exists and the operator is less experienced. In the concept of situation awareness,
the perceived options are not explicitly considered. However, a good understanding of
the current situation is necessary in order to assess the existing possibilities properly.
Therefore, the perceived options are based on the second level of situation awareness
(the interpretation of the current situation) but they are not explicitly considered in the
definition of situation awareness as given in [End95b].
Finally, the prediction uncertainty is detailed for all perspectives of HMSs. In gen-
eral, future states are predictable in deterministic environments. However, some aspects
cannot be predicted and are probabilistic, for example the probability of technical fail-
ures. Also the system may be exposed to unpredictable disturbances making an exact
prediction of the system impossible. If a human component is part of the environment,
as the pilots in the example, the exact behavior is also not predictable. Consequently,
real uncertainty about future states results.
From the technical assistance’s point of view, inaccuracy about the consequences exists
for two reasons. On the one hand, the technical situation itself may be uncertain and
as a consequence, the predictions based on this situation will be inaccurate as well.
Thus, state inaccuracy can lead to prediction inaccuracy. On the other hand, models
of the environment are used to predict the consequences. Here the consistency of the
applied model with the reality is important and the more precise the reality is modeled,
the more accurate the predictions will be. For example, if the assistance applies a
model of the aircraft performance, which does not correspond exactly to the reality, the
predictions about future predictions are inaccurate. Similarly, the human operator makes
predictions and the uncertainty of predictions also depends on the state uncertainty in
the mental situation and on the applied knowledge. The predictions about future states
of the system and the consequences of actions are related to the third level of situation
awareness as defined in [End95b].
In [LS97], it was also differentiated between three sources of uncertainty when human
operators make decisions. These sources are incomplete information, incomplete un-
derstanding, and undifferentiated alternatives. As these are sources of uncertainty the
decision maker has to scope with, they are sources of mental uncertainty (vagueness) as
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Figure 4.2.: Sources and dependence of the different issues and perspectives of uncer-
tainty
defined above. These three sources can be sorted into the above presented classification
scheme. First, incomplete information relates to the information passed on from the
assistance to the human operator. Thus, it describes the inaccuracy in all issues of un-
certainty from the technical assistance’s perspective (e.g. information about the current
situation is missing, information about the fulfillment of preconditions for options is
missing, or a prediction which would simplify decision making is missing). The incom-
plete understanding refers to the influence of the human on the presented information.
Either the knowledge needed to interpret the information is incomplete or the capacity of
the cognitive resources of the human operator are not sufficient to process the amount of
presented information. Undifferentiated alternatives describe that no best option exists
in the environment. Thus, it describes the ambiguity of the existing options.
The classification scheme reveals some other sources of uncertainty for human oper-
ators. One of this sources are unpredictable environments. Furthermore, there are two
sources of uncertainty influencing the technical assistance. These sources affect the hu-
man operator indirectly. The first of these additional source is incomplete measurement.
While incomplete information describes mission information from the human operator’s
perspective, the incomplete measurement describes that technical assistance has not all
necessary information. The other source is an incomplete model and corresponds to
an incomplete understanding. The information is available to the technical assistance
but this system cannot interpret the data correctly. All six sources of uncertainty are
depicted in Fig. 4.2.
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4.2.4. Uncertainty in Hybrid Environments
The environments’ appearance, which is changed by implementing technical assistance,
has a crucial impact on the decision strategy. On the one hand, in the real world, which
mainly consist of continuous elements, multiple probabilistic and fallible indicators are
used to make intuitive judgments which have to correspond with the reality. For exam-
ple, the theory of naturalistic decision making [Kle98] is mainly concerned with decision
making in such settings. According to that theory an option is chosen directly to the
interpretation of a situation and different alternatives are not considered. The con-
sequences of this option are predicted and another option is considered only if these
consequences are not satisfying. If the situation is subject to uncertainty, the human
decision maker will try to clarify the situation before making a decision. Thus uncer-
tainties about alternatives are of minor importance according to this theory, but both
other issues affect the decision process.
In contrast, an artificial environment containing technical assistance has many precise
indicators informing about discrete states of the system. When artificial indicators are
used as information sources, decisions must be analytical and coherent, which means
logical consistent [Mos09]. In such situations, the normative theory of rational decision
making [Doy99] specifies that the expected utility of all different options has to be
calculated (predicted) and the action with the highest utility has to be chosen. This
implies that all possible actions are known. Hence, all issues of uncertainty are important
according to this theory in artificial environments. Despite the differences between these
two theories of decision making, the prediction, and thus the inseparably connected
prediction uncertainty, plays a crucial role.
According to [Ham96], the antipodes of intuitive and analytical decision making are
connected to a continuum in the cognitive continuum theory. As a consequence, working
domains, in which the human is supported by a variety of assistance systems, can be
seen as a hybrid environment in which both intuition and analysis are required [Mos09].
Thus the decision maker has to scope with continuous and discrete characteristics and
uncertainty. It is important to distinguish between both types as it determines the
modeling approach.
This distinction between continuous and discrete uncertainty is made in the Table 4.4
for the examples given above. Examples of continuous uncertainty are shown with a
light gray background, examples of discrete uncertainty are shown with a darker back-
ground. Additionally, different uncertainty distributions are possible. The uncertainty
of a continuous characteristic can for example have a Gaussian distribution modeled by
a mean value and a standard deviation. Otherwise, a distribution could be used which
is restricted by defined minimal error, maximal error, or both. For discrete uncertainty,
different possibilities could be given with each the same probability or with individual
probabilities.
Examples for characteristics with continuous uncertainty are the position and altitude
of the aircraft. The position could be described by a distribution which is not limited
to an interval. If an aircraft is predicted by an human operator to be 6.5NM before
the next waypoint, it could also be closer to or further away from that waypoint and
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both can be equally probable. In contrast, a distribution restricted to an interval could
be used for the altitude. If an aircraft is advised to climb to flight level 320 and the
human operator expects it to need 60 s, the aircraft will probably be at flight level 320
or below after 60 s. It is not likely that the aircraft will be above that flight level (only
when the pilot fails to execute the maneuver correctly). Therefore, the upper flight
level is a restriction to the probability distribution. An example for a discrete value is
aircraft’s altitude mode, as aircraft can climb, descend, or hold current altitude. Each
mode has its own probability, which varies during climb maneuvers. After the start of
a climb maneuver, the aircraft will probably be in climb mode. During the maneuver,
the probability of the altitude hold mode will increase as the aircraft may have reached
its final altitude already. Finally, altitude hold mode will be the most probable mode.
The alternatives can also be both, discrete and continuous. For example, the human
operator can decide to give a clearance to one or the other aircraft and instruct to change
the altitude or direction of an aircraft. This is a choice between discrete options. On the
other hand, a continuum of options is also possible. For example, different directions
or altitudes can be instructed. In this case, a value out of a continuous range can be
selected. However, the operating standards often reduce the range to a set of prescribed,
discrete values. Regarding the consequences, some values can change continuously, like
the position of the aircraft but also some discrete events can happen like the loss of
separation.
The presented classification of uncertainty has demonstrated that uncertainty is very
diverse and can take various forms. Thus, uncertainty can affect the situation, the
alternatives and the consequences and can either be discrete or continuous. In addition,
the correct perspective must be selected depending on the purpose of modeling. So
either real uncertainties, technical uncertainties of assistance, or mental uncertainty of
human operators are modeled. If, for example, the purpose is to find a theoretical
optimal solution assuming a correct and complete knowledge of the environment, only
the real uncertainty is of interest. In contrast, the second column is of meaning if
assistance is developed to find solutions under technical uncertainty. In this case, possible
measurement and modeling errors should be taken into account. As the aim of this
chapter is to extend the human operator planning model developed in the last chapter
by integrating uncertainty for generating more realistic interaction sequences as they
could be planned and executed by a human operator, the perceived uncertainty in the
third column is of importance.
4.3. Modeling of Uncertainty with Coloured Petri Nets
Existing models of human behavior based on a set of rules and implemented as CPNs
[OHS11, HS13b] as well as the human operator planning model developed in the last
chapter compare perceptions and decisions of the human operator against optimal solu-
tions, although human operators should be compared to more realistic solutions instead
(see section 4.1). For this reason, the aim of this chapter is to enable these models to
make more realistic predictions of human behavior. Therefore, an approach to integrate
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uncertainty into such models is developed. As a prerequisite, the above described clas-
sification of uncertainty was developed, which showed that various forms of uncertainty
exist in HMSs.
However, it was demonstrated [OHS11] that estimating the consequences of options is
difficult even when all required information is available. As the situations were clearly
indicated and the participants had enough time to understand them, it can be assumed
that only a little perceived state uncertainty was present. The prediction uncertainty
found in that study must consequently result from predictions by human operators
mental model. Therefore, the effect of predictions seems to be most relevant.
The approach developed in this chapter should fulfill the following requirements to
improve existing applications. First, CPNs are able to model discrete uncertainty but
have no build-in functions to represent continuous uncertainty. Therefore, this approach
should extend the capability of CPNs to represent continuous uncertainty as well. Fur-
thermore, it should be possible to restrict the probability distribution to model upper or
lower boundaries. Finally, the probability distribution should assign lower probabilities
to larger prediction errors and higher probabilities to smaller prediction error. In the
best-case, the probability distribution can be changed without much effort.
In the following, a concept is proposed, which fulfills these requirements. Continuous
uncertainty is integrated into existing models of human behavior which are based on a
set of rules and implemented as CPN. This concept is demonstrated and integrated into
the human operator planning model presented in the last chapter. As a result, aircraft’s
altitude, speed, and position are calculated with prediction uncertainty.
First, an appropriate modeling approach and a probability distribution are selected
(see section 4.3.1). Next, the implementation of this approach with CPNs is described
in section 4.3.2. Finally, this implementation is integrated into the human operator
planning model for the ATC task as example (see section 4.3.3).
4.3.1. Modeling of Probability Distributions
Uncertainty can be formalized by different methods. The most common used formalism
is probability [Hen99]. Probabilities are described by values between 0 (is not true/will
not happen) and 1 (is true/will happen). Thereby, the sum of the probability of all pos-
sible values/consequences has to be 1. In the objective view, probabilities describe facts
and can be calculated (e.g. the probability of throwing a 6 with a dice is 1/6). In the
subjective view, probabilities express a degree of belief in a fact or event. In the latter
case, the probabilities can be based on knowledge and experiments. The real prediction
uncertainty as defined in section 4.2.1 (perspective of the machine/environment) is ob-
jective. In contrast, the probabilities of perceived prediction uncertainty (perspective of
the human operator) are based on experience. Therefore, these probabilities can also be
subjective.
A discrete characteristic can have a parameter a out of the set of possible parameter
A. A probability P (a) can be assigned to each possible parameter a by P (a) = pa%.
The sum of all probabilities has to equal 1.
The probability of continuous characteristics can be described by probability distribu-
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Figure 4.3.: Triangular distribution, defined by the minimum value a, the maximum
value b and the value with the highest probability c.
tion functions. Such a function assigns a probability to each element within an interval.
The functions can be distinguished depending on intervals size. First, there are func-
tions that assign a probability to each element in the interval [−∞,+∞]. The most
common example is the normal distribution. For example, this distribution can model
a measured value including measurement error. Second, some distribution functions are
limited to the bounded interval [a,b]. Examples are the beta distribution and the trian-
gular distribution. Furthermore, some functions assign probabilities to elements within
an one-sided infinite interval [0,∞], for example the exponential distribution.
Commonly, CPNs are used to model discrete uncertainty. A possible approach to
model discrete uncertainty is to represent all possible consequences with different transi-
tions (or bindings). However, as CPNs do not allow assigning a certain probability to a
transitions (all transitions or bindings have the same probability), it would be necessary
to keep track of the probability separately, for example with an additional place con-
taining the probability of the actual state. If a transition with the probability pa% fires,
this marking has to be multiplied by pa%. This modeling approach is similar to a fault
tree analysis where a certain probability is assigned to each possible event. This allows
calculating probabilities of faults resulting from a sequence of events. As a consequence
of this implementation of uncertainty in CPNs, different firing sequences will be possible
from an initial marking. These sequences taken together show up in the state space
as branches and reflect all possible predicted consequences. An example for modeling
discrete uncertainty affecting predictions can be found in [EGVS10] . In this approach,
the action space of an agent is calculated and an interaction sequence is generated. Un-
certainty about the consequences is considered by assuming the same probability for
each action possible in a situation. The interaction sequence is calculated such that the
agents which will keep away from hazardous states.
However, the approach developed here enables CPNs to represent continuous uncer-
tainty as well. To be able to model uncertainty restricted to a limited interval with the
higher probabilities in the intervals center and lower probabilities at the interval borders,
the triangular distribution—the simplest distribution fulfilling these requirements—is se-
lected and implemented in the following. A triangular distribution is defined by the lower
limit a, the upper limit b, and the mode c with a < b and a ≤ c ≤ b. An example is
shown in Fig. 4.3. As the base edge of the triangle has the length l = b− a and area of
the triangle is A = 1, the height (and the probability of mode c) is h = 2·A
l
= 2
b−a .
This distribution can be used to model the prediction uncertainty of a characteristic
94 Chapter 4: Modeling of Uncertainty
with a certain prediction error e relative to the magnitude of the characteristic’s change.
At the beginning of the prediction at t0, the characteristic is known exactly, thus a(t0) =
b(t0) = c(t0) = d0. To assign a higher probability to smaller prediction errors and a lower
probability to larger prediction errors, the mode c(t) is calculated exactly and the limits
of the distribution a(t) and b(t) are calculated with the maximal possible prediction error
e. Consequently, assuming a constant change rate r > 0, the triangular distribution after
prediction time t can be described by
c(t) = d0 + r · t, (4.1)
b(t) = d0 + r · t · (1 + e), and (4.2)
a(t) = d0 + r · t · (1− e). (4.3)
A prediction modeled like that is shown in Fig. 4.4a. The probability density function
f(x, t) of a triangular distribution changing with time is given by
f(x, t) =

0 for x < a(t)
2(x−a(t))
(b(t)−a(t))(c(t)−a(t)) for a(t) ≤ x ≤ c(t)
2(b(t)−x)
(b(t)−a(t))(b(t)−c(t)) for c(t) < x ≤ b(t)
0 for b(t) < x
, (4.4)
and the cumulative density function F (x, t) is given by
F (x, t) =

0 for x < a(t)
(x−a(t))2
(b(t)−a(t))(c(t)−a(t)) for a(t) ≤ x ≤ c(t)
1− (b(t)−x)2(b(t)−a(t))(b(t)−c(t)) for c(t) < x ≤ b(t)
1 for b(t) < x
. (4.5)
Additionally, an upper boundary dmax and lower boundary dmin of the characteristic
can be given. If this is the case, the distribution has to be restricted to values within
these boundaries. However, the probability of these boundaries may be larger than 0.
For example, with a constant change rate, the limit of the distribution will reach the
boundary. After that, the probability of the boundary is increasing. Consequently, just
defining dmax or dmin as the limits of the triangular distribution is not sufficient. Instead,
a hidden triangular distribution can be used where a, b, and c are allowed to exceed the
boundary and are calculated with the formulas given above. However, when the upper
(lower) limit of the distribution exceed the boundary, the probability of the boundary
is defined as the cumulative probability of all values in the hidden distribution above
(below) the boundary:
p(dmax, t) =
0 for a(t) ≤ dmax1− F (dmax, t) for a(t) > dmax , (4.6)
p(dmin, t) =
0 for b(t) ≥ dmin,F (dmin, t) for b(t) < dmax . (4.7)
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Figure 4.4.: Probability distribution modeled by a triangular distribution using the
mode c and the limits a and b (a)-(d) respectively by a bundle of rays (e)
An uncertainty distribution modeled with hidden triangular distribution is shown in
Fig. 4.4b. Moreover, the boundaries could also change during the prediction (dmax(t)
and dmin(t)). As long the distribution has not reached the boundary, the boundary
can change without further consequences. When the boundary has two sections and
is given by dmax(t) = dl1 for t ≤ ta respectively d2 for t > ta with the time ta when
the complete distribution has reached the boundary (a(ta) = b(ta) = c(ta) = d1), the
triangular distribution can be modeled by
c(t) = dl1 + r · (t− ta)for t > ta, (4.8)
b(t) = dl1 + r · (t− ta) · (1 + e)for t > ta, and (4.9)
a(t) = dl1 + r · (t− ta) · (1− e)for t > ta. (4.10)
This is illustrated in Fig. 4.4c. However, changing the boundary must also be possible
when one limit of the distribution has reached a boundary and its probability is greater
0 as illustrated in Fig. 4.4d. In this case, modeling the resulting triangular distribution
is more complicated. Two distributions could be used combining both cases above.
The first triangular distribution given by equation 4.1 to 4.3 models the probabilities
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resulting from prediction errors, which corresponding predictions had not reached the
boundary. The second triangular given by equation 4.8 to 4.10 distribution would model
the probabilities resulting from prediction errors, which corresponding predictions had
reached the boundary. Each update of the boundary while a limit reached the boundary
would require to consider an additional triangular distribution and further complicate
the calculation of uncertainty distributions.
To simplify the representation of the probability distribution, a bundle of rays is
calculated instead, with each ray representing a different error magnitude. These rays
span the area of the probability distribution. In Fig. 4.4e the distribution resulting from
a constant change rate and a changed upper boundary with N = 11 calculated rays is
shown. Each ray rayn with n = 1 . . . N is calculated by
rayn(t) = c0 + r · t · (1 + e · 2n−N − 1
N − 1 ). (4.11)
The term 2n−N−1
N−1 is used to modify the error magnitude and ranges from −1 for n = 1
to 1 for n = N .
The differences between the individual errors magnitudes are equal, while the differ-
ences between the cumulative probabilities are not. The cumulative probability F (n)
for each ray n out of N rays can be calculated using the triangular distribution with
a = 1, c = N+12 , and b = N by
F (n) =

0 for n < 1
2 (n−1)2(N−1)2 for 1 ≤ n ≤ N+12
1− 2 (N−n)2(N−1)2 for N+12 < n ≤ N
1 for N < n
.S (4.12)
For example, using N = 11 rays to span a triangular distribution, the cumulative
densities of ray0 is F (1) = 0%, of ray1 is F (2) = 2%, and of ray2 is F (3) = 8%. To
calculate the probability distribution between the rays, an interpolation is necessary.
The different approaches to calculate the prediction uncertainty are demonstrated
with a climb maneuver of an aircraft in the following. At the beginning, the aircraft is
at c0 = 10 000 ft. It has a constant climb rate of r = 20 ft s−1. The assumed maximal
prediction error is e = 10%. After tl1 = 100 s, the aircraft’s altitude will be c(100) =
12 000 ft, but it will be predicted to be between a(100) = 11 800 ft and b(100) = 12 200 ft
(s. Fig 4.4a). As F (11 941 ft, 100 s) = 0.25 and F (12 059 ft, 100 s) = 0.75, the aircraft
will be predicted to be between 11 941 ft and 12 059 ft with a probability of 50%.
Then a limit of dmax = dl1 = 12 000 ft is given to model the final altitude. The aircraft
will reach this altitude between tl1,min = 90.9 s and tl2,max = 111.1 s (s. Fig 4.4b). The
probability of dl1 can be calculated with a hidden triangular distribution by p(dl1, t) =
1− F (dl1, t). Consequently the probability of dl1 = 12 000 ft at t = 91.1 s is
p(12 000 ft, 97.1 s) = (b(t)− 12000)(b(t)− a(t))(b(t)− c(t)) = 0.75 (4.13)
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with tl1,min ≤ t ≤ tl1,max.
When the second climb maneuver is initiated at tl1 = 100 s and the limit dmax is
defined by dmax(t) = dl1 = 12 000 ft for t ≤ tarespectively dl2 = 14 000 ft for t > ta,
two triangular distributions can be used to model the resulting uncertainty distribution
(s. Fig 4.4d). The first triangle is valid for climbing rates which were not sufficient to
reach dl1 before the second climb started. Consequently, at tm = 150 s the first triangle is
defined by a1(150) = 12900, b1(150) = 13100, c1(150) = 13000, and is valid for altitudes
below 13 000 ft. The second triangle is described by a2(105) = 12950, b2(150) = 13050,
c2(150) = 1300 and valid for altitudes above 13 000 ft.
If a bundle of rays is used to model the uncertainty distribution, the 50% probability
range of the altitude at tm = 150 s of the step-climb maneuver can be calculated in the
following way. Using N = 21 rays, the lower limit of the probability range (F = 25%)
lies between ray7 and ray8 as F (ray7) = 24, 5% and F (ray8) = 32%. Consequently,
the altitude of the lower limit will be between ray7(150) = 12 940 ft and ray8(150) =
12 960 ft. A linear interpolation reveals that the aircraft will be above 12 941.3 ft with a
probability of 25% as 12940 + 12960−1294032%−24,5% · (25%− 24, 5%) = 12941.3.
4.3.2. Implementation of Continuous Uncertainty in CPNs
The approach to represent uncertainty by a bundle of rays developed in the last section
is implemented into CPNs realized with the modeling software CPN Tools [JK09] in the
following.
First of all, the type of the variable which should be represented including uncertainty
has to be replaced, since a single value is not sufficient anymore (commonly of type
INT). Therefore, a new colorset colset Bundle = list INT; is defined which realizes
a bundle of rays as a list of integers to describe the uncertainty distribution. As ex-
plained above, each of the list’s elements represents a prognosis assuming different error
magnitudes. Then, a variable with uncertainty can be defined using the new type (e.g.
var characteristic: Bundle; instead of var characteristic: INT).
The functions implemented to process uncertain characteristics with CPNs are sum-
marized in Table 4.5. At first, two functions are defined to transform variables without
uncertainty into variables with uncertainty and the other way around. In the first case, a
list is generated whereby the number of elements equals the amount of rays N and each
element is set to the exact characteristic (function No. 1.1). No uncertainty is generated
through the transformation. To transform an uncertain variable into an exact variable,
the value in the middle of list is taken, and the rest of the list is rejected (function No.
1.2).
If the characteristic with uncertainty changes, every ray has to be updated. This is
realized by three functions (No. 2.1 - 2.3). These functions have in common that they
expect the initial bundle bundle, the exact change delta, which specifies how much
the exact characteristic changes and, and the maximal error e as input. The most
straightforward function out of these is function No. 2.1. This function implements
equation 4.11 with r · t given by delta and adds delta to each ray multiplied by a
specific error. After each ray is updated, the first element in the list of rays is always the
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Table 4.5.: Developed functions to realize uncertain characteristics with CPNs
No. Name Input Output
1. Transformation of uncertain to precise variables and vice versa
1.1 generateBundle (value, N) int * int Bundle
1.2 getValue (bundle) Bundle int
2. Update of bundles of rays
2.1 updateBundleDelta (bundle, delta, e) Bundle * int * int Bundle
2.2 updateBundleLimit (bundle, boundary, delta, e) Bundle * int * int * int Bundle
2.3 updateBundleRange (bundle, delta, range, e) Bundle * int * int * int Bundle
2. Update of hybrid characteristics
3.1 updateBINTDelta (bint, delta, e) BINT * int * int BINT
3.2 updateBINTLimit (bint, boundary, delta, e) BINT * int * int * int BINT
3.3 updateBINTRange (bint, delta, range, e) BINT * int * int * int BINT
3. Calculation of probabilities
4.1 Pbundle(n, N) int * int int
4.2 Plower (bundle,value) Bundle * int int
4.3 Vlower (bundle,p) Bundle * int int
smallest value and represents the lower limit a of the triangular distribution. In other
words, if delta > 0, E = delta · e is subtracted from the first ray, and if delta < 0, E
is added to the first ray (Note: E is negative as delta < 0).
The second function (No. 2.2) is for uncertainty distributions with boundaries. It
additionally expects a boundary as input and is similar to the first function but addi-
tionally verifies that no ray exceeds the given boundary. Finally, the third function (No.
2.3) adds uncertainty to each ray relative to an additional value range. Its implements
a modification of equation 4.11 and updates each ray by.
rayn(t) = c0 + delta + range · (e · 2n−N − 1
N − 1 ). (4.14)
To allow the representation of uncertainty when needed but to be able to represent a
characteristic also precisely, a colorset for a hybrid characteristic is defined by colset
BINT = union Int:INT + Bundle:Bundle; which can either include a precise variable
of the type INT or an uncertain variable of the type Bundle. To manipulate a variable
of the type BINT without the necessity to identify if it contains an exact or uncertain
value, three functions are defined (function 3.1 - 3.3), which are similar to the above
described functions 2.1 - 2.3. The difference is that instead of an uncertain variable
(Bundle), a hybrid variable (BINT) is expected as input. If the hybrid variable contains
a precise variable, just the specified delta is added. In the case it contains an uncertain
variable, the respective function (2.1 - 2.3) is called.
Furthermore, some functions were implemented to access the probability distribution
modeled by the rays. This requires first a function to calculate the cumulative probability
for every ray n out of N rays (function 4.1) by implementing equation 4.12. Further,
the function 4.2 calculates the cumulative probability for any given value by calculating
the cumulative probability for the both nearest rays and returning the interpolation
between. Finally the function 4.3 is defined for the opposite query, expecting a bundle
and a cumulative probability and returning the corresponding value. This function
first searches for those both rays, which cumulative probabilities surrounds the given
probability, and returns the interpolation between those rays.
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4.3.3. Integration of Prediction Uncertainty into the Planning Model
The implemented data types and functions are integrated into the ATC simulation as
part of the human operator planning model developed in the last chapter. The simulated
task is explained in section 3.3.
Up to now, an aircraft is modeled as record (aggregation of other types) by: colset
Aircraft = record AI: AcInfo * AS: AcState * ACL: AcClr * APL: AcP timed;
Thus, the type aircraft consists of four values and the type of each of these values is
in turn a record. The colset AcState = record HD: INT * ALT: INT * SPD: INT
* PosX: INT * PosY: INT * RnVec:STRING * POR: INT; is of interest here as it de-
scribes the current position of the aircraft (in X-and Y-coordinates, PosX and PosY), its
altitude (ALT), and its speed (SPD). RnVec gives the name of the aircraft’s current Route,
and POR the current position on this route. All continuous variables in this colorset, which
have to be predicted, and thus can include uncertainty, are changed to the hybrid vari-
able BINT. Thus, the new colset AcState = record HD: INT * ALT: BINT * SPD:
BINT * PosX: BINT * PosY: BINT * RnVec: STRING * POR: BINT; results.
To be able to transform aircraft stored in the precise data type without uncertainty
into the newly defined hybrid data type and vice versa, two functions are defined, which
integrate generateBundle and getValue to transform an aircraft at once (see function
1.1 and 1.2 in Table 4.5). Because access to aircraft characteristics is encapsulated in
get- and set-functions, only these functions have to be adapted to the new hybrid data
type. In order to reduce further changes, they return the exact value. If uncertainty has
to be handled explicitly the uncertain characteristics of aircraft are accessed directly.
This is the case four times: altering the position, altitude, and speed of the unequipped
aircraft and altering the position of the equipped aircraft.
If the ghosting assistance is not activated (see section 3.3) in MAGIE, the human op-
erator has to predict the flight trajectories up to the late merging point. As the equipped
aircraft follow their route automatically, the progress on this route and consequently the
X- and Y-coordinates (X: west–east, Y: south–north) have to be predicted. Additionally,
the position of the unequipped aircraft has to be predicted. However, as these aircraft
fly east to west during the merging procedure, the Y-coordinate is constant and only
the X-coordinate varies. Furthermore, the unequipped aircraft have to comply with the
altitude and speed constraints when entering new route sections. Therefore, prognosis
of altitude and speed are also of interest. All characteristics of an aircraft which are
predicted if the human operator is not assisted depending on the aircraft’s equipage are
summarized on the left hand side of Table 4.6.
If the ghosting assistance is activated, the operators do not need to predict the air-
craft’s trajectories up to the late merging point. Instead, it has to be predicted whether
the unequipped aircraft fit between the ghosts on the centerline and how the distance
between ghost and equipped aircraft will change until the late-merging point is reached.
As ghost and unequipped aircraft fly in the same direction with a similar speed on the
centerline, it is assumed that the position of the equipped aircraft is predicted according
to the position of the ghost. Consequently, not the change of absolute position of the
aircraft generates uncertainty, but the change of its distance to the ghosts. Therefore,
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Table 4.6.: Variables represented with uncertainty depending on aircraft’s equipage
and activated assistance
Ghosting not activated Ghosting activated
Characteristic Equipped Unequipped Equipped Unequipped
X Uncertaina Uncertaina Exact Uncertainb
Y Uncertaina Exact Exact Exact
Altitude Exact Uncertaina Exact Uncertaina
Speed Exact Uncertaina Exact Uncertaina
a Proportional to change of parameter
b Proportional to change of own speed relative to ghost speed
the uncertainty of the X-position of the unequipped aircraft is not implemented relative
to this aircraft’s absolute speed but relative to the difference between its speed and the
ghost’s speed. For example, when the unequipped aircraft is on the centerline and flies
with the same speed as the ghosts, the uncertainty does not change. However, if an air-
craft just started a turn and is flying in the opposite direction compared to the ghosts,
the uncertainty increases proportional to the sum of both speeds in X-direction.
As the distance to the ghosts is used as indicator for conflicts if the ghosting functions
is active, the position of the equipped aircraft is not of interested and consequently
not predicted. On the right hand side in Table 4.6, the characteristics predicted with
uncertainty, if ghosting assistance is activated, are given.
4.4. Results of Integrating Prediction Uncertainty into the
Planning Model
The integration of prediction uncertainty into an existing an ATC simulation as a demon-
stration is reported in the following.
The results concentrate on the differences between an exact and an uncertain predic-
tion. The considered situation and the predicted consequences are shown in Fig. 4.6
(ghosting not activated) and Fig. 4.7 (ghosting activated). The black lines in these
figures indicate the route structure. All aircraft are flying toward the LMP at X =
100000, Y = 100000. Whereas the equipped aircraft fly from the entries in the north
and south directly to that point, the unequipped aircraft also entering in the north and
south, first fly in east direction and are then instructed to turn west. In the example
situation the unequipped aircraft U90 is located at X = 114538, Y = 105994 and is just
instructed to start the turn maneuver, it is flying at the altitude of 6049 ft and declining
to 3000 ft. The equipped aircraft A57 is arriving from the south. U90 should arrive
behind A57 at the LMP and keep a minimum separation distance of 3NM (= 5558m).
For this situation, two predictions are calculated assuming an uncertainty of 10% and
using N = 21 rays. On the one hand, prediction uncertainty is calculated according
to deactivated ghosting (s. Fig 4.6), on the other hand, prediction uncertainty is calcu-
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lated according to activated ghosting (s. Fig 4.7). The uncertain and exact predicted
characteristics are given in (see Table 4.6).
In both settings, the altitude of U90 is predicted with uncertainty. The result is
show in Fig. 4.5. For the sake of simplicity, only 5 out of 21 calculated rays are shown,
including both outer rays (ray1 and ray21) and the middle ray (ray11). At t = 103 s,
the first ray reaches 3000 ft. In other words, the aircraft is predicted to reach 3000 ft at
t = 103 s at the earliest. At t = 113 s, also the middle ray reaches 3000 ft. At this time,
the probability of the aircraft’s altitude being 3000 ft, is exactly 50%. This altitude is
reached by the last ray at t = 126 s. Now the aircraft is predicted to have reached its
dedicated altitude with 100%.
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Figure 4.5.: Prediction of the altitude profile of U90, declining from above 6000 ft to
3000 ft. Calculated with an uncertainty of 10%
If ghosting assistance is not activated, the equipped aircraft’s progress on route is
calculated with uncertainty. Consequently, the X- and Y-coordinates, which are derived
from that progress, are uncertain and a distribution of the aircraft positions along the
route results. For unequipped aircraft, only their X-coordinate is predicted with uncer-
tainty as they have a constant Y-coordinate (Y = 100000) in the critical phase close to
the LMP. In Fig. 4.6, the predicted lateral position of aircraft U90 and A57 are shown
for specific points in time. In the example, the separation between both aircraft is vi-
olated at t = 107 s if uncertainty is considered. For this moment, the smallest distance
is predicted to be only 5458m (3NM = 5558m) between ray1 of U90 (ray with lowest
x-value) and ray16 of A57.
If ghosting assistance is activated, the positions of equipped aircraft are calculated
without uncertainty and the uncertainty of the unequipped aircraft’s X-coordinate de-
pends on their speed relative to the ghosts speed. The resulting prediction is shown in
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Figure 4.6.: Uncertain prediction of the positions of the aircraft U90 and A57 without
ghosting calculated with an uncertainty of 10%
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Fig. 4.7. According to the uncertain prediction, separation is violated firstly at t = 111 s,
as the distance between the first ray of U90 and the exact position of A57 is 5480m at
this moment.
The exact prediction is represented by the middle rays. Consequently, it is not influ-
enced by activating the assistance (and the corresponding exact or uncertain prediction).
The distance the middle rays of U90 and A57 is 6484m at t = 107 s respectively 6165m
at t = 111 s. Consequently, an exact calculation would not predict violations of sepa-
rations at t = 107 s or t = 111 s. However, at t = 122 s, the exactly predicted distance
between both aircraft has decreased to 5546m, and thus the separation between both
aircraft is violated.
The comparison of exact prediction (t = 122 s) and uncertain prediction with as-
sistance (t = 111 s) and without assistance (t = 107 s), indicates, that the accuracy
of conflict prediction increases, when the assistance ghosting is activated. The loss of
separation is closer to the exact prediction, when ghosting is activated.
For the generation of human-like interaction sequences, the predictions are used to
determine when speed reductions are necessary. Regardless of taking into account the
uncertainty, the speed of aircraft U90 needs to be reduced to avoid loss of separation.
In this sense, all predictions would lead to the same result. However, if the prediction
uncertainty is considered, the separation is violated earlier. Hence, a speed reduction
would need to be planned for an earlier point in time. In the example, the speed reduction
is predicted to be about 25 seconds earlier with uncertainty. Thus, predictions calculated
with uncertainty result into earlier than necessary speed reductions and thus a loss of
efficiency. Although, the difference seems small, it has a large impact on the efficiency,
as each decision is affected. It is assumed, that uncertain prediction are the reasons for
inefficient decisions of human operators and that interaction sequences generated with
uncertain predictions produce more human-like interaction sequences.
4.5. Concluding Remarks
The aim of this chapter was to enable models of human behavior based on CPNs to
allow more realistic predictions of human operator behavior. This should be achieved
by integrating uncertainty into the models. Therefore, a classification of uncertainty in
HMSs was developed first, which helped to identify the different issues and perspectives
to select and model the kind of uncertainty with the largest impact. The classification
supported the identification of the strong impact of prediction uncertainty. Therefore,
this uncertainty was selected, modeled, realized in CPN Tools and applied to the example
application. The developed classification is further useful to clarify the different forms of
uncertainty and can be applied in other cases before an appropriate modeling approach
is selected.
The integration of prediction uncertainty enables Petri Net models to make predic-
tions including continuous uncertainty. As the realized data types allow both, exact and
uncertain representations, and are accessed by encapsulated functions, integration into
the existing planning processes is possible without much additional effort. Modeling
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Figure 4.7.: Uncertain prediction of the positions of the aircraft U90 and A57 with
ghosting calculated with an uncertainty of 10%
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uncertainty as a bundle of rays has, on the one hand, the disadvantage that only an
approximation of the assumed probability distribution is possible. On the other hand,
switching to other distributions is possible and only requires implementing the corre-
sponding cumulative probability distribution. Furthermore, representing uncertainty
as rays allows representing complex distributions resulting from nonlinear predictions,
which could not be modeled with a distribution function.
The implementation of uncertainty in the example application indeed resulted into
predictions, which lead to inefficient behavior. However, it has to be analyzed how
realistic interaction sequences calculated based on uncertain predictions are. Therefore,
the parameters, in particular the maximum prediction error, have to be defined. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to compare the generated interaction sequences to the measured
behavior of human operators.
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5. Model-Based Evaluation of Decisions of Human
Operators
The last chapters described the cognitive model of planning developed in this thesis
to generate interaction sequences to be used as criteria for the measurement of human
operators’ cognitive task performance. The application of the generated interaction
sequences to evaluate human operators’ individual decisions is presented in the following
chapter. The generated interaction sequences are compared to the actual decisions of
human operators and deviations are detected and evaluated based on their consequences.
This method additionally allows determining the involved kind of action and the type
of human error.
The evaluation based on the deviations’ consequences becomes possible by combining
a result measure to evaluate the result of a complete interaction sequence with the
approach of event measures which compares the decisions of human operators to facts
of the real world. This allows measuring human operators’ task performance during an
interaction process.
The procedure of the developed method to evaluate single decisions of human operators
during an interaction is briefly summarized as follows:
1. Different situations, which occurred during a real measured interaction, are selected
as initial states to generate goal-directed interaction sequences with the cognitive
model of planning presented in chapter 3 respectively with the extended model
described in chapter 4.
2. The measured actions, which were executed by an operator before the selected
situation was reached, are combined with the generated sequence starting with
the selected situation.
3. Every pair of measured and calculated sequences represents a possible course of
interaction and is simulated to determine its consequences.
4. Evaluation functions are applied to assess the effects of these sequences.
5. The evaluation results of two adjacent situations are compared. The difference is
attributed to the decisions of the human operator between both situations.
When sufficiently small distances between two situations are used, the evaluation of
individual actions becomes possible. By comparing the actions planned to be executed
(calculated by the model) and the actions actually implemented (by the human operator)
in the interval between two adjacent selected situations, the kind of the relevant action
and the type of human error (omission or addition of an action) can be identified. This
allows detecting specific problems during observed interaction.
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Prerequisite for the application of the method described above is the existence of
evaluation criteria. As the simulation environment MAGIE is used as application ex-
ample, the criteria defined for MAGIE are presented and compared to criteria applied
in other studies with the same simulation environment in section 5.1. Subsequently,
the procedure of the method is explained in detail in section 5.2. Then, in section 5.3
the exemplary application of this method is described. As reasoned in chapter 4, the
human operator should not be compared with an ideal solution but with a realistic and
expectable solution. Therefore, the impact of uncertainty, which is inevitably connected
with predictions in dynamic environments, is considered. The implemented modifi-
cations of the planning model necessary to calculate interaction sequences including
uncertainty are presented in section 5.4. Afterwards, the application of the developed
method including the uncertainty in predictions is demonstrated in section 5.5. Finally,
the results are discussed in section 5.6.
5.1. Result Evaluation Criteria in Example Application
Result evaluation criteria are used to assess the result of an interaction sequence. They
transfer the reached result into a number to make the comparison of different interaction
sequences possible. The evaluation criteria cannot be chosen arbitrarily as they must
reflect the objectives in the analyzed task. In the example application MAGIE, the
objectives are instructed to the participants. These are the three objectives separation,
constraints, and throughput (see section 3.5.2).
In the written instructions of MAGIE, no formula to calculate the fulfillment of the
objectives is given. An exact formula has not been specified because it was not expected
that the participants are able to memorize this formula and to use this formula to
compare different decisions under time pressure. However, this has the consequence
that there are several ways to transfer the objectives described by words into an exact
formula. When such a formula is defined, it is important that plausible evaluations
result.
However, a ranking of the objectives is given in the instructions. The ranking of
the objectives implies that the fulfillment of the higher objective should be the aim in
every case, no matter how the lower objectives are affected thereby. Only if several
options fulfill the higher objective equally, the lower objective should be considered.
Consequently, a weighting of the objectives is not possible and it is necessary to regard
all objectives as independent.
Below the development of formulas to measure the fulfillment for the three objectives
is described. The defined formulas are justified and compared to these used in other
studies applying MAGIE. The formulas are defined such that 1 is the optimum value
(objective fulfilled completely) and that lower values indicate a lack of performance.
A value of 0 should represent the theoretical minimum (if possible) of the reachable
performance.
The variables used for the definitions of the objectives fulfillment are named according
to the following rules. Variables describing an individual aircraft or conflict within an
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interaction sequence are denoted with lower case Latin letters. Variables describing the
sum of these individual variables are named with upper case Latin letters. Latin letter
are also used as index (lower case) or for totals (upper case). Greek letters are used
for the fulfillment of the objectives, lower case letters for the contribution of individual
aircraft, upper case letters for the overall fulfillment.
5.1.1. The Objective Separation
The most important objective is separation. The aircraft should be separated by at least
3NM at all time. Consequently, a loss of separation should reduce the fulfillment of the
objective.
To measure the fulfillment of the objective separation in compliance with the in-
structions, a formula must be defined which meets the following conditions. First, the
calculated value must decrease if the duration of a conflict increases. Further, it must
decrease if an additional conflict occurs. Additionally, it must be independent from other
effects. Moreover, the criteria should facilitate the identification of the impact of each
action.
In general, two approaches are possible to calculate the fulfillment of the objective
separation. On the one hand, the objective can be based on the sum of the duration
of each particular conflicts (conflict-based approach). On the other hand, the objective
can be calculated as the sum of the duration of losses of separation for each unequipped
aircraft (aircraft-based approach). These two approaches differ, when equipped aircraft
are involved in the conflicts. As the equipped aircraft are planned automatically and
the separation between two equipped aircraft will never be violated, it is sufficient to
concentrate on the manually controlled unequipped aircraft.
Both approaches are compared in the following. In the conflict-based approach, the
duration of each conflict dj with j = 1, . . . , C are summed up. The variable C is used to
denote the total amount of conflicts during an interaction. The overall duration of all
conflicts D is accumulated as
D =
C∑
j=1
dj. (5.1)
The fulfillment of the objective separation according the conflict-based approach ∆cb
(cb for conflict-based) can be defined by
∆cb = 1− D
Dmax
, (5.2)
with Dmax as the maximal possible value of D so that ∆cb is between 0 and 1. As an
aircraft can violate the separation to several other aircraft at the same time, the total
amount of aircraft at every moment during the simulation must be considered for the
definition of Dmax.
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For the aircraft-based approach, the durations ki during that aircraft i violates at
least one separation are accumulated
K =
U∑
i=1
ki, (5.3)
with the total amount of unequipped aircraft U . The objectives fulfillment ∆ab (ab for
aircraft-based) is defined by
∆ab = 1− K
Kmax
. (5.4)
Conflicts between unequipped aircraft have a different impact on this measure fol-
lowing the aircraft-based approach than conflicts between unequipped and equipped
aircraft. In contrast, in the conflict-based approach the duration of conflicts is counted
independently from the equipage of the involved aircraft. However, an impact depending
on the equipage is acceptable as the performance of the human operator should be mea-
sured and the conflicts between equipped and unequipped aircraft can be attributed to
the technical assistance as well. Furthermore, the amount of conflicts in which the same
aircraft is involved at the same time is not considered in the aircraft-based approach.
Nevertheless, this additional conflict affects the conflict duration of the third aircraft.
Thus, the overall value K increases.
The aircraft-based approach has the advantage that it allows breaking down the overall
evaluation to the individual aircraft. Thus, it facilitates the identification of the impact
of each action. Consequently the aircraft-based approach is chosen.
As Kmax is the flight duration of all unequipped aircraft, it could be calculated as the
sum of the flight durations ti of aircraft i. One problem with approach is that an increase
of the flight duration would also increase the fulfillment of the objective separation. This
is not plausible. To solve that issue, the interaction sequence calculated for the initial
situation of an interaction is simulated and used as a reference. The resulting flight
duration for aircraft i in that reference sequence is called t0,i. Consequently, Kmax can
be calculated as
Kmax = T0 =
U∑
i=1
t0,i (5.5)
and the fulfillment of the objective separation is calculated by
∆ = 1− K
T0
. (5.6)
It is now possible to specify the fulfillment of the objective separation δi for each
individual aircraft i by considering only the duration this aircraft is involved in at least
of conflict with
δi = 1− ki
T0
. (5.7)
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The overall fulfillment can optionally be calculated based on the evaluations of the
individual aircraft by
∆ = 1− u+
U∑
i=1
δi. (5.8)
The objective separation was measured similarly in previous studies with MAGIE. In
the project FAGI [WO10], the conflict-based approach was used and the duration of all
conflicts was accumulated. Further, the fulfillment was not scaled to a value between 0
and 1 so that it was measured by
∆FAGI = D. (5.9)
However, the comparison of interactions with different length is hindered without scaling
to a standard range.
In the project FlexiGuide [JCH13], the aircraft-based approach was chosen and the
fulfillment was calculated by
∆FG = 1− K
T
. (5.10)
The variable T was used instead of T0 as the cognitive planning model was not yet
available.
5.1.2. The Objective Constraints
In addition to keep the aircraft separated, the human operator must make sure that the
eight constraints are respected, namely the limits for both, speed and altitude, defined
for the four route sections (downwind, base leg, extended centerline, and final).
The fulfillment of the objective constraints Γ should also be between 1 (represent-
ing the optimal value) and 0 (representing the theoretical minimal value). To be in
compliance with the instructions, the degree of fulfillment must decrease as long as the
constraints are violated. Each additional violation must also reduce Γ. Further, there
must be no difference between a violation of the altitude or the speed restriction, as no
such difference is instructed.
Three different approaches are possible to calculate the degree of fulfillment. For all
approaches al,i gives the duration constraint l being active for aircraft i and wl,i gives
the duration aircraft i violating constraint l. L gives the total of constraints and equals
8 (altitude/speed times four route sections). Following the constraint-based approach,
the fulfillment is calculated for each constraint separately and afterward the median is
calculated. Thus, with
al =
U∑
i=1
al,i (5.11)
as the duration constraint l being active and
wl =
U∑
i=1
wl,i (5.12)
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as the duration constraint l being violated, Γcb (cb for constraint-based) can be expressed
following the constraint-based approach by
Γcb = 1− 1
L
L∑
l=1
wl
al
. (5.13)
This approach has the advantage that it helps to identify the constraints which are
causing problems, as they are considered separately.
In the aircraft-based approach, first the fulfillment for each aircraft is determined and
then the mean value is calculated. Consequently, with the duration of active constraints
for aircraft i
ai =
L∑
l=1
al,i (5.14)
and the duration of their violation by aircraft i
wi =
L∑
l=1
wl,i (5.15)
the degree of fulfillment according to the aircraft-based approach Γab (ab for aircraft-
based) is defined as
Γab = 1− 1
U
U∑
i=1
wi
ai
. (5.16)
The advantage of this approach is that it concentrated on the aircraft and helps to
identify the individual impact of each aircraft.
The common drawback of both approach is that the constraints respectively the air-
craft are weighted equally. Although this sounds plausible, this has the consequence that
the same duration of a violation of a constraint can have different impacts depending
on the affected aircraft or constraint.
Consequently, the impact of each constraint (or aircraft) should be weighted with its
contribution to the overall duration of active limits, which is
A =
U∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
al,i. (5.17)
This leads to the combined approach and Γc can by calculated by
Γc = 1− 1
U
U∑
i=1
wi
ai
· ai
A
(5.18)
= 1− 1
U
U∑
i=1
wi
A
(5.19)
= 1−
1
U
∑U
i=1wi
A
(5.20)
= 1− W
A
with W = 1
U
U∑
i=1
wi (5.21)
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The transformation of this equation shows that the introduction of such a weighting
merges both approaches. This combined approach has the drawback that neither the
effect of a limit nor the effect of an aircraft can be calculated without knowing about
the overall duration A the limits being active.
Additionally, in all three approaches the problem is that A can vary between two
compared options while the overall duration of the violation of all constraints
W =
U∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
wl,i. (5.22)
is equal. Consequently, the objectives fulfillment would vary whileW is constant. There-
fore, a similar modification as for the objective separation is used and al,i is replaced by
the duration the limits being active in the reference sequence calculated for the initial
situation of an interaction called a0,l,i. Thus with
A0 =
U∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
a0,l,i (5.23)
the degree of fulfillment of the objective constraints is defined by
Γ = 1− W
A0
. (5.24)
The fulfillment can be separated for speed and altitude constraints. With the intro-
duction of A0, the calculation of the impact of each aircraft respectively limit does not
depend on al,i anymore so that it can be calculated without knowledge about the other
aircraft. Consequently, the fulfillment of the objective by aircraft i can be calculated by
γi = 1− wi
A0
. (5.25)
or for only speed constraints by
γi,speed = 1− wi,speed
A0
(5.26)
respectively for only altitude constraints by
γi,altitude = 1− wi,altitude
A0
. (5.27)
Similar as for the objective separation, the overall fulfillment can be calculated based
on the individual evaluations by
Γ = 1− U +
U∑
i=1
γi (5.28)
As in former studies [WO10, JCH13] calculated interaction sequences and a0,l,i were
not available, the drawback of the effect of prolonged flight duration on the objective
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could not be solved. In this studies, the constraint-based approach was chosen and the
fulfillment of the objective constraints was defined as
ΓFAGI/FG = 1− 1
L
L∑
l=1
wl
al
. (5.29)
5.1.3. The Objective Throughput
The degree of fulfillment of the objective throughput Θ must measure how much the
operators succeeded with the task to guide the aircraft as early as possible to the airport.
Here the idea is to take the time needed by the operator to guide all aircraft from their
entry point to their exit point (T ) and to compare it to the time needed in the initial
solution (T0). Consequently, the objective’s fulfillment can be defined in a first step as
Θ∗ = 1− T − T0
T0
= 2− T
T0
. (5.30)
With this definition, Θ∗ is equal to 1 if the aircraft are guided as quickly as in the
sequence calculated for the initial situation of the interaction (T = T0). As no maximal
flight duration can be defined (fuel consumption is not simulated in MAGIE), is it not
possible to define Θ such that is equals to 0 in the worst case. However, it is possible to
define Θ such that it equals to 2 if this objective is maximized and both other objectives
are ignored. Therefore, it is necessary to divide T into the time inevitably required for
all aircraft to be guided from the entry to the exit and the time caused by additional
guidance over the path-stretching area. Only downwind and extended centerline are
considered as additional as the base-leg cannot be avoided. Consequently, with P as
the flight duration of all aircraft in the path-stretching area and P0 to denote the flight
duration of all aircraft in the path-stretching area in the reference interaction, Θ can be
defined as
Θ = 1− P − P0
P0
= 2− P
P0
. (5.31)
The fulfillment of the objective can also be calculated for each aircraft i by
θi = 1− pi − p0,i
p0
(5.32)
with pi as the flight duration of aircraft i in the path-stretching area, and pi,0 as the flight
duration of aircraft i in the path-stretching area in the reference interaction sequence
generated for the initial situation.
Similar to both other objectives, the overall fulfillment can be calculated based on the
individual evaluations by
Θ = 1− U +
U∑
i=1
θi (5.33)
5.2. Procedure for the Evaluation of Decisions of Human Operators 115
As no interaction sequences could be calculated in former studies with MAGIE, the
comparison of the flight duration with the necessary flight durations was not possible.
Furthermore, the interaction sequences were not supplemented by calculated sequences
so that not every aircraft landed during the evaluated interaction sequences. Therefore,
the amount of aircraft arriving at their exit point varied between simulation runs and
this variable was used as a measure [WO10]. In [JCH13], the duration of each interaction
was so short that no aircraft reached its exit in most interactions. Therefore, this amount
was not suitable. Instead, the amount of aircraft which reached the base-leg was used
as a measure for throughput.
5.1.4. Interdependence of Objectives
The degree of fulfillment for the objectives separation and constraints cannot be larger
than 1. However this is possible for the objective throughput if the routes are shorter
than in the interaction sequence calculated for the initial situation. Nevertheless, in the
ideal case all objectives have the degree of fulfillment of 1. If shorter routes are advised,
throughput increases but the separation to other aircraft will be violated and hence
the corresponding fulfillment decreases. As separation is much more important than
throughput, throughput should not be preferred for the cost of a decrease in separation
5.2. Procedure for the Evaluation of Decisions of Human
Operators
After evaluation criteria are defined, the procedure of the developed method for the
evaluation of human operators’ decisions can be applied. The aim of this method is to
evaluate each individual action and to identify the contribution of the different kinds of
action and types of errors on the overall result of the interaction. The general idea is
to evaluate the action depending on what was possible before the action was executed
and what is still possible after the action is executed. The procedure developed to reach
this aim consists of six steps which are explained in the following. As input to the
procedure, a recorded interaction sequence is necessary. In the first step, the cognitive
planning model developed in chapter 3, which is based on a CPN model of the controlled
system and a set of rules defining the prototypical human operator behavior, is applied
to generate interaction sequences for different points during the measured interaction
representing what was possible at the respectively situation (step 1).
To compare the results of interaction sequences, all compared interaction sequences
have to start with the same situation. Consequently, it is first necessary to combine
the measured behavior and the generated interaction sequence (step 2). Then this
combined sequence has to be simulated in order to get the results of this interaction
(step 3). Finally, these results can be evaluated with the functions defined in the last
section (step 4).
After that, an assessment of the actions measured between adjacent combined se-
quences is possible, as decreases in the objectives’ fulfillment indicate erroneous actions
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(step 5). Finally, in step 6, it is possible to sum up the assessments of individual action
and to identity the frequency and impact of specific kinds of actions and types of error.
5.2.1. Generation of Interaction Sequences
The application of the cognitive planning model developed in chapter 3 to generate
interaction sequences is the first and most complex and extensive step of the procedure.
The execution of this step has three preconditions. First, the process, with which the
human operator is interacting, must be modeled as a CPN. Furthermore, prototypical
behavior of the human operator for interaction with this process must be defined as a set
of rules. Finally, an interaction sequence (interaction protocol) and its results (results
protocol) must be recorded. The interaction protocol describes all actions occurred,
whereas the results protocol contains all states that resulted from these actions.
Subsequently, some situations have to be selected from the results of the measured
interaction sequence. For each selected situation, an interaction sequence is calculated
indicating the reachable result. The aim is to evaluate actions of human operator be-
tween two selected situations depending on the actions’ impact on the reachable result.
On the one hand, situations directly before and after the execution of a measured action
could be analyzed. This has the advantage that the measured difference can directly be
attributed to the surrounded action. However, missing executions of required actions
cannot be considered equally with this approach, as they do not take place as events
but last for some time. To consider missing actions equivalently, situations are selected
with regular intervals.
The size of the interval should be chosen so that in most cases the effect of the actions
on the objectives’ fulfillment is unambiguous. Thus, first of all, the size of the interval
should depend on the frequency of actions. Furthermore, the fact that not every action
affects each objective can be used to make a more precise assignment of actions to
decreases of the objectives’ fulfillment. This allows choosing larger intervals.
The selected situations are loaded into the CPN model of the controlled process and
interaction sequences are generated. For details see chapter 3. Interaction sequences are
generated for all selected situations which transform the respective situations into goal
situations.
5.2.2. Combination of Measured and Generated Interaction Sequences
In the next step, measured and generated sequences are combined. A prerequisite is
that both are available, in other words the interaction must be recorded and the first
step of this procedure must be applied successfully.
It is necessary to evaluate the same time period of interaction sequences in order to
gain comparable measures. For example, two interaction sequences are calculated for the
first and last situation of a 10 seconds cutout of an interaction. During the whole cutout,
a problem is present (which affects at least one objective). In the interaction sequence
calculated for the first situation, the problem is solved after 15 seconds. In the interaction
sequence generated for the last situation it is solved after 10 seconds. If only the two
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Figure 5.1.: The combination of a measured interaction sequence, which starts with
the initial station and ends with the selected situation, and a calculated
interaction sequence, which starts with the selected situation end ends
with the goal situation
generated sequences are compared, a reduction of the duration from 15 to 10 seconds can
be found. Actually, the problems duration is longer according to the seconds sequence
as this sequence is generated for a later point in time. Starting from the first situation
of the cutout, the problem lasts for 20 seconds. Thus, both interaction sequences can
only be compared, if the interaction during the cutout is considered. Hence, to be able
to evaluate the existing options for the selected situation, it is necessary to combine
calculated and measured interaction sequences. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.1. The
actions, which took place between the initial and selected situation, are taken from the
recorded interaction protocol and are combined with the calculated sequences which
transform the selected situation into a goal situation.
If several action sequences are compared, the starting time of the earliest sequence
determines the point after which the measured behavior has to be taken into account.
This is the initial situation of the measured interaction sequence. If this situation is
selected, the combined interaction sequence contains only calculated actions. If other
situations are selected, the combined sequence always contains both measured and cal-
culated actions. This also holds for the final situation. Here the calculated interaction
sequence contains the actions necessary to transform this situation into a goal situation.
After this second step of the procedure is executed, as many combined sequences result
as situations were selected in the first step.
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5.2.3. Simulation of Combined Interaction Sequences
To evaluate the combined interaction sequences, their results must be known. Results
are available only for the measured sequences up to now. During the generation of
interaction sequences, the effects of different options were determined, but no output
was generated containing only the results of the interaction sequence found as solution.
In addition, this output would not be sufficient, as the effects of the combined (and not
only the calculated) sequences have to be considered.
To determine these effects, a small tool is developed which also uses Access/CPN
[WK09] to modify the CPN of the controlled process directly. At first, the initial state is
loaded into the Petri Net. In addition to the transitions modeling the dynamic behavior
of the process, the transitions corresponding to the actions in the combined sequence
are fired. In doing so, a result protocol results for each combined sequence.
5.2.4. Product Evaluation of Simulation Results
After the result protocols of the combined interaction sequences are generated, the pro-
tocols are evaluated. As they have the same format as the protocols of the measured
behavior of the human operator, both can be analyzed with the same procedures.
The aim of the product evaluation of combined interaction sequences is to generate
an output which is sufficient to assess the operators’ actions. Therefore, not only the
fulfillment of the objectives is calculated for each combined sequence. Additionally,
actions are identified which can cause decreases of the objectives’ fulfillment during the
interval. In this step, each combined sequence is evaluated independently from other
sequences.
Executed and missing actions can influence objectives. Consequently, the actions
measured in the considers interval x (actions Ex in the measured interaction sequence),
the actions planned for that interval by the model (planned actions Px in the generated
interaction sequence), and the difference between planned and given actions (missing
actions) are considered. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.2. In this figure, the interval
contains one action, which is not necessarily always the case. On the one hand, several
actions are possible during an interval. On the other hand, intervals often contain no
action.
To reduce the amount of actions to be considered and to allow a precise assignment of
actions to decreases of the objectives’ fulfillment in the next step of the procedure, the
objectives and subsystems are considered separately. For each combination of subsystem
and objective, a subset out of the given and planned actions is extracted as candidates
for a potential decrease of the objective’s fulfillment. As changes of the objective’s
fulfillment cannot be identified in this step of the procedure yet, all action which can
possibly influence an objective come into question as candidates. The planned actions
identified as candidates are called P ∗x ⊂ Px while the measured actions identified as
candidates are called E∗x ⊂ Ex.
If the objectives of a subsystem can only be influenced by actions related to that
subsystem (isolated problems) a large amount of actions can be sorted out. Moreover,
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objectives and kind of actions can be split up in more specific ones if a more precise
assessment becomes possible. Consequently, in addition to its fulfillment, a list of can-
didates which could cause a decrease during the next interval are generated for each
objective.
Some actions concerning a subsystem can cause problems affecting another subsys-
tem’s objective. These problems are called common problems. For each of these common
problems also a list of candidates is generated. The assignment of common problems to
a subsystem’s objective is conducted in the next step.
When candidates are identifies, it has to be taken into account that some actions can
be undone nearly immediately. The consequences can be illustrated with the following
example. In an interval, an aircraft is advised to increase its speed which leads to a
violation of the constraints. During the same interval, no speed clearance was planned
for that aircraft. This situation can be viewed from two perspectives. Following the
first perspective, a wrong action was executed. Following the second perspective, the
operator missed to revoke this action so that a missing action is causing the problem.
It was decided to follow the first perspective, as the executed action is the primary
reason. Hence, when an action is executed while it is not planned, the execution and
not the missing withdrawal of this action is interpreted as an error. The example can
be slightly modified to illustrate another point. The increase of speed is given while a
decrease of speed was planned. In this case, the primary reason for possible problems
is the missing action. Hence, when an action was planned and it is not executed in the
interval, this missing action is considered as a candidate, even if another action (contrary
to the planned action) was given during the interval.
If no candidate can be identified for a combination of subsystem and objective or for a
common problem, an “undefined” reason for a decrease of the performance is specified.
The evaluation of a selected situation thus comprises the individual fulfillment of
the objectives and candidates for erroneous actions for each objective. Additionally,
a description for each common problem including the list of candidates affecting this
problem is added. The evaluation of all selected situations is written in one file which
is used as input for the evaluation of actions in the next step.
5.2.5. Evaluation of Actions by Comparison of Adjacent Sequences
To evaluate actions, the result evaluations of two adjacent selected situations are com-
pared. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.3. The situation at the beginning of the interval x
is called pre-situation (Sx) and the situation at the end of the interval is denoted as
post-situation (Sx+1). The aim of this step is to generate a list containing all erroneous
actions causing a performance reduction together with the corresponding effect on the
objectives’ fulfillment and additional details about the action. The list of erroneous
actions is basically a subset of the list of candidates identified in the last step.
If the fulfillment of an objective decreases during the interval, the human operator lost
the option to reach the performance possible in the pre-situation. The actions executed
by the operator in the interval (Ex) must deviate from the actions planned by the model
Px. However, this difference between measured and planned actions alone does not
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Figure 5.2.: Evaluation of combined sequences
indicate an erroneous action as different options (and thus actions) can lead to the same
result. A reduction of the reachable performance must occur at the same time. Only if
the objective is decreasing and the measured actions deviate from the planned action,
the action implemented by the human operator was not the best option available. Thus,
only if a decrease of performance can be assigned to an action identified as candidate
in the last step, this action was erroneous. Consequently, these reductions are identified
first in this step and are consequently combined with the candidates identified in the
last step.
After a performance reduction between two compared interaction sequences is de-
tected, the erroneous actions must be identified out of the candidates generated in the
last step. To enable a precise assignment of erroneous actions to performance reductions,
the performance as well as the actions are considered for each subsystem separately.
This step is straightforward for objectives of a subsystem, which can only be influenced
by actions concerning this subsystem. In this case, the procedure illustrated in Fig. 5.4
is followed. If the set of given actions identified as candidates E∗x in the last step is not
empty, this set of actions is considered as erroneous and added to the list of errors as
commission. If no commissions are identified and the set of missing actions identified as
candidates in the same combined sequence P ∗x is not empty, these actions are added to
the list of errors as omissions.
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are called observed actions and the actions between both situations in
the combined sequence generated for the pre-situation are called planned
actions. Note that although situation in various sequences are denoted
the same, they differ in general.
Additionally, objectives which can be influenced by common problems have to be con-
sidered. Here a list of candidates relevant for a subsystem’s objective has to be generated
out of the list of candidates for each common problems. Thus, the connection between
the fulfillment of a subsystem’s objective and the common problems has to be made.
Out of the common problems in the combined sequences generated for both the pre- and
post-situation, only these problems are of interest, which take place during or after the
interval and in which the considered subsystem is involved. Furthermore, problems can
only have a negative impact on the objective if they are created or prolonged during the
interval. Thus, the common problems in the combined sequences for the pre- and post-
situation are compared to identify created and prolonged problems. The candidates
assigned to the created or prolonged problems are then summarized to constitute the
candidates for a reduction of a subsystem’s objective’s fulfillment (E∗x for given actions
and P ∗x for missing actions). If no candidates were found for a common problem in the
last step (and an “undefined” reason was specified), these reasons are ignored in the
combined list. Subsequently, the procedure illustrated in Fig. 5.4 can also be applied for
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is detected
Following this procedure, an error classification similar to this of the signal detec-
tion theory (see section 2.3.1) result. The difference between actions required by the
environment and actions as responses of the operator are detected.
The list of errors generated this way contains the following details for each action.
First, the execution time of an action is given. To be able to handle also periods
without measured actions (namely omission errors), the beginning of an interval in
which the action is executed or omitted is used. Second, a description of the influenced
objective is given. Further, the kind of actions and the type of error is added (omission
or commission). Finally, the performance lost due to this erroneous action during the
interval is given.
If multiple actions are identified for a decrease of performance, the decrease is divided
between all actions equally and it is expected that they all have the same impact.
However, this should rarely occur due to the chosen interval size, the consideration of
each subsystems separately, and the assignment of actions to objectives.
This classification of actions can be extended so that errors according to the definition
in the time window method result (see section 2.3.1). This extension is illustrated in
Fig. 5.5. Instead of classifying all given actions E∗x causing a performance reduction
as commission, a more precise assignment follows for each action e∗ ∈ E∗x. At first,
it is checked if the action is also a planned action. Here the intersection of given E∗x
and planned actions P ∗x results. As types of actions are considered, this identifies in-
correct actions which are planned but executed in a different way than planned. For
example, action with an inappropriate intensity are incorrect. Actions not identified as
incorrect actions are checked if they are planned for later intervals and element of L∗x
(see Fig. 5.3 for an illustration). This comparison identifies the early actions. Actions
neither classified as incorrect or early actions are compared to the actions planned for
earlier situations A∗x in the next step. A∗x is defined as the union of previously calculated
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Figure 5.5.: Possible extension of the error identification process according to the time
window method
interaction sequences by A∗x = P ∗1 ∪L∗1∪P ∗2 ∪L∗2∪ ...∪P ∗x−1∪L∗x−1. Here the late actions
are identified. Given actions not part of one of the other considered sets of actions are
regarded as false alarms. Following this procedure, all actions are classified according to
the complete classification of the time windows method as depicted in Fig. 2.16. How-
ever, this extended classification does need not only two adjacent sequences as input but
all previous sequences. Due to this increased effort, the extended classification is not
applied in this thesis.
5.2.6. Identification of the Impact of Kind of Actions and Types of Error
In the last step of the procedure, the impact of the different kind of actions and types
of errors on each objective is determined. Therefore, the list of erroneous actions and
their impact created in the last step is used and the elements of this list are combined
stepwise. It was decided to combine elements with only one different characteristic at
a time. As some information is lost in each step, an output of the results is generated
after each step. In each output, the lost performance due to omissions and commissions
is given for each possible combination of objective and kind of action.
In the first aggregation level, list items are summarized which are identical expect for
the impact on the objective. As subsystems were considered individually, actions, which
influenced common problems and thus the fulfillment of the objective separation for two
subsystems, were added multiple times. These items are combined now.
Then, the same actions with the same effect are combined. Consequently, items with
a different time of execution are merged (all other characteristics, expect the impact,
must be the same). If objectives were split up to allow a more precise assignment of
actions to lost performance, these are reunited in the next step. In a further step, also
kinds of actions, which were separated into more detailed kinds, are merged again. For
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each remaining combination, the effect of both types of errors (omission or additional
action) is calculated.
If these results are further summarized, important information will be lost. Either,
the kind of action, the type of error, or the objectives would be combined. However,
the aim of the whole method was to identify the impact of each action and type of
error and therefore the most important additional benefit of the method would be lost.
Additionally, when it is no longer differentiated between different actions and errors,
similar result could also be achieved by calculating only one interaction sequence to
transform the final situation of the measured interaction into a goal situation so that a
much smaller effort would be necessary. A combination of the different objectives would
require defining a weighting of these objectives.
5.2.7. Application of Procedure
The above described procedure is applied to the microworld MAGIE. First, five different
actions are considered, which are to increase and to decrease speed and altitude and the
initiation of the turn maneuver. Second, the objective constraints is split up in speed
and altitude constraints, as violations of speed constraints are caused by changes of the
speed and the same holds for altitude constraints. Both allow a more precise assignment
of actions to objective. As additionally, the frequency of actions is rather low, an interval
size of 10 seconds is chosen.
In MAGIE each aircraft can be considered as a subsystem. The objectives constraints
and throughput are the result of isolated problems for each subsystem whereas the ob-
jective separation is influenced by common problems. Hence, the product evaluations
of the results of interaction sequences in MAGIE, contains data about each aircraft and
additionally about each conflict. For the evaluation of an aircraft, the individual fulfill-
ment of the objectives is given, whereby the fulfillment of the objective constraints is
split up in speed and altitude constraints. To determine the fulfillment of the objectives,
the equations 5.7, 5.26, 5.27, and 5.32 are used.
Candidates are determined from given actions, planned actions, and missing actions.
Only the objectives’ fulfillment and candidates would be necessary, but additionally the
call-sign is given to identify the aircraft and some durations are included (flight duration,
flight time in compliance with restrictions, flight duration in the path-stretching area) to
enable a reconstruction of the objectives’ fulfillment. For each conflict, which occurred
in the combined interaction sequence, candidates are determined. These are (given or
missing) actions concerning one of the involved aircraft. Additionally, details of the
conflict, like its duration and the aircraft’s call-sign, are determined.
Candidates for a decrease of the performance of the objective separation are initi-
ations of turn maneuver and missing and given speed clearances. As the objective
separation can be influenced by actions concerning both aircraft in a conflict, the candi-
dates concerning each individual aircraft are not exhaustive. For the violation of speed
constraints, only missing and given speed clearances are candidates. Missing and given
altitude instructions are considered accordingly for altitude constraints. For a reduction
of the throughput, several actions come into question. First, missing action which di-
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rectly influence the throughput are considered, which are missing initiations of the turn
maneuver and missing speed and altitude changes. In addition, given initiations of the
turn and given speed instructions are considered in subordinate ranking. Regarding the
conflicts, actions concerning one of the involved aircraft are candidates. These actions
are first initiations of the turn maneuver, then missing actions, and finally other given
actions.
Then the result-evaluations of sequences generated for adjacent selected situations
are compared to assess the individual actions within the interval. When the evaluation
results are summarized, objectives and actions split earlier are combined again. First,
it is no longer differentiated between speed and alt constraints. No information should
be lost here, as these objectives are influenced by different kind of actions. Further,
it is no longer differentiated according to the direction of changes of speed or altitude.
Hence, the amount of different actions is reduced from five to three. After that step,
the different combinations are reduced to nine, three objectives (separation, constraints,
and throughput) and three kinds of actions (initiation of turn, change of alt, a change of
speed). For example all changes of speed causing conflicts are combined. To compare the
influence of the turn maneuver to the impact of all other actions, additionally speed and
altitude changes are combined finally. After this step, the highest level of aggregation
results, which contains six different combinations (three objectives and two kinds of
actions).
To combine the objectives, a weighting would be necessary. But as already mentioned
in section 5.1, the definition of a weighting would be arbitrary, as only a ranking was
instructed. Consequently, the objectives are not combined.
The lost performance of the objective separation ∆− is defined as the sum of the im-
pact of all actions reducing the separation performance. Similarly, the lost performance
is defined for the objectives constraints Γ− and throughput Θ−. The fulfillment of the
objectives constraints and throughput can increase during the interaction (at the cost of a
decrease in separation) and only decreases of these objectives are considered for the calcu-
lation of the lost performance. Therefore, in general: 1−Γ− 6= Gamma(finalSituation)
and 1−Θ− 6= Theta(finalSituation). However, as the separation performance can not
increase during an interaction 1−∆− = ∆(finalSituation).
5.3. Demonstrative Application
To demonstrate the method described in the last section, it is applied to a measured
interaction sequence with a duration of 600 s. The results are reported in the following.
A step size of 10 s is chosen and 61 sequences are calculated, combined with the measured
sequences, simulated and finally evaluated. The results of the evaluation of all combined
interaction sequences with respect to the objective separation are shown Fig. 5.6. At first,
periods in which a conflicts occurred in the measured interaction sequence are highlighted
in light red. The first conflict lasted from 160 s – 171 s and the second conflict lasted
from 284 s – 297 s. In the figure further the fulfillment of the objective separation during
the interaction according to equation 5.6 is given as black squares. At the beginning,
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this objective is fulfilled completely and decreases to 0.9778 during the interaction. The
value decreases during two periods, which are each located before both conflicts, while
it remains constant otherwise. This shows that the achievable performance is dropping
way ahead of a conflict. In other words, once the performance first decreases, the conflict
cannot be avoided. The more the fulfillment of the objective decreases, the longer the
conflict will inevitably last. Actions causing the conflict or actions that could have
prevented the conflict are to be found during the two periods in which the reachable
performance is decreasing and not at the time the conflict realizes. This periods can only
be identified if the combined interaction sequences of measured and calculated behavior
are analyzed. To support this claim, the fulfillment of the objective separation is also
calculated and shown in this figure (gray triangles), if only the measured interaction
sequences are used as an input (and the calculated interaction sequences are ignored
completely). In this case, the performance is decreasing only when the conflict finally
realizes. This shows that the measured and calculated interaction sequences have to be
analyzed to detect possible reasons for a loss of performance.
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Figure 5.6.: Fulfillment of the objective separation by combined interaction sequences
(black squares) and only measured interaction sequences (as gray trian-
gles). Durations with conflicts in the measured interaction sequence are
highlighted with red (160 s – 171 s and 284 s – 297 s).
The fulfillment of the objective constraints during the same interaction sequence is
given in Fig. 5.7. Both, the fulfillment of the altitude constraints (as blue squares with
crosses) and of the speed constraints (as blue squares with x) are shown separately.
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Additionally, the fulfillment of the combined objective is indicated (as blue squares with
stars, calculated with equation 5.24). While the speed constraints are never violated (the
objective is fulfilled completely at the end of the interaction), a drop in the fulfillment
of the altitude constraints indicates a violation. The combined objectives consequently
drops by the half amount and reaches 0.9884 finally.
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Figure 5.7.: Fulfillment of the objective constraints by all constraints (blue squares), by
only speed constraints (+), by only altitude constraints (x), and fulfillment
of the objective throughput (yellow circles). Durations with violations of
constraints in the measured interaction sequence are highlighted with red
(452 s – 488 s violation of altitude restriction)
The violation causing the drop last from 452 s – 488 s is highlighted in the figure. Here,
in contrast to the time curve of the objective separation, the objective drops only when
the violation occurs although the combined interaction sequence is considered. This
indicates that the violation was either caused by an action with direct consequences or
was preventable till it finally realized. In fact, the violation of the altitude constraints
could be prevented as an aircraft was descending below the minimum allowed altitude
and needed to be instructed to stop the descent.
In the figure additionally the objective throughput is given as yellow circles. The value
of this objective decreases to 0.9808 during the interaction. The aircraft needed longer
then necessary to reach the end of the sector. The objective is constant at the beginning
and decreases with several smaller steps in the following. The frequent changes indicate,
that this objective is affected by many erroneous actions.
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Based on the time curve of the objectives, the actions of the human operator are
evaluated in the next step. For example, the aircraft U90 and U74 have a predicted
conflict at the time point 120. In the following interval (120 s – 130 s), it is planed to
accelerate U90 and to decelerate U74. The objective separation is decreasing in this
interval by 0.026 for each aircraft. As the objective is decreasing for the first time,
the conflict becomes inevitable during the interval. Since it is not clear which of both
missing changes could prevent the conflict, the loss of performance for each aircraft is
assigned to both actions, the missing acceleration of U90 and the missing deceleration
of U74. Consequently, four list items are added to the list of erroneous actions.
Later, at time 230 s, U74 and U23 have a predicted conflict. In the following interval,
an acceleration of U74 is planned, but this action is not executed and thus missing. Since
there are no other executed or missing actions, not only the decrease of the objective
separation for aircraft U74 by 0.034 is assigned to the missing acceleration, but also the
decrease for aircraft U23 by 0.035. (The difference between both changes is cause by
rounding errors.)
In the next step the evaluation for each action and aircraft are summarized. First,
evaluations for the same time-step and the same kind of action and type of error are
combined. In the above example, in which U90 and U70 are in conflict and speed changes
were planned for both aircraft in the interval 120 s – 130 s, the decrease of the objective
separation was divided between both actions so that four elements where added to the
list of erroneous actions (two for each aircraft, two for each action). Now the list items for
the same action but regarding different aircraft are combined. As each original elements
had on impact of 0.013 on the objective, both combined items have an impact of 0.026
each. Both elements can be seen in the first and second line of Table 5.1. In this table
the results of the first aggregation with an impact on the objective separation are given.
On the highest level of aggregation, Table 5.2 results. This table gives for all six
combinations of objectives and actions (turn or other action) the impact of both types
of errors, which are the execution of unnecessary additional actions (commissions) and
omissions. The results in this table show that no additional actions were executed in
the measured interaction sequence. Only omissions caused decreases of the objectives.
Furthermore, all decreases can be attributed to changes of altitude and speed. The
initiations of turn maneuvers had no influence on the objectives, neither additional
initiations (which includes too early initiations) nor omissions (which includes delayed
initiations)
5.4. Adaption of the Planning Model to Predict Behavior
As argued in chapter 4, the human operators should not be compared to an optimum
which cannot be hold during training or operation. However, the evaluation presented
in the last sections uses optimal interaction sequences as criteria. Consequently, it is
no surprising result that the measured efficiency is steadily decreasing during scenarios.
In the last chapter, the integration of prediction uncertainty into a CPN model was
explained. This enables more realistic predictions of human behavior and consequently
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Table 5.1.: List of erroneous actions in a measured interaction sequence with impact
on the objective separation. The time of execution, the type of error, the
kind of actions, and the decrease of the objective’s fulfillment due to each
action is given
t Type of error Kind of action [∆(t)−∆(t+ 10)] · 103
120 Omission SpeedUp 26
120 Omission SpeedDown 26
130 Omission SpeedUp 12
130 Omission SpeedDown 12
140 Omission SpeedUp 8
140 Omission SpeedDown 8
150 Omission SpeedUp 4
150 Omission SpeedDown 4
230 Omission SpeedUp 69
240 Omission SpeedUp 34
260 Omission SpeedUp 8
280 Omission SpeedUp 4
280 Omission SpeedDown 2
more realistic measures of human performance. The integration of such an uncertain
CPN model into the cognitive planning model (see section 3.6) to generate more realistic
predictions of operators behavior is explained in the following of this section. The
implemented adaptations of the planning model to integrate uncertainty are already
published in [HS14]
The cognitive model of human operators planning must be modified slightly to gener-
ate plans under uncertainty. Up to now, the model consists of a set of rules and a CPN
of the controlled system. First, this CPN has to be replaced by a net also modeling
uncertainty (see chapter 4 for details). Further, some definitions used by the rules have
to be modified to scope with the uncertainty. If continuous values, which are associ-
ated with uncertainty in the model, have to be kept between certain limits, neither the
maximal nor the minimal prediction error should exceed the limit. Thus, the minimal
predicted values has to be compared to lower limits and the maximal predicted values
has to be compared to upper limits. If this is strongly obeyed, the limits will never be
violated.
The rules implemented in MAGIE can be changed in the following way. If the min-
imum of all calculated distances is below the minimum separation distance, a conflict
is detected and the corresponding rule is activated. Furthermore, the rules defined
to comply with the constrictions are modified to check both the minimal and maxi-
mal predicted value. After these changes are made, the planning model can generate
human-operator-like plans including prediction uncertainty.
If the model generates plan without uncertainty, a planned interaction sequences will
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Table 5.2.: Most aggregated results of the evaluation of an observed interaction se-
quence showing the overall impact of a combination of action and error on
each objective
∆− · 103 per type of error
Objective Kind of action Commission Omission
Separation Start turn 0 0Altitude / speed 0 217
Constraints Start turn 0 0Altitude / speed 0 231
Throughput Start turn 0 0Altitude / speed 0 192
be executed exactly as planned. However, if uncertainty is included, a difference between
the plan and the later execution will result. When generating a plan, the decisions
about actions and their timing are based on predictions which have the time of the
plan’s generation as reference point. While the plan is executed it can be adapted
continuously. Consequently, decisions can be based on predictions that have the time
of the execution of an action as reference point. Thus the prediction horizon is shorter,
the uncertainty is lower, and the actions fit more to the real conditions.
If now uncertainty is considered by the model of human operators planning, the gener-
ated sequences are planned interaction sequences but not predictions of human behavior.
This difference was not present as long as exact plans were generated. Consequently, an
additional modification of the model is necessary to generate interaction sequences as
predictions for actual behavior. Therefore, it is important to allow an update of a plan
when better (more exact) prognoses are possible.
When a plan generated under uncertainty is executed, the accuracy of predictions is
steadily increasing allowing updates of the plan. However, often replanning is elaborately
and only small increases of accuracy are expected. One possibility is to generate a more
precise plan only right before an action is executed to check if this action is still necessary
at this point in time or if it should be delayed or canceled. The action is executed only if
it is confirmed by the updated plan. Independent from the execution of this action, the
plan is updated again right before the next action is planned to be executed (according
to the updated plan). This action has to be confirmed or refused by a further update
of the plan. This realizes an alternating between an execution and a planning phase as
described in the model of Mumford [MSD01] detailed in Section 2.1.4. Instead of an
refinement of the plan as explained in this model, the plan is completely regenerated
here.
The cognitive planning model is modified in three ways to get a model of human-like
interaction. These modifications are a further rule, a variable indicating the execution
horizon te of an interaction sequence and a function to reset uncertainty. The additional
rule specifies that after an interaction sequence was generated, which represents a plan
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in the first run, the algorithm jumps back to the state right before the execution of
the first planned action. The time at this state is stored in the added variable te and
the uncertainty of this state is removed. In other words, the uncertainty range for each
variable is set to zero. Specifically, the type of each variable represented as a bunch of
rays (type bunch) stays the same but each ray is set to the value of the middle ray
which is the exact value. By activating this rule, the execution of a part of the plan is
simulated. As the jump to the state right before the execution of an action removes all
later actions from the iteration sequences, a new plan has to be generated next. This
plan uses prediction with the execution horizon te as reference point. The resulting
interaction sequence thus contains an expected behavior (before te) and a plan (after
te). Now the added rule is activated again, the algorithm jumps back to the state right
before the first action in that part of the interaction sequence representing a plan. This
state is transformed into an exact state and the time of this state is stored as new
execution horizon. This procedure is repeated until an interaction sequence is generated
which contains no action after the execution horizon and hence contains not a plan but
an expected behavior.
5.5. Demonstrative Application with Prediction Uncertainty
In the implemented model of human behavior, separation and constraints must be ob-
served under all predicted consequences. Thus even an interaction sequence generated
with simulated projection imprecision must fulfill both objectives to the same extend
as an interaction sequence generated with precise predictions. However, an increase of
projection uncertainty leads to inefficient actions, as the turn of aircraft may be delayed
or speed reductions may be executed earlier than necessary. This results in a decrease
of the objective throughput.
The projection uncertainty parameter e has to be defined, before interaction sequences
can be generated. It indicates how much the predictions deviate from the exact value.
The parameter should be chosen in such a way that the operators behavior can be pre-
dicted as accurate as possible. In other words, interaction sequences generated for earlier
situations during an interaction should fulfill the objective throughput as much as mea-
sured interaction sequences at later situations. Consequently, the objective throughput
should remain approximately constant during the interaction.
Several scenarios were generated for MAGIE. They have different demands in terms
of operators’ guidance precision as the distance between two equipped aircraft is varied
systematically between scenarios. In the scenario evaluated in section 5.3, the distance
between two equipped aircraft is ts(2E,high) = 142 s. An unequipped aircraft placed
in the gap between those two equipped aircraft has to be guided with a precision of
±3.5 s. In other scenarios, the interval between two equipped aircraft is increased to
ts(2E,medium) = 150 s respectively ts(2E,low) = 158 s. The guidance of unequipped aircraft
between two equipped aircraft requires a lower precision of ±7.5 s respectively ±11.5 s.
To determine the value of the projection imprecision parameter e, which leads to an
approximately constant fulfillment of the throughput, several values are simulated and
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compared. In Fig. 5.8 the fulfillment of the objective throughput is shown for the same
scenario and interaction analyzed in section 5.3 with interaction sequences generated
with the projection uncertainty parameter set to e = 0.05. This scenario requires the
highest guidance precision of ±3.5 s.
Most striking in this figure is the jump at 480 s. While the cognitive model of operator
behavior could not find a sequence to guide an unequipped aircraft into a gap between
two equipped aircraft, the human operator initiated the turn maneuver. Consequently,
the throughput increases significantly in this moment, as the aircraft’s trajectory will
be much shorter than predicted. However, the fulfillment decreases almost continuously
during the interactions (with this one exception). This means that the human operator’s
decisions are less efficient than predicted by the cognitive model of operator behavior
most of the time.
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Figure 5.8.: Fulfillment of the objective throughput in a high guidance precision sce-
nario (±3.5 s) with e = 0 (circles) and e = 0.05 (x). The “+” indicate the
throughput performance if the effect of the delayed turn is neglected.
In Fig. 5.9, the fulfillment of the objective throughput for an interaction in a scenario
with a distance between two equipped aircraft of ts(2E,medium) = 150 s and a resulting
required medium guidance precision of ±7.5 s is given. The throughput calculated with
precise predictions (circles) and with a projection imprecision parameter set to e =
0.15 (crosses) is given in the figure. Although the difference between the fulfillment of
throughput predicted by the model for the initial situation of the interaction and the
fulfillment reached by the human operator in the last situation of the interaction is quite
small if e = 0.15, the fulfillment has three distinctive jumps during the interactions.
Besides these jumps, the throughput calculated with e = 0.15 decreases during the
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interaction most of the time. However, these jumps are much smaller than the jump
of the throughput with e = 0.05 depicted in Fig. 5.8. They are again related to the
initiation of turn maneuvers. Here the human operator starts the maneuvers earlier
than predicted by the cognitive planning model which causes a higher than expected
throughput.
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Figure 5.9.: Fulfillment of the objective throughput in a medium guidance precision
scenario (±7.5 s) with e = 0 (circles) and e = 0.15 (x)
In Fig. 5.10, the fulfillment of the objective throughput is given for a scenario which
requires the lowest guidance precision of ±11.5 s for unequipped aircraft as the distance
between two equipped aircraft is ts(2E,low) = 158 s. As a lower guidance precision is
required in this scenario, larger values can be chosen for the projection imprecision
parameter e without the consequence of some gaps missed by unequipped aircraft. In the
figure, the fulfillment of the objective throughput is compared for e set to 0, 0.18, and 0.20.
The interaction sequence generated by the cognitive planning model with e = 0.18 for the
initial situation of the interaction reaches a higher throughput than the human operator
reached at the end of the interaction indicating that the model overestimates human
operators’ performance in general. During the interaction, the throughput is mainly
decreasing which indicates that also in most decisions the performance is overestimated
by the model. If the projection imprecision parameter is increased to e = 0.2, the
prediction underestimates human operator’s performance in general as the fulfillment
reached at the end of the interaction is higher than the fulfillment predicted at the
beginning of the interaction. However, small jumps occur again when the operator
initiates turn maneuvers, indicating that these are executed earlier than predicted by
the model. Thus, the performance’s underestimation is mainly due to these jumps.
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Figure 5.10.: Fulfillment of the objective throughput in a low guidance precision sce-
nario (±11.5 s) with e = 0 (circles), e = 0.18 (+), and e = 0.20 (x)
5.6. Discussion of Prediction Uncertainty
The integration of uncertainty should enable the comparison of human operators to an
expected behavior instead of an optimal behavior. Thus interaction sequences calculated
under uncertainty should be able to predict the human operators behavior. Various
uncertainty parameters were simulated for scenarios, requiring different precisions. The
results are ambiguous.
In the first scenario, which requires a very high precision, an assumed uncertainty of
5% leads the model to miss a gap for an unequipped aircraft. The assumed uncertainty
of 5% seems to be too large for the required precision. However, apart from omitting a
gap, the human operator is less efficient with most of his actions than predicted by the
model. From this point of view, the assumed uncertainty of 5% seem to be to low to
predict the behavior. This suggest several conclusions. First, the model should assume
a larger uncertainty. Second, as a gap is missed, the modeled behavior to choose the
right moment to initiate the turn should be changed to fit to the measured behavior.
For example, the human operator could decide to initiate a turn even though he is not
able to predict that the aircraft will fit into the gap and thus takes a risk. Furthermore,
the operator could apply another strategy as modeled by the rules. The strategy used
by the operator would then be less efficient than the modeled strategy.
In the second example, the throughput reached by the human operator at the end of
the interaction can be predicted by the model. However, the jumps in the course of the
predicted throughput under uncertainty indicate that the human operator made decisions
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much better than predicted in some cases. These decision are three of four decisions to
start the turn maneuver. However, changes of speed are less efficient than predicted.
While this model is able to predict the operator’s performance in general, it fails to
determine the exact causes. An obvious conclusion would be to assume that speed
is predicted with a greater uncertainty as assumed, whereas the position is predicted
with a high accuracy. However, uncertainty in the prediction of speed are compensated.
For example, the speed of an aircraft is decreases earlier than necessary. In this case
the reduction of the distance to the aircraft ahead is delayed and a further reduction
of speed can also be delayed. Thus, while the first speed reduction is made earlier,
the second speed reduction is delayed and uncertainty in the prediction of speed have
minimal impact on the objective throughput. On the other hand, the set of rules used
by the operator could be less efficient then the set used in the model. However, if
the uncertainty is assumed correctly, the operator should be able to execute the more
efficient strategy.
In the last presented scenario, the throughput calculated for parameters of e = 18%
and e = 20% can predict the operators behavior quite well. As the prediction with
e = 18% in mostly decreasing and thus overestimated the operators performance, the
prediction with e = 20% is increasing most of the time and underestimates the operators
performance.
In this case, the modeled strategy seems to be implemented by the human operator.
However, this was not the case in other conditions. This indicates that the operator
changes the applied strategy depending on the necessary precision.
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6. Validation of Process-Oriented Performance
Measurement
In this chapter, the model-based human operator performance measurement developed
throughout this thesis is validated. Therefore, a study is conducted in which this mea-
sure is applied. The model-based human operator performance measure is validated by
showing that it is sensitive to the difficulty of the task. Further, the advantages of this
process-oriented performance measures are demonstrated. At first, the developed per-
formance measure enables to look into the details of specific situations and reveals the
effects of the human operators single decisions. Furthermore, by aggregating the effects
of specific actions and errors, this measure additionally enables to evaluate a HMS based
on an analysis of actions and errors and gives valuable hints for future improvements.
Before the main study is planned, a preliminary study is conducted.
6.1. Preliminary Study
The preliminary study is conducted for two reasons. First, techniques necessary for the
main study should be developed. In this preliminary study, Access/CPN is applied for
the first time to analyze the state space of a dynamic task environment. Furthermore,
the preliminary study is conducted to identify how uncertainty impacts decision making
in different simulation environments.
The simulation environment applied in the preliminary study should have the following
similarities with the simulation environment applied in the main study (see section 3.3).
First, the simulation environment should consist of moving objects. Second, the par-
ticipants should be required to make decisions based on the predicted position of these
objects. Additionally, the possible options to choose from should differ in the difficulty
of accessing their consequences. Furthermore, it should be possible to analyze the state
space of the task environment like it is possible for the task environment used in the
main task to evaluate human operator decisions.
However, there should also be an important difference between the simulation envi-
ronments. It should be possible to calculate the complete state space of the simulation
environment used in the preliminary so that no model of human operator behavior is
needed for this task.
Additionally, the simulation environment should be motivating to engage the partic-
ipants. Based on this requirements, the simulation environment “Pizza Express” was
developed by [Sch11]. This simulation environment is—as MAGIE (see section 3.3)—
based on a CPN. In contrast to MAGIE, the GUI of the simulation environment is not
connected via TCP/IP with the CPN. Instead, they are connected using Access/CPN.
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6.1.1. Simulation Environment and Scenarios
The simulation environment “Pizza Express” shows a simple street map, which consists
of several squares (s. Fig 6.1). Each square can contain a straight road section, a curve,
or a junction. A car is moving along the road sections with a speed of 0.66 squares per
second. The speed is constant and cannot be influenced by the participant. Before the
car reaches a junction, the participant has to select a direction. This is done by clicking
on the arrows shown for each possible directing close to the junction. It is possible to
select the direction for several junctions in advance.
Guided car
Selected route
Bonus square
Start
Obstacle square
Destination
Figure 6.1.: Example for a street map in the simulation environment “Pizza Express”
The car starts at a defined square and it has to be guided to another square marked
as destination. There a two other types of squares. First there a bonus squares, marked
with a pizza. If the car passes such a square, the participant is reward with 100 points.
Each bonus can only be collected once. Furthermore, there are obstacle squares which
can either be activated or deactivated. If the obstacle is deactivated, it is marked with a
crosswalk. If the obstacle is activated, a police car is additionally shown at this square.
The status of obstacles changes with a fixed frequency which differs between obstacles.
If the car controlled by the participants passes an activated obstacle, the participant
loses 200 points. If the obstacle is deactivated while the car passes that square, no
consequences follow. The aim of the participant is to collect as much points as possible
in each scenario before finally reaching the destination.
The maps designed for the study contain different variants of a junction at which the
participant has to make a decision. A variant of such a situation is shown in Fig. 6.2.
If the car reaches the junction, the participant can choose between two alternatives.
On the one hand, the route marked with “S” can be selected. There can be bonus
squares on this route but there are never obstacles on this route. On the other hand,
the participant can select route “A”. This route has always one bonus square more than
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route “S”. Furthermore, route “A” always contains an obstacle square. If the participants
selects route” A” and the car will pass the obstacle while it is deactivated, this route has
an advantage of 100 points compared to route “S”. However, if the participant passed the
obstacle while it is activated, the route “A” had a disadvantage of 100 points compared
to route “S”. Consequently the participant has to predict the status of the obstacle and
the position of the car to make the right decision at the decision junctions.
Decision Junction
Route A
Route S
Route B
Figure 6.2.: Variant of the decision junctions integrated into the scenarios
To ensure the same conditions for all participants, the status of the obstacle should
be the same when reached by the car. As each scenario contains multiple decision
junctions, it must be ensured that independent from the decision at the earlier junctions
the conditions for the later junctions do not change. This is reached either by designing
decision junctions with routes “A” and “S” of equal length, or by extending one route
such that the time needed for the extension is an integral multiple of the duration the
deactivated/activated change of all following obstacles.
The decision junctions are varied regarding the distance of the obstacles from the
junction, the frequency of the obstacles, and the effect of route A. The distance can
either be 2, 4, or 6 squares. The frequency can either be 1/5 s−1, 1/6 s−1, 1/7 s−1, or
1/8 s−1. Finally, route “A” can either have an advantage over route “S” of 100 or -100
points. Decision junctions of all 24 ( = 3 · 4 · 2) possible combinations are integrated in
ten scenarios.
Originally, it was planned to reward additional points depending on the time needed
to reach the destination. The impact of this time should be so large that much more
points would be lost due to guiding the car in circles than could be earned for passing
an additional bonus square. As the decision junctions with different length of the routes
“A” and “S” would not be comparable to decision junction with equal route length, it
was decided to give no points depending on the time needed to reach the destination.
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However, this increased the possible benefit of selecting the route marked as “B” in
Fig. 6.2.
6.1.2. Experimental Design
The preliminary study is conducted with N = 25 participants. The participation is
voluntary. The participants receive neither a payment nor any other benefits.
After signing a consent form and a demographic questionnaire, the participants com-
plete four training scenarios. These scenarios are used to familiarize the participants
with the simulation environment and how they can control it. Furthermore, they learn
the functions of the bonus and obstacle squares. After the training, each participant
completes the ten scenarios which together included 24 decision junctions. The order of
the scenarios is randomly for each participant.
6.1.3. Results
For analyzing the impact of uncertainty on the decisions of the participants, the complete
state space for each scenario is generated. The state space is generated by accessing the
CPN used for the simulation directly with Access/CPN and an adapted depth-first-
search.
Scenario 2 has to exclude from the analysis due to technical reasons. In cases the
participants decides to follow route B (s. Fig 6.2), the conditions of the following decision
junction can change. The junctions with changed conditions are also excluded from the
analysis. Furthermore, sometimes the participants do not manage to make a decision
in time before the car reaches a junction. In this case, the simulation aborts and the
following decision situations are not reached. In summary, the participants make the
decision given in Table 6.1 separately for each variant of decision situation.
The decisions at the junctions are analyzed with the SDT (see section 2.3.1). Regard-
ing the state of the environment it is differentiated between route “A” being advanta-
geous compared to route “S” and route “A” being not advantageous. Consequently, the
decision of the human operator can either be to select route A or not to select route
A. The analysis revealed a hit rate of 49% and a false alarm rate of 44%. The sensi-
tivity index is d′ = 0.13. This is a rather low sensitivity. To identify if predicting the
position of the guided car and the status of obstacles varies with the distance of the
obstacles or with their frequency, the hit rate, false alarm rate, and the sensitivity index
are calculated for each distance respectively frequency separately. The result are given
in Table 6.2. The results indicate that the participants were not able to predict the
position of the car and the status of the obstacles, if the obstacles was more than two
tiles apart from the junction.
The question arises, why the participants have so much difficulty with making the
correct decision at the junctions. Consequently, it is further analyzed if the participants
do not predict the status of the obstacles but decide based on the status of the obstacles
at the moment the car reaches the junction and the decision has to be made. Therefore,
the visibility of the obstacle is determined for all decisions. Again a SDT is performed. In
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Table 6.1.: Decisions at all variants in the preliminary study
Identifier Route A Obstacle Total decisions
Scenario Junctions bonus Frequency Distance Route A not Route A
1 1 -100 1/5 4 14 11
1 2 +100 1/6 2 20 5
3 1 +100 1/5 4 8 16
3 2 +100 1/8 4 14 11
4 1 -100 1/7 6 6 17
4 2 +100 1/6 4 14 9
5 1 +100 1/7 6 5 19
5 2 -100 1/6 2 9 15
5 3 -100 1/8 4 14 6
6 1 -100 1/7 4 8 17
6 2 -100 1/6 4 14 11
6 3 +100 1/8 6 2 11
7 1 +100 1/5 2 7 18
7 2 +100 1/7 4 9 17
7 3 -100 1/8 2 5 19
8 1 +100 1/7 2 14 9
8 2 +100 1/6 6 9 14
8 3 +100 1/8 2 20 3
9 1 +100 1/5 6 12 8
9 2 -100 1/8 6 10 10
10 1 -100 1/5 6 11 11
10 2 -100 1/7 4 10 12
Table 6.2.: Results for each condition in the preliminary study
Total decisions
Route selected: A not A
Advantageous Route: A not A A not A
Condition Hit rate False alarm rate Sensitivity
Distance 2 61 14 35 34 64% 29% 0.89
Distance 4 45 60 51 57 47% 51% -0.11
Distance 6 28 27 52 38 35% 42% -0.17
Frequency 1/5 s−1 27 25 42 22 39% 53% -0.36
Frequency 1/6 s−1 43 23 28 26 61% 47% 0.34
Frequency 1/7 s−1 28 24 43 46 39% 34% 0.14
Frequency 1/8 s−1 36 29 25 35 59% 45% 0.25
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this case, the state of the environment is differentiated between activated and deactivated
obstacles when the car reaches the junction. The decision is still differentiated between
the selection of route “A” and another route. This analysis reveals a hit rate of 43%, a
false alarm rate of 51%, and a sensitivity of d′ = −0.21. This shows that the status of
the obstacles was not consistently used as decision criterion. Further, it is analyzed if
the consistency of the obstacle’s status—when reaching the junction and when passing
the obstacle—facilitates decision making. Here a STD is carried out considering only
these cases where the status is consistent. The state of the environment is differentiated
between the status activated and the status deactivated. A hit rate of 57% , a false
alarm rate of 45%, and a sensitivity of d′ = 0.30 are revealed. This is a rather low
sensibility indicating, that the consistency of the status does not help much to improve
decision making.
Additionally, it is analyzed if the participants had not enough training. Therefore,
the decisions in the first five scenarios of each participant and in the last five scenarios
are analyzed separately. For the first half, a hit rate of 73%, a false alarm rate of 73%,
and a sensitivity of d′ = 0.00 are detected. For the second half, a hit rate of 38%, a false
alarm rate of 30%, and a sensitivity of d′ = 0.19 are detected. This indicates a small
learning effect leading to a small increase in the sensitivity. However, more strikingly is
the decrease of both rates. This can indicate a decrease of the participants’ engagement
in the later scenarios.
In summary, the preliminary study showed the difficulties in predicting future states
of the system. Only if the obstacle were only 2 squares apart form the decision junctions,
the participants could predict the consequences and tended to make the right decisions.
However, the preliminary study facilitated the development of techniques necessary for
the implementation of the cognitive planning model described in chapter 3 and the
analysis of the main study described in the following.
6.2. Simulation Environment MAGIE
In the conducted main study, the simulation environment MAGIE is applied. The
participants of the study take over the role of ATCOs, more precisely the role of feeder in
an approach sector, and have to control traffic approaching at an airport. The simulated
task is described in detail in section 3.3.
The participants are supported by two assistance functions. First, the arrival sequence
planned by the implemented computer-based assistance is displayed. Additionally, the
ghosting functionality is activated so that ghosts are projected on the centerline indicat-
ing positions which should be reserved for equipped aircraft.
6.3. Experimental Design
The first aim of this study is to validate the model-based human performance measure
developed in this thesis, by demonstrating its sensitiveness to variances of the task’s
difficulty. To control the difficulty of the task, only the required precision of the task
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is varied. The amount of aircraft and the traffic mix is fixed. It is assumed that the
required precision has the strongest correlation with the difficulty of the task. If the
amount of aircraft is varied between scenarios, it would have been difficult to deal with
a lot of aircraft as well as to stay concentrated while only a few aircraft are controlled.
Also, the traffic mix could be modified. As a result, also the amount of aircraft controlled
by the operator would vary with the above described consequences.
In each scenario, the arrival times at the late merging point are defined for all equipped
aircraft. These arrival times are chosen in this study such that exactly one equipped
aircraft can be merged between two equipped aircraft without violating the minimum
separation. Additionally, enough unequipped aircraft are defined in each scenario to fill
the gaps between the equipped aircraft. This results into an alternating sequence of
equipped and unequipped aircraft in the optimal case.
The distance between two equipped aircraft determines the precision necessary to
guide unequipped aircraft into the gaps between the equipped aircraft. To vary the
required guidance precision between conditions, the distances between the equipped air-
craft are varied. Three levels of difficulty are defined with the conditions easy, medium,
and difficult.
To define the planned distance between aircraft, the minimal possible timely distance
between two aircraft is considered first. The simulated aircraft have a speed of 160 kn
shortly before being handed over to the tower. With a minimal separation of 3NM, a
minimal distance of 67.5 seconds results (s. equation 6.1).
3NM
160 kn =
3 · 1852m
160 · 0.514 44ms−1 ≈ 67.5 s. (6.1)
Therefore, two equipped aircraft must be separated by 135 seconds at least to allow
an unequipped aircraft to be merged between them.
Second, the distance used in previous experiments is taken into account. In previous
experiments a timely distance of 75 seconds was planned. Hence, a distance of 150
seconds results between two equipped aircraft if one unequipped aircraft should be placed
between them.
It is defined that the same distance of 75 seconds (150 seconds between two equipped
aircraft) as in previous studies is used in the condition Medium of this study. In the
condition Difficult, the distance is reduced by the half of the possible reduction to a
planned distance of 71 seconds (142 seconds between two equipped aircraft). In the
condition Easy, the distance is increased by the same amount as it is reduced in the dif-
ficult condition. Therefore, a distance of 78 seconds (166 seconds between two equipped
aircraft) results. The conditions are illustrated in Fig. 6.3.
Each of the three conditions is simulated four times. Hence, a within subject 3 (diffi-
culty) times 4 (repetition) repeated measurement design results.
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67,5 s 71 s 75 s 79 s
Minimum
distance
Previous
distance
Condition
Difficult
Condition
Medium
Condition
Easy
3,5 s 4 s 4 s
Figure 6.3.: Timely distances between equipped and unequipped aircraft
6.4. Method
In this section, the conduction of the study is explained. The participants, the procedure
and the direct measures are described.
6.4.1. Participants
Before the study is conducted, the required amount of participants is calculated using
the software G*Power [GPo13, FELB07] (Version 3.1.5). The error of first kind is set
to α = 0.05, the error of second kind to β = 0.8. The study should be able to detect
effects of medium size, therefore an effect size of f = 0.25 is selected. This is defined as a
medium effect [Coh88]. For the calculations in G*Power, the corrected effect size is used.
For the factor “difficulty” (“repetition”), a corrected effect size of f ′ =
√
3 · f = 0.4330
(f ′ =
√
4 · f = 0.5) and as number of measurements of 4 (3) was used for calculations.
The G*Power screenshots are given in the appendix.
The calculations indicate that at least 12 participants are necessary to detect medium
size effects with the experimental design.
Finally, 14 (7 female, 7 male) undergraduate students from the Technical University
of Braunschweig participated in the study. Their age ranges between 18 and 31 years
(M = 23.9, SD = 3.83). Each participant is paid 25e as an incentive for participation,
which lasts approximately 3 hours.
6.4.2. Procedure
The procedure of the study is illustrated in Fig. 6.4. At first, the participants are
informed about the purpose, procedure, and risk of their participation and sign a consent
form. After that, they fill out a demographic questionnaire, with questions about their
age, subject of study, and previous experience with the simulation environment MAGIE.
Following that, participants read detailed instructions about their task, available as-
sistance functions, and the interface. They are encouraged to ask questions in case of
ambiguity. After the instruction, three practical trials have to be completed, each last-
ing for 10 minutes. Each condition is practiced in one training scenario. The training
scenarios are designed to be similar to the experimental scenarios.
After the practice trails, twelve experimental scenarios are absolved. Again each
scenario lasts for 10 minutes. The four scenarios for each experimental condition are
grouped. The order of the conditions was controlled for. However, the order of the
scenarios within each condition was the same for each participant. The order of the
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condition in the training corresponded to the order of conditions in the experimental
trails. After finishing the twelve experimental scenarios, the participants receive their
incentive.
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Figure 6.4.: Procedure of the study with training and three conditions
Initially, one scenario was created for each condition. If only the distance between
equipped aircraft had been increased between the different conditions and the un-
equipped aircraft had not been modified, their estimated arrival times at the LMP would
have increase. Consequently, they have to stay longer on the downwind. To avoid this,
the aircraft are initialized at different points on the arrival route in each condition such
that the overall flight duration of all aircraft in the scenarios is approximately the same
in all conditions. After defining the first scenario for each condition, the other three
scenarios are derived from that by first mirroring the traffic at the centerline (aircraft
arriving from north are changed to the south and vice versa). Additionally, aircraft are
mirrored at the middle standard arrival route so that aircraft arriving on an east arrival
route are changed to arrive on a west arrival route and vice versa. Aircraft on the middle
route are not modified in this second step. Additionally, all call sign are change between
the scenarios. In doing so, the scenarios are comparable but the participant should not
be able to recognize the same basis of all scenarios.
6.4.3. Measures
During each simulation run, states and events are directly measured. At first, the states
of all simulated aircraft are recorded for each simulation step which equals one second.
As the first and the last state are included, 601 states are recorded for each simulation
run. Furthermore, the participants input in form of time and the details of every given
clearance are recorded. Although the data are also recorded during the training, only the
data recorded during the simulation runs is later used for the performance evaluation.
6.5. Process of Evaluation
To evaluate the participants behavior, the recorded data are analyzed as detailed in sec-
tion 5.2 and summarized shortly in the following. At first, the cognitive human operator
planning model described in chapter 3 is used to generate interaction sequences, using
each tenth recorded state as initial states. After that, the recorded interactions sequence
prior to a state used as initial state for the model is combined with the interaction se-
quence generated by the model for this state. In the third step, the combined interaction
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sequences are simulated. The results of the simulation indicate what was reachable at
the selected state. This results are subsequently evaluated using the evaluation criteria
given in section 5.1. Then the evaluations of adjacent sequences are compared. This
turns the result measure used to evaluate the combined interaction sequences into a
process measure. After these comparisons, different kind of actions (initiations of the
turn, changes of altitude, and changes of speed) and types of error (omissions and com-
mission) are identified for each evaluated situation and their effects are aggregated for
each simulation run.
The developed process-oriented human performance measure is not able to evaluate
all simulation runs. Out of 168 simulation runs (14 participants times 12 experimental
runs), the results of the evaluation for 13 runs is not plausible. These runs are excluded
from further analyses. The capability of the performance measure is limited by the
implemented cognitive planning model. This is based on a set of rules which are designed
for specific situations. It cannot be guaranteed that the set of rules can be applied to
unexpected situations. The (in the design phase) unexpected situation causing most
of the problems in the excluded simulation runs is the participant trying to guide two
unequipped aircraft into a gap in which only one unequipped aircraft can fit. Due to
the limited interaction possibilities of the simulation environment, serious problems are
inevitable in this case. However, no rules are implemented to reduce the problems as
much as still possible.
The excluded simulation runs fall upon only three participants. Consequently, the
simulation runs of eleven participants could be evaluated completely. Those three par-
ticipants possibly use other strategies during the simulation, leading to unexpected (from
the design perspective) situations.
6.6. Validation Results
To validate the developed performance measure, its ability to detect differences between
conditions with different difficulty is demonstrated. The calculated missed performance
based on the aggregation of the effects of different kind of actions and types of errors
for each run is used as input (compare section 5.2.6). The missed performance is given
for each objective separately, but for the validation, on overall performance for each run
must be used, as the difficulty of the different conditions results from a combination of
the objectives. For example, small deviations from the planned positions for unequipped
aircraft are more likely to cause conflicts in the condition Difficult. Consequently, in the
condition Medium and Easy small deviations are not punished as hard as the condition
Difficult. Thus, participants might tend to accept larger deviation and consequently
reach a lower performance regarding the objective throughput in the condition Medium
and Easy.
The objectives are ranked so that no weighting of the objectives can be derived theo-
retically. However, as the difficulty stems from all objectives together, all of them must
be included in the overall performance. Consequently, a weighting is necessary, but its
definition is arbitrary. However, as the objectives are ranked, separation should have
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a higher weighting as constraints, which in turn should have a higher weighting than
throughput. It is deiced to use a multiplier of 3 between the ranks so that throughput has
the weighting of 1, constraints has the weighting of 3, and separation has a weighting of
9. Consequently, the missed performance is defined by
Σ− = (9 ·∆
− + 3 · Γ− + Θ−)
13 . (6.2)
6.6.1. Graphical Comparison of Conditions
A histogram of the missed performance in all conditions is shown in Fig. 6.5. This
shows that in a lot of simulation runs (94), the missed performance was very small
(between 0 and 0.01). In contrast, a large missed performance of between 0.1 and 0.15
resulted in 4 simulation runs. To allow for a better differentiation between the simulation
runs with only a small missed performance, but to include the simulation runs with a
larger missed performance, a logarithmic scaling is used. In Fig. 6.6 the same histogram
using logarithmic group sizes is shown. Here, the lost performance between 0.001 and
0.01 is divided into five groups, while the missed performance between 0.1 and 0.15 is
summarized to one group.
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Figure 6.5.: Histogram of missed performance (conditions combined)
In Fig. 6.7 a boxplot is shown, which indicates the minimum, maximum, median
and 25- as well as 75-percentile of the missed performance for each condition. Note
the logarithmic scaling of this plot. It can be seen, that in the condition Difficult the
missed performance is larger than in both other conditions. However, in the condition
Easy the median is even larger than in the condition Medium. This reveals, that the
median performance was better in the condition Medium compared to the condition
Easy. However, the range of the performance shows that there are more extreme poor
performances in condition Medium compared to condition Easy.
To analyze this further, a histogram is plotted for each condition in 6.8. Also in this
diagram, the group sizes are generated logarithmically. The comparison between the
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Figure 6.6.: Histogram of missed performance with logarithmic group sizes
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Figure 6.7.: Boxplots of missed performance in all conditions
conditions Medium and Easy shows that in the condition Medium more often only little
performance is missed but also that more often a lot of performance is missed compared
to Easy. In condition Easy the measured performance has the lowest range.
6.6.2. Statistical Evaluation with SPSS
In the following, the data are analyzed with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
repeated measurement. This method presume a normal distribution of the independent
variable, however it is robust to a violation of this assumption. To reduce this violation,
the logarithmized measured missed performance is used in the following.
The data are analyzed with SPSS. The repeated measurement of the general linear
model is used. The factors Difficulty—with 3 levels—and Repetition—with 4 levels—
are entered as inner subject factors. The error of first kind α is set to 0.05. The three
participants, where performance data could not be calculated for every scenario, have to
be excluded from the analysis. Thus, it is based on the results from eleven participants.
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Figure 6.8.: Histogram of missed performance with logarithmic groups for the condi-
tions Easy (a), Medium (b), and Difficult (c)
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Table 6.3.: Results of repeated measurement analysis by SPSS
p pa η2p
Difficulty 0.001 0.009 0.51
Scenario 0.045 0.112 0.232
a corrected conservatively
Table 6.4.: Pair-by-pair comparison generated by SPSS
p Difficult Medium Easy
Difficult - 0.025 0.015
Medium 0.025 - 1.000
Easy 0.015 1.000 -
SPSS first executes the Mauchly procedure to test for sphericity. This test is signif-
icant for the factor difficulty. It is not significant for the factor repetition or for the
interaction of both factors. Consequently, the assumption that sphericity is present in
the data should be rejected. Correction factors are calculated and used in the following
calculations to compensate for missing sphericity.
The output of SPSS regarding the significance and effect sizes of the two main factors
are given in Table 6.3. This output indicates a significance of p = 0.009 for the factor
difficulty when the conservative correction for sphericity is applied. Without a correction,
a significance of p = 0.001 results.
Besides the factor Difficulty, also the factor Repetition is significant (p = 0.045) if no
correction factors are used. If correction factors are applied, this factors is not significant
(p = 0.112). The interaction between both factors is not significant. The partial eta
square η2p, which is a measure of effect size, is 0.51 for the factor Difficulty and 0.232 for
the factor Repetition.
Also a pair-by-pair comparison for the main factors is conducted. For the adaption
of the confidence interval, „Bonferroni“ is selected. This comparison for the factor
Difficulty reveals a difference between the condition Difficult and Medium as well as
between Difficult and Easy. A difference between Medium and Easy cannot be detected.
This is summarized in Table 6.4.
6.6.3. Discussion of Validation
Comparing the histograms for the three conditions shows a clear difference between the
conditions. Most noticeable is the difference between the condition Difficult and both
other conditions. The differences between the conditions are confirmed by an analysis
conducted with SPSS. However, the results of the statistics should be treated with care
as the assumption of sphericity is violated - although this was corrected conservatively.
The pair-by-pair comparison also confirms the first impression as differences between the
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conditions Difficult and Easy as well as between the conditions Difficult and Medium
but no difference between the conditions Medium and Easy are detected. Thus, it can
be concluded that increasing the planned distance between the unequipped aircraft over
150 seconds (condition Medium) did not impact the difficulty. However, it can be stated
that the model-based human performance measure as developed in this thesis is able
to detect the differences in the performance between different conditions in which the
required guidance precision is modified. Consequently, the validation is successful.
6.7. Revelations of Details in Selected Situations
The aim for the development of the model-based performance measure was to enable
considering the process during an interaction. However, if the developed measure is ap-
plied in a way like in the last section, there is no significant gain of information compared
to performance measures considering only the result of an interaction. Therefore, the
further advantages of the method are demonstrated in the following section by showing
the ability of this method to analyze selected situations in detail. Therefore, four simu-
lation runs (cases) are selected, in which one or more interesting periods occurred, and
analyzed with the developed process-oriented performance measure.
6.7.1. Case 1: Missed Planned Position in Sequence
In the first selected case, the participant missed to start a turn maneuver in time and
caused the aircraft to be moved back in the arrival sequence. For this case, the simulation
run of scenario 5 and participant 12 is selected. The expected performance according
to the three objectives (with constraints split in speed and altitude constraints) over
simulation time is given in Fig. 6.10.
If only the result of the interaction is considered, a relatively low performance for
the objective throughput can be detected. However, analyzing the process reveals that
the performance regarding throughput mainly drops during the interval after t = 420.
Besides the performance over time, the list of reasons for missing performance gener-
ated by the method (see section 5.2.6) is used to interpret the interaction. This list
indicates that the start of the turn maneuver was forgotten during the interval after
t = 420. Thus, the participant missed the last moment to catch the originally planned
position in the arrival sequence for this aircraft. Additionally, it was not possible to
guide another aircraft into this position. If another aircraft could fit into the gap, the
decrease of its flight duration would have settled the increase of the flight duration of
the delayed aircraft and the throughput performance would not have been affected. The
other objectives are not affected by the omission of the turn maneuver in the selected
case.
The necessary adaption of the planned arrival sequences at t = 420 is also evident
when considering the planned flight duration in the path stretching area (pi) over time
during this simulation run. The flight duration in the path-stretching area is shown in
Fig. 6.9. Following to the situation at t = 420, the flight duration of aircraft D increases
about 300 seconds. The aircraft will consequently arrive 5 minutes late. As the planned
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Figure 6.9.: Performance over simulation time for case 1: missing planned position in
sequence (participant 12, scenario 5)
distance between to equipped aircraft is 150 s in the selected scenario, the updated
sequence includes three additional aircraft prior to aircraft D. The flight duration over
time also shows that the participant missed to start the turn for aircraft C at t = 330.
As it was possible to guide aircraft D into the generated gap instead, this had no direct
consequences on the performance. The performance is not affected till aircraft D misses
that gap finally at t = 420.
This simulation run includes further interesting periods. One example is the situation
at t = 190. Following to this situation, the performance of the objective separation
decreases while the performance of the objective throughput increases. For this interval,
the generated list of errors reveals that a reduction of speed is missing. This reduction
of speed would have avoided a conflict but would have increased the flight duration of
the aircraft. As consequence of this omission, the objectives separation and throughput
are affected in the observed way.
Furthermore, the performance over time shows that a further error in the interval
after t = 400 accounts for the finally reached separation performance. In fact, a further
speed reduction was missing in this interval. This missing action does not only influence
separation performance but additionally reduced constraints performance.
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Figure 6.10.: Flight duration in path stretching area over simulation time for case 1:
missing planned position in sequence (participant 12, scenario 5)
6.7.2. Case 2: Throughput Performance Increase
In the second case, the participant managed to reach a throughput performance larger
than one. However, the price for this is a lower separation performance. For this
case, the simulation run of scenario 6 and participant 12 is considered. The performance
according to the three objectives (with constraints split in speed and altitude constraints)
over simulation time is given in Fig. 6.11.
In this interaction sequence, conflicts are cased during two periods. The first period
is between t = 180 and t = 210. During this period, the throughput performance is
increasing and reaches a value larger than 1. Note that 1 is defined as the maximal
reachable performance for each objective. However, this holds only when all other ob-
jectives are considered but the participant causes a conflict during this period indicated
by a decrease of the separation performance. Consequently, an increase of the throughput
performance exceeding 1 is achieved at the cost of a conflict. The generated error list
states that a decrease of speed was missed during this period, which causes the problem.
As the considered aircraft started the turn shortly after t = 70 already, there was
enough time to reduce the speed after starting the turn. However, this was omitted and
consequently a conflict was caused.
In the following period from t = 210 to t = 230, the speed reduction is still missing.
However, it does not affect the length of the conflict anymore. Instead, the missed
154 Chapter 6: Validation of Performance Measurement
0,925
0,95
0,975
1
1,025
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
Simulation time in s 
Constraints Γ(t) speed 
Constraints Γ(t) altitude 
Separation Δ(t) 
Throughput Φ(t) 
Events
Figure 6.11.: Performance over simulation time for case 2: conflict (participant 12,
scenario 6)
speed reduction leads to a violation of the speed restriction and a decrease of constraints
performance. In contrast, throughput performance still increases due to the missing
speed reduction.
A similar case can be detected in the second period between t = 480 and t = 500. A
reduction of speed is missed again, which causes a conflict but increases the throughput
performance. The affected aircraft started the turn shortly after t = 320. Again, the
conflict was not caused by selecting the wrong moment for the turn procedure but by
missing the right moment for a speed reduction.
6.7.3. Case 3: Conflict Between Separation and Constraint Performance
The third selected case includes periods in which conflicts could be avoided for the
cost of violating speed constraints. For this case, the simulation run of scenario 1
and participant 9 is considered. The performance according to the three objectives
(with constraints split in speed and altitude constraints) over simulation time is given
in Fig. 6.12.
When analyzing the reachable performance over simulation time in this case, it can
be noticed that the separation performance is decreasing almost steadily. Furthermore,
a violation of the speed constraints is predicted in the periods from t = 190 to t = 300 as
well as from t = 340 to t = 440. However, at the end of these intervals, a speed violation
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Figure 6.12.: Performance over simulation time for case 3: conflict and speed con-
straints (participant 9, scenario 1)
is not predicted any longer. Starting from t = 500 to the end of the simulation, a
violation of speed constraints is predicted again. This implies that this predicted violated
did indeed realize during the interaction—in contrast to both violations predicted earlier.
During each of these three periods, the operator model tries to avoid conflicts by
increasing the speed above the limit given by the restriction. In doing so, the model ac-
cepts a decrease of the constraints performance to keep a higher performance in the more
important objective separation. For this reason, the expected constraints performance
decreases at first. However, the participant does not implement this increase of speed.
Consequently, the violation of the speed restriction does not realize as predicted by the
model and the constraints performance increases again. However, this has the cost of
a more severe conflict and a decreasing separation performance. This behavior can be
observed during the first (t = 190 to t = 300) and second (t = 340 to t = 440) period,
with a longer predicted violation of the speed restriction in the first period. In the third
period (t = 500 to the end), the model again accepts a violation of speed constraints to
reduce the severity of a conflict. In this period, the participant follows the model and
also accepts this violation in order to reduce a conflict’s duration.
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6.7.4. Case 4: Separation Performance Reduction Caused by Turn
In the fourth case selected, a turn causes a conflict. For this case, the simulation run
of scenario 4 and participant 6 is considered. The performance according to the three
objectives (with constraints split in speed and altitude constraints) over simulation time
is given in Fig. 6.13.
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Figure 6.13.: Performance over simulation time for case 4: delayed start of turn (par-
ticipant 6, scenario 4)
In this selected case, the throughput performance is slightly decreasing in the interval
after t = 80. In the next interval it is dropping to shortly above 0.5 (due to scaling
reasons not shown in the figure). For both intervals, an omission to start the turn
maneuver is identified as error. In the first interval, the corresponding unequipped
aircraft will still fit into the originally planned gap in the arrival sequence between the
equipped aircraft but it will be some seconds late. During the second interval, it is
not possible to guide the aircraft into that gap without causing a conflict with another
aircraft. Consequently, the model changes the arrival sequence. As no other equipped
aircraft fits into the opened gap, all following aircraft are delayed causing the extreme
throughput performance fall-off.
However, in the next situation at t = 110, the throughput performance is increasing
to about 0.99 again. At the same time, the separation and constraints performance
decrease. This is caused by the participant’s decision to start the turn maneuver. How-
ever, the duration of the conflict caused by the turn maneuver will be short if a violation
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of the restriction is accepted. This solution is generated by the model and possible
through the period from t = 110 to t = 200. After that period, the separation perfor-
mance is further decreasing. Now, the effect of accepting a violation of the restriction
is diminishing and the unavoidable duration of the conflict is increasing. After t = 220,
the constraints performance starts increasing as the possibility of accelerations violating
the speed constraints is fading away. For the whole period starting with the turn at
t = 110, a missing speed increase is identified as error. The constraints performance is
not increasing to 1 again as the participant does not decelerate the aircraft to comply
with the lower constraints at the LMP.
The conflict finally occurring during the interaction is thus partially caused by starting
a turn maneuver at the wrong moment and partially by failing to increase the speed above
the given constraints. However, if the participant had increased the aircraft’s speed, a
reduction of the constraints performance would have resulted.
6.8. Effects of Kinds of Actions and Types of Errors
Besides the possibility to analyze selected situations in detail, the developed process
measure of human operator performance also allows to identify the impact of different
kind of actions and types of errors. It is differentiated between the three objectives sepa-
ration, constraints, and throughput as well as between actions to start the turn maneuver
and actions to set new target values for aircraft’s altitude and speed. Furthermore, it
is differentiated between the execution of an error as reason for missed performance
(commission error) and not execution an action planned by the model (omission error).
The evaluation process for each simulation run results in a table including the impact
of each objective/action/error combination for each run. To get the overall impact of
each combination, these values are just added up over all simulation runs. The results
are given in Table 6.5 and illustrated in Fig. 6.14. In this table, the overall performance
reduction by all combinations of action, error, and objective is given. Furthermore,
the percentage of the objectives’ performance reduction caused by each combination of
action and error is indicated.
Regarding the objective separation, the performance is reduced by ∆−overall = 2.0311 in
all 168 simulation runs. Start turn commissions describing the necessary action to start
the turn maneuver in an interval where it is not planned by the model only contributed
with 6.4 % to this performance reduction. Omissions of the turn have no impact on the
separation performance. This is expectable due to the fact that the scenario is defined
in such a way that no conflicts occurred on the downwind. Consequently, staying on
the downwind is always a reliable solution to avoid conflicts and to keep the separation
performance up. Most of the separation performance is reduced due to changes of the
aircraft altitude or speed. However, only 0.3 % of the performance reduction is caused
by executing such actions. This is due to the fact that it is possible to correct each given
action and only the inevitable performance reduction between the wrong execution of
an action and its correction is considered. If the correction is not executed, the resulting
missed performance is attributed to this missing action. All missing action regarding
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Table 6.5.: Overall impact on performance differentiated between each objective, kind
of action, and type of error including the relative impact on each objective
by each combination of kind of action and type of error
Overall separation performance reduction ∆−overall
2.0311 (100 %)
Start turn Altitude / Speed
0.1313 (6.4 %) 1.9001 (93.6 %)
Commission Omission Commission Omission
0.1313 (6.4 %) 0.0 (0.0 %) 0.0060 (0.3 %) 1.8941 (93.3 %)
Overall constraints performance reduction Γ−overall
3.0497 (100 %)
Start turn Altitude / Speed
0.9779 (32.1 %) 2.0718 (67.9 %)
Commission Omission Commission Omission
0.9717 (31.9 %) 0.0062 (0.2 %) 0.0851 (2.8 %) 1.9867 (65.1 %)
Overall throughput performance reduction Θ−overall
7.3950 (100 %)
Start turn Altitude / Speed
3.9658 (53.6 %) 3.4292 (46.4 %)
Commission Omission Commission Omission
0.0521 (0.7 %) 3.9137 (52.9 %) 0.0629 (0.9 %) 3.3663 (45.5 %)
6.8. Effects of Kinds of Actions and Types of Errors 159
6,4% 
0,3% 
93,3% 
31,9% 
0,2% 
2,8% 
65,1% 
0,7% 
52,9% 
0,9% 
45,5% 
Separation Performance Reduction  
Start turn - commission Start turn - omission Altitude / Speed - commission Altitude / Speed - omission
Figure 6.14.: Errors reducing the separation, constraints, and throughput performance,
differentiated between kinds of actions and types of errors
speed and altitude (omission) including the missing corrections contribute with 93.3 %
to the performance reduction of the objective of separation. Although changes of speed
and altitude are combined, it can be assumed that mainly speed changes contribute to
the reduction of separation performance.
The results show that the largest part of the separation performance reduction was
not caused by starting the turn at the wrong moment but by not giving the necessary
speed (and altitude) changes. This result can be applied for the development of further
assistance. The results indicate that an assistance advising only which speed and alti-
tude should be selected and when it should be implemented could help to increase the
separation performance. In contrast, a further assistance (besides Ghosting) helping the
operator to find the correct moment for starting a turn maneuver is only necessary to
prevent the remaining 6.4 % of the performance reduction.
However, an assistance helping with the turn maneuver could lead to a larger im-
provement. If turn maneuvers are executed more precisely to the planned times, less
correction of the speed could be necessary and thus the benefit for the separation perfor-
mance could be larger than 6.4 %. As starting the turn maneuver more precisely is not
necessary but giving the required speed instructions is sufficient for a major improve-
ment of the separation performance, the development of a turn assistance is also not
mandatory but a speed and altitude assistance is enough to expect a higher separation
performance.
An overall constraints reduction of Γ−overall = 3.0497 was measured during all simu-
lation runs. Regarding this objective, turn actions contributed to about one third to
the performance reduction (32.1 %) while altitude and speed changes contributed to
about two thirds (67.9 %). In detail, the turn actions nearly completed contributed as
commissions to the performance reduction (31.9 %). This includes cases, in which an
imprecise turn maneuver is making violations of the constraints necessary in order to
avoid a conflict. The influence of omissions of the turn maneuver is very low (0.2 %).
This is because only in very rare situations omitting a turn can influence the constraints
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performance. Indeed, the only possible situation is an aircraft on the downwind with
an instructed reduction of speed and altitude bellow the allowed value. Additionally, a
turn must be planned before the constraints are violated. Omitting this turn leads to a
violation. However, larger violations can be prevented in this situation by implementing
corrections for speed or altitude.
Altitude and Speed changes mainly contribute to the constraints performance reduc-
tion as omissions. These are speed and altitude changes planned by the model but not
executed by the operator. Again possible corrections for implemented speed or altitude
changes causing avoidable problems are included. As an aircraft needs time to change
speed and altitude, the omissions probably occurred a long time before the violations
they are causing realize.
The conclusions for the development of assistance out of the results concerning the
constraints performance are similar to the conclusions drawn from the results concerning
the separation performance. Again, an assisting supporting the selection and implemen-
tation of required speed and altitudes commands could lead to a large improvement of
missed constraints performance. However, concerning constraints the percentage would
be much smaller (67.9 %).
The result for the objective throughput have obvious differences to both other objec-
tives. On the one hand, the impact of turn actions (53.6 %) as well as altitude and speed
actions (46.4 %) on the overall throughput performance reduction of Θ−overall = 7.3950 is
almost equal. On the other hand, the effect of turn actions is mainly caused by omissions
(52.9 %) and not by commissions (0.7 %). This result is not surprising as omitting the
turn leads to an increase of the flight duration on the path-stretching area and conse-
quently affects the throughput performance. If the turn is omitted for several intervals,
the planned arrival sequence has to be updated which can have a huge impact on the
throughput performance. In contrast, the possibilities for commissions to contribute to
the missed throughput performance are rare. First, an turn must be omitted so that the
aircraft cannot hold its planned arrival time at the LMP. Second, it must be possible
for another aircraft to meet the arrival time originally planned for the delayed aircraft.
In this case, changing the arrival sequence has no impact on the throughput perfor-
mance. If in such a situation the turn of the aircraft is initiated, the arrival sequence is
reverted back to the original sequence but the aircraft cannot meet its original arrival
time. Consequently, this implementation of the turn maneuver caused a reduction of
the throughput performance.
The impact of wrongly executed altitude or speed changes (commission) is low again,
as these commissions can be corrected. Missing corrections in turn are considered as
missing actions (omissions)
Analyzing the results for the throughput performance allows to draw the following
suggestions for improvements of the system. Both, an assistance for turn maneuvers
and an assistance for speed and altitude changes, could contribute to half of the possible
throughput performance improvements. While a major improvement of the separation
and constraints performance is possible with only a speed and altitude assistance, addi-
tionally a turn assistance is necessary to make an increase of the throughput performance
of more than 50 % possible.
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It must be noted that these results are valid only for the used simulation environment.
The transferability of this study results to real world applications is limited. Indeed,
this study was conduct to demonstrate the benefits of the developed method and not to
identify the problems in the selected demonstration environment. However, the method
can be transferred. After this demonstration of this method’s feasibility in a simplified
setting, a real world application becomes possible.
6.9. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the developed process-oriented model-based human operator cognitive
performance measure was validated and its benefits were demonstrated. The method was
validating by proving its ability to detect variations of an task difficulty (see section 6.6).
However, this is only a minimum requirement as existing result-oriented performance
measures are also able to detect these variations.
For this reasons, also the benefits of the developed process-oriented measure, which
exceed the possibilities of result-oriented performance measures were demonstrated. The
main advantage of the developed process-oriented measure is the possibility to analyze
specific situations as show in section 6.7. Furthermore, the method can help to identify
conditions in which the participant made decisions resulting into a performance reduc-
tion. It thereby can detect situations in which assistance could be needed. Both results
can for example be used for a discussion of the simulation run with the participant. As
the method allows focusing on the relevant situations, it can support a fruitful discussion.
Further the benefits for the development and improvements for systems was demon-
strated in section 6.8. The overall impact of actions and errors can be used to identify
the benefits of improvements of further assistance. Consequently, the method can give
valuable hints to guide the further goal-oriented development of assistance. Thereby, the
method enables making an estimate of the benefits of assistance before this assistance
is implemented or even developed.
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7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, a conclusion of this thesis is drawn fist. Subsequently, directions for
future research are depicted.
7.1. Conclusion
In this thesis, a model-based process-oriented cognitive performance measure for HMSs
was developed and validated for the first time. Instead of measuring the performance by
evaluating only the result of an interaction—like existing measures of human operator
performance in HMSs—the developed measure evaluates the sill achievable output during
the interaction. Thus, it measures the performance constantly during an interaction
and enables measuring the performance of each decision. Consequently, the developed
performance measure is process-oriented. It allows getting more information especially
about situations in which erroneous actions are executed. Additionally, impact of single
actions (or their omission) on the reached performance can be identified.
As a basis for this process-oriented performance measure, a cognitive human operator
model planning model based on CPNs was developed for the first time. This model com-
pletes interaction sequences realized by the human operators and transfers the resulting
state into a goal state. Furthermore, the set of rules used to model human operators’ be-
havior was developed during this thesis. The set of rules was derived from the operators’
objectives and available actions in the selected example application.
The integration of projection uncertainty into the planning modeled performed in this
thesis allows the differentiation between performance possible from a technical perspec-
tive and performance expectable from a human operator. It enables explaining a part of
the reduced performance by mental prediction uncertainty and to concentrate on other
reasons for erroneous actions impacting the performance.
A classification of uncertainty in HMSs was developed in this thesis as a prerequisite
for the integration of uncertainty into the model first. This supported selecting precisely
the right type of uncertainty to model. The selected approach, to represent uncertain
values by integrating a bundle of rays, allows implementing uncertainty in different ways
and thus easy modifications.
Moreover, an evaluation process of a process-oriented performance measure in HMS
was developed in this thesis for the first time. The developed process allows the eval-
uation of executed and missing actions based on their impact on the achievable per-
formance. Additionally, evaluation criteria were defined for the example application.
According to the developed process, measured interaction sequences executed by human
operators are combined with interaction sequences generated by the developed model
and evaluated using the defined criteria. In the next step of the developed process,
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the evaluations of sequences are compared to transfer the result measure of combined
sequences into a process measure for the measured interaction sequences.
Finally, the novel model-based process-oriented performance measure was validated
in a study as part of this thesis. The sensibility of the developed measure regarding
the difficulty of the task is proven in this study. This demonstrates that the developed
measure can at least be used as any result-oriented measure. However, the main accom-
plishment of the study is to demonstrate the advantages the developed process-oriented
performance measure offers compared to conventional performance measures. These are
the ability to look into the details by analyzing specific situations and to identify the
impact of specific kinds of actions and types of errors.
This further information gathered by the developed performance measure can be useful
in discussions with the human operators. Possible explanations for their deviation from
the model are erroneous actions or differences between the human operators’ objectives
and those implemented in the model. Whatever reason is true, a discussion can give
valuable feedback for further improvements of the system. Also the aggregation of
the impact of different kind of actions and types of errors on the reached performance
gives useful hints for the development of further assistance. The developed performance
measure allows the possible impact of assistance to be assessed before this assistance is
implemented or developed.
The developed approach of model-based process-oriented performance measurement
also has some drawbacks. Some are inevitably connected with the choose approach
and are likely to appear if the developed measure is transferred to other applications.
Other drawbacks result from the implementation and will probably not affect other
kinds of implementation. A principle drawback of this approach is that it is model-
based and thus limited by the capability of the model. The model is designed for a
specific task and is only able to handle this task. If the developed approach to measure
performance is transferred to another task, the task environment as well as the expected
operators’ behavior must be modeled. The more complex the task, the more extensive
the development of this model will be. However, an approach task was used as example
application in this thesis. As this is one of the more complicate tasks in ATC, the
developed approach should be applicable to other ATC tasks without extensive effort.
The implementation of the performance measure with CPN Tools has the drawback
that the calculation of interaction sequence takes a lot of time. This is not only a result
of the complexity of the task but also a result of the limitations of the applied software.
However, fast calculations were not required for the validation of the developed method
in this thesis but might be required if this approach is transferred to other applications.
Also the dependency on CPNs can be considered as a drawback. However, even if this
approach was developed based on a CPN model, other modeling approaches can be used
as well. Every model generating goal-oriented interaction sequences is applicable in the
concept of process-oriented performance measure as developed in this thesis.
In summary, the model-based process-oriented human operator performance measure
developed during this thesis extends the possibility of existing result oriented measures in
HMS and gives valuable information useful for the development and further improvement
of assistance.
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7.2. Future Work
This thesis initiated the development of process-oriented performance measure in HMS.
The validation of the model-based process-oriented human operator performance mea-
sure developed in this thesis showed that this measure is ready to use. The concept of
process-oriented performance measure as well as the implementation can be extended
and improved in differed ways. In the following, directions for possible future research
are depicted briefly.
• As part of this thesis, mental prediction uncertainty was integrated into the human
operator model. The application of this uncertainty to explain decreases of the
reachable performance and to separate performance reductions due to uncertainty
and performance reductions caused by an improper set of rules applied by the
human operator was demonstrated. However, mental prediction uncertainty was
not considered during the analysis of the conducted study. To be able to apply the
uncertain human operator model for the evaluation of a study, it is first necessary
to quantify the individual uncertainty parameter of a participant. This uncertainty
may not only differ between participants but may also change due to learning dur-
ing an interaction. Thus, a constant uncertainty parameter can only be assumed
for experienced participants. Consequently, it is a task for the future to conduct
a study with experienced and well-trained participants, to determine the specific
uncertainty parameters, and to evaluate the potential of integrating uncertainty
for the insights generated by the developed process-oriented performance measure.
• During the result evaluation of combined interaction sequences, possible candidates
for erroneous actions are identified out of the given and missing actions. This iden-
tification is based on a pre-defined and fixed assignment of actions to objectives,
which they can possibly affect. An improvement would be to identify erroneous
actions based on their real impact on an objective. This would require to simulate
given and missing actions and to evaluate their consequences. For example, an
action given by the operator but not planned by the model is detected. Up to
now, this action is detected as erroneous action if it fulfills the predefined condi-
tions and a performance reduction is detected. Instead, the real impact could be
calculated by adding the additionally given action to the already measured actions
and simulating this extended sequence. This would allow the exact impact of this
additionally given action on the objectives to be determined. The procedure would
be similar in case of missing action. The measured sequence would be extended
by an empty interval in this case. The integration of this procedure would be an
improvement of the developed method as it would allow determining the impact
of actions even in complicate settings in which a pre-defined assignment as applied
in this thesis is not possible.
• The developed measure can also be improved by implementing an extended error
classification. Instead of only differentiating between omissions and commissions,
an extended error classification could split omissions into early, late, and incorrect
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actions. The process for this extended classification is detailed in section 5.2.5. The
differentiation between actions executed at the wrong time, and incorrect action
gives additional information valuable for the improvement of the analyzed HMS.
In the case of too late or too early actions, the operator selects the correct actions
and only needs help for its execution. In case of incorrect actions, computer-based
assistance for the selection of actions would be beneficial.
• The implemented error identification is based on the detection of performance
reductions. This requires the interaction sequences generated by the integrated
human operator model to represent the maximum reachable performance. How-
ever, if the model would include prediction uncertainty as developed in chapter 4,
the interaction sequences would no represent the best reachable performance. Con-
sequently, actions of the human operator can not only lead to a performance re-
duction but also to a performance increase. Consequently, not only errors (per-
formance reduction) but also actions resulting into an outstanding performance
(performance increase) could occur. Besides the existing classification of errors,
this would require to implement a classification of outstanding performance. While
using the optimal performance as criterion indicates which improvements are pos-
sible compared to a fully automated system, using a more realistic prediction of
human behavior and consequently a not optimal performance as criterion would
indicate which improvements are possible with human operators as part of the
system.
• As part of this thesis, the developed performance measure was validated with an ex-
ample application and the feasibility of the developed concept for process-oriented
performance measurement in HMS was demonstrated. Consequently, a transfer of
this measure to a high-fidelity simulation is possible as the next step. Transferring
the approach to a new task requires also adapting the human operator model to this
task. However, instead of a CPN-based human operator model existing planning
systems can be used for the generation of goal-directed interaction sequences. For
example, an AMAN could be used to generate goal-directed interaction sequences
in an air traffic control approach task, or an Surface Manager / Surface man-
agement system (SMAN) could be used in a ground control task. However, it is
important to consider if these systems generate interaction sequences representing
an optimal solutions from a technical perspective or representing a feasibility solu-
tion considering the cognitive limitations of the human operator. In the first case,
the necessary modifications to the approach as developed in this thesis are limited
to the replacement of the model. In the second case, human operators’ action can
cause increases of the performance. Consequently, an additional classification of
outstanding performance as discussed above is necessary.
• A possible extension of the developed performance measure is to replace to result
evaluation criteria by a measure of the proximity to critical situations. The prox-
imity to critical states could in particular be beneficial as a measure for a safety
objective as considering only the actually occurred critical situation is of limited
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value due to the rareness of critical situations. In this thesis, the criteria based
on the duration of conflicts were only meaningful as a higher frequency of critical
situations was expected due to the student sample. As the approach can be ap-
plied to task with continuous and discrete characteristics, the distance to critical
situation can either be a continuous distance or a discrete distance. An example
for a continuous distance is the time to be elapsed before a critical situation is
reached [HOS09]. An example for a discrete weighted distance is the sequence
of operators leading to a critical situation [EGVS10]. As critical situation can
arise by combination of both continuous and discrete changes, a combined hybrid
distance measure would be required.
The developed model-based process-oriented human operator cognitive performance
measure gives additionally indicators valuable for improvements of the analyzed HMS.
Its main advantage is its ability to evaluate single actions executed or omitted by the
human operator. Therefore, the measure is able to identify situations in which errors
are conducted and the actions causing problems are executed. Consequently, an analysis
or discussion of an interaction can concentrate on situation in which the problems were
caused instead on focusing on situations in which the problems became obvious. By
accumulating the consequences of different kind of actions and types of errors, the de-
veloped human operator performance measure allows estimating the effect of assistance
systems even before they are developed.
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A. G*Power calculations
Figure A.1.: Calculation of required participants for factor Difficulty with G*Power
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Figure A.2.: Calculation of required participants for factor Repetition with G*Power
